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Almost as soon as the loss of the nuclear submarine USS
Thresher, with a crew of 129 men, had been confirmed, the author
began investigating the possibility of preparing an extensive
study of the public relations aspects of this disaster, a study
of public relations matters associated with a disastrous ex-
plosion aboard an aircraft carrier in the Boston Naval Shipyard
in 1950, prepared by Lieutenant E.L. Castillo, United states
Navy, has proven to be of great value in the curriculum of the
Navy's journalist school, and suggested the study of the loss of
THRESHER. With assurances of cooperation from IMavy public in-
formation officials in Washington and Boston, the study began.
In the months that have followed, the author has received
the complete cooperation not only of iMavy officials, but also of
newsmen who covered various aspects of the story of the loss of
ThnhibHu^R . Their cooperation and canaor have been, in some in-
stances, surprising, and in all instances, gratifying. Without
their assistance this study could not have been complete. It
could not have been accomplished at all if the author had not
been stuaying at Boston University during this period, under a
program administered by the haval Postgraduate School, wonterrey,
California
.
As the story of the loss, search for and investigation of
the submarine has developed, the author, on several occasions,
was given the opportunity of working with the press in his ca-
ii

pacity as a Navy public information officer. The opportunity to
deal with newsmen and Navy officials during a period of stress
has provided material that could never have been obtained in in-
terviews conducted subsequently . For providing these opportu-
nities, and for their helpful commentary on the entire sequence
of events, the author is especially indebted to Commander ueorge
Hall, United States Navy, public information officer for the
First Naval District, and Commander James Gormsen, United States
Navy, the specially-appointed public information officer for the
court of inquiry which investigated the loss of the submarine
„
The cooperation of these individuals is gratefully
acknowledged, although the responsibility for the contents of
this study rests entirely with the author,, it should be spe-
cifically noted that this study does not necessarily consti-





Department of the i\lavy
The requirements of maintaining a large seagoing force sup-
ported by an equally extensive land organization have led the wavy
to adopt a unique administrative organization. The following
description of the organization, as it existed in April, 19o3,
is designed to assist the reader who is unfamiliar with the Navy.
The Department of the wavy is divided into three principal
parts:
(1) The Operating Forces, which include most of the forces
afloat along with a few specified land activities, whose identi-
fication is not essential to this study.
(2) The wavy Department, or central executive agency, lo-
cated at the seat of government.
(3) The Shore Establishment, consisting of all remaining
activities
.
The responsibility for the direction of the Department of
the Wavy rests with the Secretary of the iNiavy, who is appointed
by the President of the United States, and reports to him
through the Secretary of Defense.
The Chief of waval Operations (CWO) is the senior military
officer of the Department of the Wavy.
Although the Secretary of the Wavy retains policy control
over the Wavy, he has delegated some of his authority; for
iv

instance, the Chief of IMaval Operations is responsible for the
military direction of the IMavy. The Secretary retains direction
of "business" activities, and, pertinent to this study, of public
relations, legislative affairs and morale and welfare of per-
sonnel of the department.
For administration, the operating forces are divided into
fleets according to area of operation (e.g. Atlantic and Pacific),
and, within the fleets, into smaller forces according to ship
type and function (e.g. Destroyer and Cruiser Force, Submarine
Force or Amphibious Force.)
The Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet
(CliM CLAIM TFLT) is in command of all operating forces mentioned
in this study. He is a full admiral, with headquarters in
iMorfolk, Virginia. Subordinate commanders include: Commander,
Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet (CQMSUBLANT)
,
a vice admiral, with headquarters in IMorfolk, Virginia; Com-
mander, Destroyer and Cruiser Force, United States Atlantic
Fleet (COMCRUDJESLANT) , a rear admiral, with headquarters in
Newport, Rhode Island; and Commander, Amphibious Force, United
States Atlantic Fleet (COkPHlBLivisiT) , a vice admiral, with head-
quarters in Little Creek, Virginia.
For administration of the shore establishment, the con-
tinental United States is divided into ten geographical areas
called IMaval Districts. Each district is headed by a rear ad-
miral, whose title is Commandant. The Commandant exercises mili-
tary control over all shore activities in his district, though
normally he does not command fleet units. The New England States
all fall into the First Naval District. The Commandant of the
v

First Naval District (GQMONE) , has headquarters in Boston,
Massachusetts.
Public Information Organization
The Army, Navy and Air Force each conduct their own public
information program, receiving broad policy guidance from the
Department of Defense. All military information released at the
seat of government must be coordinated with the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
Within the Navy, the Secretary of the i\iavy maintains im-
mediate supervision of those activities "which involve vital
relationships with the public.
"
The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for assuring
the effective implementation of the public information policies
of the Secretary of the Navy within all units of the operating
forces and certain other units under his coriimand.
The Chief of Information (CH1NFO)
,
however, is the direct
representative of the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations
in all matters of public information. The Chief of Information
is a rear admiral who directs the operations of the Office of
Information, which consists of about 100 persons located in the
Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. Not only is the Chief of
Information an advisor on public information policies and pro-
grams, but, through his office, information and regulations on
such matters is disseminated throughout the Navy. Members of his
1Navy Public Information Manual, NaYEjCOS P-1305 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955i, p. 7.
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staff also collect information of national importance originating
within fleet commands and coordinate its release by the Department
of Defense.
The Office of Information is an integral part of the exe-
cutive offices of the Secretary of the Wavy. The Chief of i^aval
Operations does not have a separate public information staff, but
utilizes the Office of Information to conduct such programs as
he considers appropriate for the fleets. The Chief of Naval
Operations does have an Assistant for Information, but his duties
are primarily concerned with information matters which personally
affect the Chief of Naval Operations.
Fleet Commanders are the direct representatives of the
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations for
public information within their commands. Regulations provide
that
They will prepare and disseminate to all units under their
command such supplementary instructions as are necessary
-,
to implement Navy Department public information policies.
Naval District Commandants are the direct representatives
of the Navy Department, and are assigned public information
responsibilities similar to those for Fleet Commariders. General
Order 19, a basic Navy regulation concerning the relationships
among various commanders, provides that iMaval District Comman-
dants are responsible for the coordination of all Navy public
2






General Order 19, though officially a separate document,
is appended to Navy Regulations. 1948 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1948 K
vii

Subordinate fleet commanders and commanding officers of
ships and stations are also responsible for implementing wavy
Department public information policies.
To assist commanders in the fulfillment of these respon-
sibilities, public information personnel are assigned to duty on
their staffs—the number of personnel varying with the size of
the command. The public information staff of the Commander in
Chief of the Atlantic Fleet consists of a captain, a commander,
two lieutenants and enlisted jcurnalists and photographers. The
First iNiaval District public information staff is somewhat smaller,
with a commander, a lieutenant and enlisted and civilian person-
nel. Subordinate fleet commands have only one public information
officer, usually a lieutenant commander, assisted by enlisted
personnel. At all but uhe largest stations, public information
duties are carried out by an officer whose primary responsibility
is another field. At the Portsmouth l^aval Shipyard, the only
station involved in this study, the public information officer
was a Wave lieutenant (junior grade), whose primary auty was as
a communications officer.
Courts of inquiry are formal investigative bodies,
authorized by federal statute and convened to collect and pre-
serve information pertaining to a particular matter or event.
They are intended to be temporary bodies, and normally their
administrative staff is limited to legal experts and stenographic
personnel.
The court of inquiry investigating the loss of THK^bhu^t
took the unique step of appointing a special public information
officer to remain with it during its existence. The officer
viii

assigned was a Commander , whose regular duties were as Public
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PLATE 1.--USS THRESMrt (SS0O593 ) , built at
the Portsmouth (hew Hampshire) waval Ship-
yard; launched July 9, I960. Length, 273
feet; beam, 31 feet; submerged displacement,
4,311 tons; speed, over 20 knots; armament,
four, semi-automatic loading torpedo tubes;
complement, eight officers and seventy-five
enlisted men.
Lost at sea 200 miles east of Cape Cod, Ap-
ril 10, 1963, while conducting submergence
tests.
This photograph was distributed bv the De-
partment of Defense in Washington, D.C # on




PLATJi 2.-Bow view of Ub& THftJibHriil.
also distributed to newsmen on the
night of April 10, 1963
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PUBLIC RELATIONS AND DISASTERS
At the end of each calendar year, the newspaper editors
of the United States vote to select the "ten biggest news stor-
ies of the year." The preponderance of stories are distinguished
by one of two characteristics: (l) they, in some way, involve
the government, and/or (2) they were catapulted to prominence
by a single, unpredictable event.
One class of story most often a contender for the "ten
biggest" list is the crisis or disaster,, Any disaster story,
even those which are not destined to be among the biggest stor-
ies of the year, attracts special attention.
Since dealing with representatives of the mass media of
communications is part of the public relations function, the
characteristic reaction of the press to a disaster should be of
special consequence to the public relations official. This is
particularly true since the "big story" so often has implications
which influence the public's confidence in the organization in-
volved in the disaster.
The study which follows is an account of the public re-
lations implications of one of the "big stories" of 1963, the
loss of the nuclear powered submarine USS THRESHER. (Sae Table
1 for the other "big stories" of 1963 J

kTABLE 1. =- The ten n\ sst news stories
of 1963" as selected by the editors of the






Coup in Viet Nam
Submarine THRESHER lost
Pope dies, successor named
Nuclear test treaty





2 Civil rights crisis
3 Pope dies, successor named
4 Cooper space flight
5 Nuclear test treaty
6 Coup in Viet Nam
7 Submarine THRESHER lost
8 Britain's Profumo scandal
9 Supreme court prayer ruling
10 Fischer quintuplets
While the subject of this study is THRESHER, the purpose of
the study is to document and analyze a typical disaster story in
an attempt to determine the essential characteristics of this sort
of event
„
The loss of THRESHER was a major event, and the story, even
at the end of almost a year, is not finished. However, the major
distinguishing characteristic of a disaster story is the sudden
onset and tremendous initial interest that it generates.
During this initial period, the public relations official
faces three related yet different types of problems:
(1) There is a sudden, large-scale demand for information
which generally exceeds the public relations official's ability
to accommodate within the framework of the normal organization.

5(2) The unique nature of the public response to a disaster
is such that the initial intense interest quickly diminishes . The
public relations official then finds it difficult to attract at-
tention to information which he considers significant.
(3) Superimposed on these demands, unique to the disaster,
are the continuing problems of maintaining satisfactory working
relationships with newsmen. Certain problems, which exist at all
times, become proportionally more pressing during a disaster sit-
uation simply because a greater amount of information is being
reported.
It is the aim of this study to report the interplay of all
the elements that transpired as a result of the loss of THttiL&HEtt
,
with emphasis on the first days and particularly the first hours.
All the elements are important, but those unique to the disaster
are given special attention.
The study includes a detailed account of the events at
Portsmouth, N,H. and Naval headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
which reveals the great effort necessary to accommodate the public
demand for information.
The manifest and latent content of selected newspapers is
studied to reveal the nature of information reported, and the
rapid decline of general interest in the story.
Also included are some examples of error and distortion
in reporting the events, which although not unique to the disas-
ter situation, are unquestionably a part of the total considerat-
ion of this event.
The performance of both Na /y public information officials
and civilian newsmen, though generally commendable, was not flaw-

6less. Each at times made mistakes in reporting events, although
it is fair to say that these mistakes were unintentional. This
study is not an attempt to assess the performances of any indi-
vidual or group. It is, instead, an attempt to report the phe-
nomena which occurred. Those tentative conclusions to which
the study leads, are expressed in general terms. Any value they
have is in terms of better understanding the disaster situation,
not in evaluating the specific events incident to the loss of
THRESHER
.
Fortunately, disasters of the magnitude of the loss of
THRESHER are rare. Unfortunately, disasters are not. One need
not be a fatalist to predict that other disasters will occur.
Inevitably, public relations officials will be called upon to
deal with newsmen in the wake of such tragic events.
And yet, one of the most persistent commentaries on public
relations is that its practitioners deal only with subjects favor-
able to the organizations they represent. It is compatible with
common sense to believe that an individual, or an organization,
would prefer to speak of that which is favorable; and observation
proves this to be the case. The output of any public relations
"shop" consists essentially of salutary information. According
to a popular slogan, public relations is "good performance, pub-
licly appreciated." The phrase implies the organization's ac-
ceptance of the responsibility to perform well. Some critics
suggest that the slogan is only a thinly veiled admission that
the public relations man, like the sun dial, records only the
sunny hours
.
J.A.R. Pimlott, in Public Relations and American Democracy ,

observed:
The commonest form of distortion is the suppression of in-
formation unfavorable to the source . Few would say that
this is never permissible. That some latitude must be al-
lowed is clear; nobody is going to hire public relations
counsel to blacken his reputation, any more than he would
hire a lawyer to secure his own conviction. Even in the
federal government, where the checks on abuse are probably
stronger than anywhere else, every delinquency will not be
published as well as every achievement.
His reference to the government is especially significant,
since the government public relations official is a servant of
the people with basic obligations and responsibilities which
go beyond those of his colleague in private life.
Public relations is generally conceded to be a legitimate
function of government. It tends to fulfill an essential need
in a democracy-- informing the people of the activities of their
government. In an era of complex government, the citizen sel-
dom has first hand contact with his government, and must learn
of its activities through the mass media of communication. The
government public relations official serves an an intermediary
between the bureaucracy and the press. The public relations
function also serves as an aid to administration, explaining
and interpreting the operations of the government to the citi-
zen.
Unless the public relations official is dedicated to the
idea that the people have a right to know everything, good and
bad, about their government, he impedes the process which makes
democracy viable. It is relatively easy to measure up to the
Lj.A.R. Pimlott, Public Relations and American Democracy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 195D, P» 214.

standards of faithful public service when the situation is fa-
vorable and there is only good news to report . It is the diffi-
cult situation which is the true gauge of the government official's
acceptance of duty.
The public relations official facing a difficult news sit-
uation must rely on his own experience, good judgment, integ-
rity and honesty in meeting the problems presented; the public
relations literature offers him almost no guidance. The text-
book treatment of public relations deals almost exclusively with
those situations which can be planned, and are subject to tech-
niques such as proper timing, or form of release. The Mbadn news
situations like scandal or disaster offer no opportunity for
such a methodical approach. They require instantaneous reaction.
In what is perhaps the standard textbook on public re-
lations, Cutlip and Center's Effective Public Relations , only two
and one half pages are devoted to the subject of disasters.
1
The major part of that brief discussion is devoted to the ac-
tivities of a private corporation in winning public approval of
personnel policies formulated after the occurrence of an explo-
sion. There are probably several reasons for the dearth of in-
formation on the public relations implications of disasters.
They occur relatively infrequently, and therefore are not a
general problem for the public relations practitioner. Most often,
disasters are caused by natural forces, and elicit public sym-
pathy in response to an improvident circumstance. Another, and
perhaps most significant, restraint is the natural reluctance
IScott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public
Relations (?nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N,J,: Prentice-Hall,
1958), pp. 121-23.

9to discuss painful circumstances.
Paradoxically, nothing attracts more public attention than
stories of crime, scandal or disaster. One needs only to examine
the pages of most newspapers to realize that these are the top-
ics which receive special attention,,
What should be especially significant to the public re-
lations official is the fact that events, at least certain events,
stimulate the formulation of public opinion . In 1944, Hadley Can-
tril and a group of associates formulated fifteen "laws" of public
opinion. These laws indicated that events and particularly cru-
cial events were the primary stimuli of public opinion,, The
laws include:
1. Opinior. is highly sensitive to important events.
5. By and large, public ooini on does not anticipate emer-
gencies, it only reacts to them.
6. Psychologically, opinion is basically determined by self-
interest. Events, words, or any other stimuli effect opin-
ion only in so far as their relationship to self interest
is apparent.
In 1948, Leonard Doob postulated another set of tentative
principles of public opinion, and the first is:
Public opinion remains latent until an issue arises for the
group; an issue arises when there is conflict, anxiety or
frustration.
^
By either Cantril's or Doob's standards, a disaster would
appear to be a prime motivater in the formation of public opin-
ion if it involved self interest, or gave rise to conflict,
lHadley Cantril, Gauging Public Upinion (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1947), pp. 220-230.
2Leonard Doob, "The Behavior of Public Opinion," in The
P rocess and Effects of kass Communication , ed. Wilbur Schramm




anxiety or frustration. Any activity of a government is the pro-
per concern of its citizens; the citizens' self interest is con-
stantly at stake. It is clear that every action of the government
does not attract the interest of the public. But when an exciting
event, involving government and arousing conflict or anxiety oc-
curs, public interest is at the highest peak.

CHAPTER I
THE LOSS OF USS THRESHER
Sequence of Events
Such a circumstance occurred when the nuclear powered sub-
marine USS THRESHER was lost with 129 men, during diving tests
in the Atlantic on April 10, 1963.
The submarine had been specially designed to withstand
pressures which would enable it to operate at depths below those
of normal submarines. When it had been commissioned three years
before, the Navy had characterized it as the world's "fastest
and deepest diving submarine."
On April 10, the submarine was conducting the last of a
series of tests which would prove her fit to rejoin the fleet
after nine months in the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard for overhaul.
She was to dive to her maximum operating depth, which the Navy
would only identify as being "below 400 feet" for security rea-
sons. Since this was a test dive, her normal crew was augmented
by 21 Navy and civilian personnel from the shipyard and repre-
sentatives of civilian fjrms whose equipment was installed in
the submarine.
At 8:00 a.m., the submarine submerged 22$ miles east of
-"-a jomplete fact sheet, including this statement, is in-




Cape uod. Standing by was an escort ship, the submarine res-
cue vessel USS SKYLARK. Her mission was to accompany THRESHER,
provide routine services, and serve as a communications link with
the submarine via underwater telephone.
Once underwater, the s ubmarine completed preliminary tests
and then started down, step by step, to her maximum operating
depth. During the descent, she periodically reported her con-
dition to SKYLARK. At 400 feet, a routine check for leaks was
made. At 9:00 a.m., THRESHER was nearing her "test depth." At
9:13 a.m., the submarine transmitted, "Experiencing minor dif-
ficulties, have positive up angle, attempting to blow ["surface].
Will keep you informed." The message was spoken without urgency.
At 9:17 a.m., another message was transmitted, but the
only words that could be understood by men aboard SKYLARK were
"...test depth." The rest of the message was garbled, but this
circumstance is not uncommon in underwater communications.
THRESHER was never heard from again. At 8:00 p.m that
night, the Navy's top uniformed official, Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Admiral George W. Anderson, announced that the next of
kin of the crewmen were being notified that the submarine vas
"overdue and presumed missing." An hour and a half later, he said
that the presence of an oil slick in the area indicated that the
sub was probably lost. The discovery of debris ruled out the
possibility that the submarine was merely experiencing commun-
ications difficulties and, though safe, was unable to report her
presence, '^he following morning, at 10:30 a.m., Admiral Anderson
announced that he had reluctantly come to the conclusion that the
submarine had indeed been lost.
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The nature of the disaster immediately made it of world-
wide interest. In the grim record books of disaster, it went
down as the first loss of a nuclear powered warship and the worst
single submarine disaster in history. Practically every daily
newspaper in the United States devoted from 60 to 70 per cent of
the front page of its first edition after the report of the loss
to the story. In an era when television had the obvious advan-
tage in reporting the news first, several newspapers put out ex-
tra editions.
Newsmen were aware from the first minute that the loss of
THRESHER was a big story. One of the first to learn of the
suspected loss of THRESHER was Elton C. Fay, the Associated Press
correspondent in the Pentagon. When he received a statement from
the Chief of Naval Operations, he didn't wait for any supple-
mentary details, but turned and hurried to a telephone. Recount-
ing the event later, he said:
I hadn't dictated more than a few words when I heard the
bells ringing on the teletype machine indicating that a bul-
letin was going out.l
As the wire services flashed the story across the country,
editors geared their papers to cover what was obviously a wbig
story." The Boston Globe , reflecting on their reaction to the
initial news, said:
At just such a time, a big-city newspaper city room
actually does take on some of the tension, electricity and
bustle that Hollywood and television depict as the routine
way of life for a newspaperman.
The situation is quickly assessed. Assignments are made.
And, within minutes, reporter and photographer teams are on




their ways to start recording all the details that must be
gotten back to t he city room where re-write men and copy
editors tie the loose ends together into the story-and-pic-
ture package that is unfolded in your newspaper.
1
The Role of Navy Public Information
Officers
Since the Navy was the sole source of much information about
the disaster, the way in which it assisted newsmen in telling
the story would have the gravest implications for future public
confidence in the Navy and the United States' defense program.
To Navy public information officials fell the job of in-
forming the public fully and honestly , while at the same time,
protecting the families of crewmen from added grief brought on
by the glare of publicity } protecting classified information
about the submarine's operating capabilities and insuring that
the court of inquiry, sure to be convened, could conduct its
investigation in an orderly manner.
The magnitude of the story meant that many public infor-
mation officers throughout the United States would be involved.
Obviously, Washington, D„C would be a primary point of inter-
est, since ivavy headquarters were located there. So would Ports-
mouth, N H
,
for the submarine had sailed from the Naval Shipyard
a fter nine months of overhaul there, and relatives of most of the
crewmen resided in the communities near the shipyard.
Since THRESHER was a unit of the Submarine Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, public information officers on the staffs of
the Commander in Chief, UoS. Atlantic Fleet and the Commander
1The Boston Globe
,
April 14, 1963, p. 42.
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Submarine force, both in Norfolk, Virgina would be involved.
Newsmen would also come to New London, Connecticut, the
traditional home of the submarine serve and regular home oort
of THRESHER; to Newport, Rhode Island, where many of the search
ships were based; to the First Naval District Headquarters in
Boston, Massachusetts; and even to San Diego, California, where
the bathyscaph which was to be used in search operations was
located.
Nevertheless, the public relations events surrounding the
loss of THRESHER were centered in two cities: Washington, D„C.
and Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Washington, D.C.
The first hint that THRESHER might be in trouble was re-
ceived in Washington at 3:35 p.m. on April 10. Admiral Robert
L. Dennison, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, called from
his headquarters in Norfolk to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
George W. Anderson, on a "hot line" telephone circuit that links
the offices of the two men. Admiral Anderson, at that mone nt , was
walking down a Pentagon corridor on his way to his office, having
concluded a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The phone
call was taken by Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Claude
V. Ricketts, who was advised that communications had been lost
between SKYLARK and THRESHER and the submarine might be in trouble.
Admiral Ricketts immediately sent his aide to intercept Admiral
Anderson and advise him of this.
The aide mat Admiral Anderson in a corridor adjacent to the
office of the Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth, at about 3^40 p.m.

16
Admiral Anderson immediately went into the Secretary T s office
and Mr. Korth then called President Kennedy's Naval aide, ad-
vising him of the situation so that he could brief the Presi-
dent. Mr. Korth then went to the office of Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, who was acting Secretary of
Defense.
Upon his return, Secretary Korth advised his information
assistant, Commander James E. Jenkins, who in turn called the
Navy's representative in the news service section of the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Com-
mander Edmund L. Castillo, advising him to "break out" background
information on USS THRESHER and her crew. A few minutes later,
Commander Castillo left a note in Commander Jenkin T s office which
said, " I have broken out the file - any reason to stay past
5:30?" As it turned out, he did not leave the Pentagon until
about 5l30 p.m. the following afternoon, after spending 33 con-
secutive hours on the job.
By this time, word was spreading rapidly to key Navy pub-
lic information personnel in the Pentagon. Admiral Anderson had
alerted his assistant for information, Captain Vincent C. Thomas,
Jr. and the Deputy Chief of Information, Captain James S e Dow-
dell. (The Chief of Information, Rear Admiral James S. McCain,
Jr., was representing the Navy at a meeting in New York and did
not return to Washington until after midnight.)
The Davy's Office of Information consists of several div-
isions, the Media Relations Division being the one which routine-
ly deals with newsmen. It consists of a news branch, an audio-
visual branch, a still photo branch and a magazine and book
branch and was staffed by fifteen officers and ten enlisted men.
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At 4*45 p.m., a time when the division staff was normally-
preparing to go home for the day, the officers in the section were
briefed by the Deputy Chief of Information and the division Director.
L'he officers were asked to start collecting all available inform-
ation on THRESHER and her crew. Personnel from each of the branches
started collecting material appropriate to the medium regularly
served.
The still photo branch located three views of the submarine
in their files in sufficient quantity to meet anticipated demands.
No photograph of SKYLARK was on hand, so a picture of a sister
ship was readied. The Naval Photographic Center, which is the prin-
cipal agency for maintaining photographic files, is located in
Washington, and a rush order for pictures of SKYLARK was placed
immediately.
There is no central file of photographs for the more than
one half million men serving in the Navy. However, a file of
information on each officer is maintained in Washington, and this
file includes an identification photograph. These identification
photographs were obtained from the files of officers who served
in THRESHER as soon as their names were known, and the Office
of Information photographer began to c opy them, using an instan-
taneous Polaroid process, which provides a 4 x 5 inch negative.
In the course of the evening, 350, 8 x 10 inch portraits of
the officers lost in THRESHER were printed and made available
to the press.
At the same time that one team was working to collect
-'-These are the photographs facing pp. 1 and 2.
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photographs, another was collecting information on THRESHER and
background information on previous submarine disasters.
THRESHER information was of two sorts: background infor-
mation on the submarine, and operational information related to
her last cruise, ^he background information was collected from
files in the Office of Information, such as a folder prepared when
the submarine was commissioned in 1961. uperatioral information
was collected by telephone and radio from commands on the east
coast, and from submarine experts in the office of the Chief
of Naval Operations. By 6:00 p.m., the first draft of the ac-
count of THRESHER'S last dive was assembled, and efforts were being
made to obtain a statement on radioactivity hazards.
This statement was obtained from Admiral Hyman G. Rickover,
the ^avy's foremost authority on nuclear reactors, and was ready
at 7:00 p.m. At this time, another team completed the history
of previous submarine disasters.
The original statement on the operational aspects of
THRESHER was constantly being changed as new information became
available, and the final draft was not completed until 7»20 p.m.
This draft, which contained pencilled additions of last minute
information was reproduced by thermofax process and 20 copies
were delivered for use when the first announcement was rrade.
Although the members of the Office of -Lnformation worked
in earnestness throughout the period from 4^30 p.m., until
iDOD niws release 511-63, 11 April 1963 « Included in
Appendix A.
Subsequently retyped and issued as DOD release 509-63,
11 April 1963 o Included in Appendix A.
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8:00 p.m., it is significant that almost every one of them later
said that he felt THRESHER would be reported safe at any moment.
Practically every Naval officer who has operated at sea with sub-
marines can recall an incident when communications with a submarine
were lost and search operations instituted, only to discover later
that the submarine had surfaced and was temporarily unable to re-
port her position.
The Chief of Naval Operations
As reported, the Chief of Naval Operations learned at
3:40 p.m. that THRESHER might be in difficulty, and immediate-
ly went to the Secretary of the ^avy. Quite obviously, the men
first discussed search and rescue operations, but. they also began
to make public information contingency plans.
Admiral Anderson's assistant for information later said:
The admiral was aware from the very first that this would be
a public information matter of major magnitude.
He recognized that it was the Navy's responsibility to get
the news out and that he was the one who should do it. He
proposed his plan to Mr. Korth, who approved it.
A primary concern at that time was the decision as to when in-
formation should be released. Premature announcement could
result in needless anguish for relatives if the sub were safe.
On the other hand, any significant delay would certainly elic-
it criticism if the submarine were proven lost. It was therefore
determined that if no report of the submarine had been received
by 7*»30 p.m., when the sun would set at the site where THRESHER
had last dived and search operations would be hampered, the next




of kin would be notified that the ship was missing. Public
announcement would be made thirty minutes later.
Subsequently, Admiral Anderson outlined the information
which he felt should be in the initial release - only the fact
that next of kin were being notified that the submarine was
overdue, along with all factual information known about the
submarine's movements.
Admiral Anderson then returned to his office and prepared
in his own handwriting a list of questions that he felt was
pertinent and that he should be prepared to answer.
At 6:00 p.m., he went to the Pentagon press room where
he met with Elton Fay, of the Associated Press and Charles
Corddry, of the United Press International, who had been re-
called to the Pentagon by Department of Defense officials for
"an important announcement."
After the two wire service reporters had read only a line
or two of his statement, they asked Admiral Anderson to wait
while they filed bulletins. He agreed, and after they had
called in the first sentences of their stories, he spoke brief-
ly with them.
None of the television networks and only a few members
of the press had arrived at the Pentagon in time to hear the
first announcement, so Admiral Anderson agreed to repeat the
statement at 9»30 p.m. A tape recording of his statement had
been made on portable equipment by an officer from the Office
of Information, but the admiral re-recorded the statement on
professional equipment in the Department of Defense studio,




At 900 p.m., as he had promised, he again met with the
press. There was a large contingent of newsmen at this session,
including all but one major television network. At this brief-
ing the admiral said it "appeared" that the submarine was lost,
although the l\iavy still had "fervent hope" that communication
difficulties were responsible for the delay in reporting. The
much less optimistic evaluation was prompted by reports of an
oil slick which had been received since the first briefing.
Admiral Anderson answered all requests for factual in-
formation, but refused to speculate on the possible causes
of the loss, saying:
We have appointed a court of inquiry headed by one of our
senior admirals, Vice Admiral Austin, the President of the
Naval War College, assisted by other experienced submarine
officers, to conduct an inquiry. I would not presume to
judge what might have happened in this case.
As he left the press room at the end of the briefing,
the admiral was met by another television network crew which
was just arriving, and at their request, returned to conduct
a brief interview for them.
On the following morning (Thursday, April 11) there was
still no word from THRESHER, now long overdue, and bits of
debris which might have been associated with the submarine
had been recovered. At a 10:30 a.m. press conference, Admiral
Anderson told the press that he "reluctantly" had reached the
conclusion that THRESHER was lost. As Admiral Anderson had
walked from his office to the briefing theater, he had studied
iTranscript of a press briefing by Admiral George W.
Anderson. The Pentagon, April 11, 1963.
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a list of "important points" which had been prepared by infor-
mation officers during the night. According to his assistant
for information, he covered each of these points during the
long, and remarkably frank session with newsmen.
A study of newspaper content (which constitutes a sub-
sequent chapter of this study) reveals that a significant pro-
portion of all stories carried on the loss of THRESHER on the
first day, were devoted to the interviews which Admiral Anderson
held. His words were quoted directly in news stories and ver-
batim transcripts of the press conference were printed. Film
clips of the interviews were carried on television network news
programs
.
As a consequence of this, the first report of the loss of
THRESHER and her crew was reported in a basically sympathetic
manner. Stories were written in the context of the admiral's
statements, and he had expressed the Navy's deep feeling of
loss, its resolution to determine and rectify the cause, as-
surance that every known precaution had been taken to insure
the safety of submarine and crew, and determination to continue
every effort to enhance America's defense posture. The careful
preparation by Admiral Anderson and his information and tech-
nical assistants had resulted in his touching on practically
all of the matters that were subsequently to prove to be the
important "issues" surrounding the loss.
The Navy's Deputy Chief of Information, who was the senior
Navy information officer in Washington during the first eight
hours, and who was closely associated with information aspects
of the THRESHER case subsequently, said:
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The success of the operation can be directly attributed
to the full support given to the office by the Chief of
Naval Operations. By his personal presence, we were able
to establish, from the very beginning, the tone that was
necessary for successful handling of news aspects.
Not only was he willing to make the initial announcement
in person, but he gave us his personal assistance in get-
ting facts from other commands. He made it known by phone
calls to key operational persons that he wanted full public
information cooperation
.
Sometimes in the past, it has been difficult to get infor-
mation which can be made available to the press in a fast-
breaking story. In this case, press requirements were almost
as stringent as operational requirements .-*-
Other Public Information Activities
in Washington
The first press inquiries related to the loss of THRESHER
were actually received by the Navy a few minutes before Admiral
Anderson's initial announcement. A wire service had carried a
story saying that Navy ships were leaving from an east coast port
to search for a submarine reported to be in trouble. A tele-
phone call seeking comment on this report was received at the
Pentagon at about 7*50 p.m.
As soon as the announcement was made and carried on the
wire service teletypes, a deluge of calls that was to last through-
out the night began. Both Navy and Department of Defense tele-
phone lines were jammed with requests —primarily from newsmen,
but also from private citizens. Requests came from all over the
United States and from many foreign countries. The most dis-
tant call was from Australia.
Requests from newsmen during that period fell into four





(1) Requests for confirmation of the story, or for con-
firmation of some detail ( such as the spelling of a name).
(2) requests from radio stations for telephone inter-
views with Navy Department spokesmen discussing the general
situation.
(3) Requests for transportation to the scene of search
operations.
(4) Requests from newsmen seeking to learn if any of
the men lost were from their circulation area.
As might be expected, most of the private citizens who
called sought to learn if their relatives were aboard the sub-
marine. In one instance, a public information officer had to
confirm that the person inquired about had been aboard THRESHER
(The Navy notified only the primary next of kin-- those listed
by the servicemen to be notified in case of emergency.)
Other persons called with suggestions for salvaging the
submarine
.
So rapid was the pace, that Navy information officers
working in the Navy office and the Department of Defense office
(the two are separated by two floors) were hard pressed to
keep one another informed of what they were doing. As new
information was released in the Department of Defense it
was passed by telephone to the officers working in the Navy
office. One officer has estimated that, at one time, there
was a two-hour lag in passing information from one office to
the other.
In addition to responding to newsmen's inquiries, the

25
Washington staff was communicating the text of new statements
and related material to information officers in Portsmouth,
Boston, Norfolk and New London.
Though the volume of phone calls remained steady, it
slacked off enough by 3 '00 a.m. so that some of the officers
could return to their homes.
During most of the night, five of the Navy's top infor-
mation officers were on duty in the Navy news section of the
Department of Defense. The Chief of Information, Rear Admiral
McCain had arrived in Washington shortly after midnight, and
had gone to the Pentagon. Since he had served in submarines he
was able to brief newsmen on technical matters.
Earlier in the evening, after a telephone conference with
the public information officer on the staff of the Commander
in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Captain Bernard Solomon, it
had been decided that newsmen desiring to visit the search
area would be transported to the scene in a destroyer based
in Newport. However, reports received from the search area
during the night indicated that weather was already foul and
worsening and the ships were encountering heavy seas. It was
also learned that the destroyer marked to carry newsmen might
be needed to transport scientific equipment to the search area,
and that its departure time was uncertain.
It was decided that plans for shipboard transportation
should be cancelled and a group of newsmen, representing the
various media and selected by lot, would be flown over the
area the next day.
By then, many newsmen anxious to get to the search area
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had already gone to Newport and New London , which they con-
sidered to be the logical departure point for search ships.
During the night, about thirty newsmen went to each of the
cities. On the next day, when informed of plans to fly news-
men over the search area , some of the reporters returned to their
offices. Most remained in the port cities to see what would
develop. Later that afternoon, a destroyer did depart from
Newport. Although newsmen were told that accomodations would
be spartan, the seas rough, and the ship's schedule uncertain,
some desired to accompany the ship After a hasty conference
with information officials in Norfolk, newsmen were permitted
to board the ship. Only fifteen chose to accompany the ship,
but those reporters were rewarded by the opportunity to write
a series of dramatic stories.
Several of the newspapers which had recalled their rep-
resentatives when the original plans for sea transportation
had been cancelled were incensed at missing the opportunity
to have a reporter on the scene.
As the search ship was departing from Newport, two air-
planes with press representatives aboard were flying over the
search scene. While bad weather obscured most of the opera-
tions, the newsmen were able to listen to radio reports of the
search ships. Among the transmissions they heard was the re-
port of the submarine SKA OWL saying that she had picked up
underwater transmissions which might have come from THRESHER.
The same report went to Navy headquarters, where it was
quickly determined that the transmissions were being made by
equipment which had never been installed in THRESHER. The
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sounds apparently had come from another search ship.
A reporter in one of the press planes reported the in-
cident and for a fleeting moment public hopes were raised that
THRESHER might be in a state of equilibrium below the surface.
Even after the Navy had discounted the possibility that
the sounds might have originated from THRESHER, a television
network reported reception of the signals, without the quali-
fying information. After urgent calls from Navy officials,
who felt the report would give an unjustifiable sense of hope
to families of THRESHER crewmen, the network interrupted its
program to clarify the statement.
On April 11, Navy press officials in Washington were kept
busy answering inquiries, issuing statements on the progress
of the search, the plans of Navy officials and other new de-
velopments. Two major television networks began preparing re-
ports on the loss, and the television branch of the Office of
Information provided film footage and assisted in arrangements
for the programs. (The National Broadcasting Company issued a
news release explaining how it prepared an hour-long report
within a period of six and one-half hours. This revealing
account is included as Appendix B„ )
Press briefings on all new developments related to
THRESHER were instituted on April 11, and continued on a daily
basis so long as new information was being reported.
At one of the earliest briefings, the Navy was obliged
to explain an apparent error made by the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations during a briefing. Admiral Anderson had been asked:
QUESTION: Did the Skylark at any time at 9»17 yesterday
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morning detect any unusual noises on its hydrographic phones
or any other disturbances that might indicate that there was
an accident of some kind?
ADMIRAL ANDERSON: None whatsoever has been reported and we
have endeavored to check to see whether in retrospect any-
thing of this sort occurred; and the answer is no.
Subsequently, during testimony at the court of inquiry,
the log of communications between SKYLARK and THRESHER was
read into the record. It included the following previous trans-
mission which had not been announced:
Experiencing minor difficulty. Have positive up angle. 2Am attempting to blow (surface) . Will keep you informed.
An officer from the ship testified that at 9:18, he heard a
sound over the hydrophones. He saido
A sound registered with which I am familiar. It was the
sound of a ship breaking up, a compartment collapsing,
or something of that nature . It had a muted dull sound,
which the skipper and I agreed were cracking-up noises..
I have heard those noises before, during World War II.**
Reporters in Washington have told the author that when this
testimony was reported, they felt that the Navy had lied to
them.
Rear Admiral McCain, the Chief of Information, discussed
the matter with newsmen at the next daily briefing. One news-
paper commented:
He (the Chief of Information) also made it clear that the
extended public observations of Adm. George W. Anderson,
Chief of Naval Operations, on Wednesday and Thursday, and
the further data provided by McCain's office through Sat-
urday morning had made public all information up to then
-'-Transcript of a press briefing by Admiral George W.
Anderson. The Pentagon, April 11, 1963 •
p
As reported in The Boston Globe , April 14, 1963, p.l.





available to the department in Washington
.
The apparent delay in transmitting THRESHER'S last mes-
sages to search commanders was also to be the subject of con-
cern to the court of inquiry, and will be discussed further.
At subsequent briefings, technical experts met with news-
men and gave them information on search techniques. On April 22,
an officer discussed the progress of the search till then and
described in detail the technical problems associated with lo-
cating the remains of the submarine „ On April 25 , the command-
ing officer of the bathyscaph TRIESTE discussed the capabilities
of his research vessel with newsmen
Pentagon correspondents told the author that these brief-
ings were invaluable to them, not only providing them with im-
mediately useful information which could be put in the form of
a story, but also providing useful background material which
made subsequent reports of the search more meaningful.
Although the focus of attention quickly shifted from
Washington to Portsmouth and the search area, the Navy con-
tinued to release summaries of information from those areas
at the Pentagono A compendium of all releases issued during
the first two weeks, is included in this study, as Appendix A„
Portsmouth
To appreciate the public information events which oc-
curred in Portsmouth, one must first be introduced to the




April 16, 1963, p. 7»
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The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is one of the oldest activ-
ities in the Navy, having been established in 1$00. Over the
years it has developed into one of the largest and most modern
shipyards, and today is devoted almost exclusively to the build-
ing and overhauling of submarines. It is nevertheless one of
the few major naval installations which is not located near a
large metropolitan city. The nearest large city and major news
center is Boston, an hour and one half away by automobile.
In the course of normal operations, the most important
public relations events associated with the yard are the launch-
ings of submarines . For such events, the responsibility for
public relations coordination rests with the Commandant of the
First Naval District, in Boston.
Other public relations activities are of such a nature
that they can be supervised adequately by a single officer on
a part-time basis. At the time of the loss of THRESHER, the
public information officer was a Wave lieutenant (junior-grade)
whose principal duties were in the shipyard's communications
center. The public information office was staffed by a single
enlisted journalist. The normal cadence of public information
business was slow - an occasional news release or making arrange-
ments for tours of the shipyard.
It is difficult to imagine a major naval activity which
offers a more striking contrast to the elaborate public infor-
mation organization in Washington. There, a staff of 100 full-
time information personnel operates in close cooperation with
the Navy's key policy officials. Hundreds of major news releases,
many of national and international importance, are issued every
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month* Trained technicians operate television and radio equip-
ment, a photo lab is geared to produce many prints on quick
notice and a staff of clerical personnel reproduce and distrib-
ute news releases in great quantities.
The Pentagon press corps consists of top newsmen who devote
their full attention to reporting defense affairs. They are in-
timately familiar with the operations of the military services
and personally acquainted with information personnel and key
defense officials.
And yet, on the night of April 10, the Portsmouth IMaval
Shipyard was called upon to accommodate more than 75 newsmen,
approximately twice as many as were at the Pentagon during the
same time. Most of the newsmen were not familiar with the
shipyard, and only a few were familiar with submarine operations.
Some, representing foreign newspapers, were hardly familiar with
the American iMavy.
So sudden was the onset of the story that the shipyard
had no time to prepare for the arrival of the newsmen. In fact,
the shipyard's small public information office was pressed into
service as the headquarters for a team of officers who were
making telephone calls to notify the relatives of THRESHER
crewmen that the submarine had failed to surface after the
test dive.
Direction of the public information activities at the
shipyard was assumed by Commander George W. Hall, Public In-
formation Officer for the First Naval District.
The first suggestion that THRESHER might be in trouble
had come to him at about ltOO p.m., April 10, in the district
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headquarters in Boston, when he was handed a dispatch report-
ing the loss of communications between SKYLARK and THRESHER.-1-
This was about two and one half hours before the more serious
overdue report was sent to Washington.
Coincidentally , when the public information officer was giv-
en the dispatch, he was working on a story about another nuc-
lear submarine which had become entangled in the nets of a trawler
off Boston the day before. The THRESHER report did not partic-
ularly disturb him, since he also knew that communications fail-
ures were not uncommon. He did comment to another officer, how-
ever, that "if anything did happen to THRESHER, it will be the
story of the year."
Later that afternoon, with THRESHER still out of commun-
ication, he discussed the public information implications with
the acting Commandant of the toaval District- Realizing that
Portsmouth would be a focal point of interest for the press, the
district public information officer felt he should go there with
members of his staff if the submarine should be proven lost.
The acting Commandant agreed to this plan.
In the afternoon, the public information staff was assembled
and detailed plans were made for the establishment of press
centers in Boston and Portsmouth. At the end of working hours,
the public information officer permitted his staff to go home,
directing them to remain where they could be reached by telephone.
He then went home, but no sooner had he arrived there than he
was informed that the submarine was now officially feared mis-
1The text of this dispatch is inclueded in DOD news release
$14-63, 11 April 1963 j included in Appendix A.
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sing. He called key members of his staff, telling them to ex-
ecute the plans made earlier that afternoon.. He then called Ports^
mouth and advised officials there that he was departing immed-
iately, and reqiested that preliminary steps be taken to provide
physical accommodations for the press, which were sure to ar-
rive. After advising IMavy information officials in Washington
of his plans, he sped to Portsmouth, accompanied by an enlisted
journalist and a photographer. He arrived shortly before 8:00
p.m. - only minutes before the announcement of the loss was made
in Washington.
After checking in with the top shipyard officials present
(Rear Admiral Charles J. Palmer, the commander of the yard, was
even then flying back from Washington, where he had been when he
learned that the submarine might be in trouble), the public in-
formation officer t urned his attention to providing for the news-
men*
With the shipyard ? s public information office in use, the
district public information officer established his headquarters
in another office-- normally used for personnel administration.
Although the choice of that space was dictated purely by chance --
it was the closest office available-- it proved to be partic-
ularly well-suited for a public information headquarters. It was
fully equipped with office equipment, including duplicating
machines which were immediately put to use to reproduce news
releases. A counter, running across the front of the office,
lCommander Hall later observed in a letter to the author
that the existence of prior plans had enabled him to have public
information offices manned in Portsmouth and Boston before the
announcement was made, and without any direction f rom higher auth-
ority. He considered this to be an import factor in the success
of the public information effort.
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limited access to the working area and later allowed the public
information officer to work in relative privacy.
The office was located on the main floor of the shipyard's
administration building,. The only other office an that floor
which was not in 24-hour use by military personnel was pre-empted
as a newsroom. The office selected was normally used as a steno-
graphic pool, and was equipped with desks and typewriters which
could be used by the newsmen, Additional office equipment was
ordered for the room and a dozen extra telephones were installed.
A Navy lieutenant who was familiar with submarines was assigned
to the press room and remained all night to provide general
information about submarines . In the course of the night, a
coffee urn was brought in a nd newsmen were provided coffee during
the next two weeks . As the newsmen arrived, they also brought
equipment, such as telephoto transmitters, and by morning, the of-
fice had all the earmarks of a long-established press room.
Soon after the public information officer arrived in the
administration building, a few crewmen's relatives came there
hoping to obtain additional information about the fate of the
submarine. A special reception area was arranged for them and
Navy chaplains provided assistance and comfort.
With more and more newsmen arriving and clamoring for
information the next step was to provide them with all released
material. Even as arrangements for providing office space were
being made, telephone contact with Washington was made and the
text of releases obtained. These were reproduced and distrib-
uted to newsmen. Clerical assistance was provided by ^avymen
who happened to be in the administration building at the time.
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Throughout the night, the volunteers worked alongside the regu-
lar public information personnel, and returned the following
day to be of further assistan2e. Some did not return to their
regular duties for more than a week.
The transmission of news from Washington to Portsmouth
by telephone was a necessarily slow process. In fact, newsmen
at the shipyard were receiving the information at about the same
time it was arriving at their home offices by teletype. The newsmen
at first resented this fact, but then it became clear that the pri-
mary news source was to be Washington, and they a ccepted the
fact that they would not originate coverage of this facet of the
story. Several reporters later told the author that they felt
their primary contribution in covering the news would be to get
the "reaction" stories of next of kin and Navy officials in
Portsmouth.
Obtaining the names of the next of kin was crucial to
this aspect of the story „ According to a long-standing military
policy, the names of the crewmembers were scheduled to be released
four hours after the initial steps were taken to notify the next
of kin-- in this case, near midnight.
First release of the names of the crewmen was to be made
in Washington. The district public information officer checked
and determined that lists of the crewmen and their relatives had
been mimeographed by the casualty assistance teams in Portsmouth.
But at 12:30 a.m., when the names were released in Washington, the
head of the casualty assistance team in Portsmouth refused to
provide copies of the list to the public information officer.
Lacking specific instructions from higher authority, the personnel
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officer felt that he could not be a party to informing newsmen of
the names of persons, whom he know by personal experience to be
grief-stricken The officer held out for about an hour, during
which time, many of the names were obtained from Washington by
telephone and were released to the press in Portsmouth,, The
newsmen were obviously disgruntled about the delay since it
limited them in an aspect of the story they had felt was to be
their primary contribution to the coverage.
After the names were released, at least one reporter-
photographer team complained that they had been told by next
of kin that the Navy had advised them not to talk to reporters
„
Many other newsmen whom the author interviewed reported that
they did not encounter this difficulty and subsequent investi-
gation failed to reveal that such a warning had been made by any
Navy official. It seems likely that if such an admonition were
given, it was not by a responsible Navy official. Certainly,
many next of kin did not want to talk to newsmen and it is
conceivable that some adopted this statement as an "excuse."
Nevertheless, the district public information officer
issued the following statement;
It has been brought to the attention of this command that
the dependents of the USS THRESHER personnel have allegedly
been notified not to discuss anything with the press,, This
is not the Navy's policy and to the best of my knowledge
no official naval source has recommended this action to the
THRESHER dependents. If there are any misunderstandings in
this matter, steps will be taken immediately to correct
them.
Throughout the night, information was duplicated and
Mimeographed statement released to the press at Ports-
mouth, April 11, 1963.
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released to newsmen as it was collected, both from Washington
and Norfolk sources and from officials in Portsmoutho The re-
leases were numbered chronologically so that late-arriving news-
men could assure themselves that they had obtained a complete
file.
During the period from the evening of April 10, until
the evening of April 12, thirty news releases were issued.
They included the statements of the Chief of Naval Operations,
the names and addresses of crewmen, bulletins on the progress
of the search, background material on THRESHER, SKYLARK and the
bathyscaph, TRIESTE, biographical data on the commanding officer
of THRESHER, transcripts of the Portsmouth press conferences by
the Secretary of the Navy and the Commander of the Submarine
Force and by the President of the Court of Inquiry, other state-
ments by Portsmouth officials, texts of messages of sympathy,
and background information on assistance provided to the next
of kin
This steady flow of information was sustained even while
the public information officer was working to provide adequate
press accommodations, to establish communications channels with
other Navy activities on the East Coast and to maintain liaison
with Navy press headquarters in Washington.,
Adding to the difficulty was the fact that newsmen were
submitting a barrage of questions I requests for transportation
to the search area; requests for confirmation of stories re-
porting possible causes for the submarine's losso Some news-
men asked the public information officer to arrange for crew-
men's relatives to talk to members of the press.
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Answers to some of the questions would have revealed
classified information; others would have invaded the privacy
of the next of kin and still others would have impinged on the
prerogatives of the court of inquiry
Despite the lack of a pre-existing public information
organization, the shortage of personnel, and the almost over-
whelming number of newsmen, the situation was relatively well-
in-hand on the morning of April 11
The newsmen were provided with adequate accommodations,
information was flowing freely, the minor difficulties of the
night before had been resolved
„
The hectic pace continued on Wednesday, but the public
information officer, freed of the necessity to create an effect-
ive organization, was better able to cope with the problems
„
On Wednesday evening, the district public information officer
went to bed for the first time in two days D
On Thursday, the arrival of the Secretary of the Navy and
the Commander of the Atlantic Submarine Force to visit relatives
of crewmen was handled smoothly, although a last-minute press
conference had to be arranged in response to newsmen's requests*
The members of the court of inquiry arrived at Portsmouth
on Friday, after conducting sessions in New London., Connecticut.
The hearings of the court of inquiry occupied most of the
newsmen's attention until Monday, April 15, when the first of
several memorial services was conducted o Few phases of the
public information arrangements made in conjunction with the




The services were conducted in public and were the object
of the legitimate interest of the press . On the other hand , un-
controlled photography during the ceremonies would detract from
the solemnity" of the services., To photograph grief-stricken
persons at such a highly emotional moment would certainly con-
stitute a breach of good taste, if not an invasion of privacy
,
After consultation with religious leaders who were to
conduct the services, the district public information officer
briefed mewsmen on the forthcoming events . He provided spe-
cific areas from which the ceremonies could be photographed
unobtrusively, and he requested that photographers refrain from
taking pictures at certain times.
At the conclusion of the services, many photographers
took pictures of the deeply distraught families of crewmen
as they walked away from the site of the services
One photographer was observed to be crying as he operated
his camera o He later told a public information officer, nI
hate to take pictures like that, but if I don't, I will be
'scooped
,
v and the office would never understand.**
After one memorial service, a wreath was flown to the
last known position of THRESHER and dropped into the sea.
Search ships stopped their operations and manned their rails
in salute to the submarine .
Newsmen were flown to the scene in two Navy aircraft.
With the conclusion of the religious services, on Tues-
day, April 16, the attention of the press at Portsmouth was
again focused almost exclusively on the hearings of the court
of inquiry. Since the public information matters for the court
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were handled by its specially appointed officer, the district
public information officer was able to return to his duties in
Boston on the evening of Wednesday, April 17» He was represented
in Portsmouth by a Naval Reserve officer who had been called to
active duty for two weeks.
The district public information officer returned to Ports-
mouth on several occasions subsequently, but, except for the
court of inquiry, most of the story of THRESHER was now to be
told from other places.
The Court of Inquiry
So much is at stake in the inquiry into the loss of the
submarine Thresher that the investigation must be pursued
without ceilings of time, money or energy. An answer to
the tragedy is hidden somewhere in the case and must be
found
.
With these words, one Boston newspaper pointed to what
it xelt was uhe most impor Cant single aspect of the THRESHER
case. Certainly no aspect of the case received attention equal
to the press coverage of the investigation.
The court held its first meeting on the morning of April
11
?
and continued its hearings until June 6. During that period
it heard one-hundred twenty witnesses and recorded more than one
and one-half million words of testimony.
The witnesses included former THRESHER crewmen, three
1In May, 1964, the Public Information Office , First
Naval District was awarded a "Silver Anvil" by the Public
Relations Society of America for superior achievement in public









members of the crew who did not accompany the sub on its final
test dive, officers and enlisted men from SKYLARK, officials in
charge of search operations, shipyard workers and officials,
Navy experts in submarine design and nuclear propulsion (in-
cluding Vice Admiral Hyman G Rickover) and even the civilian
brother of two THRESHER crewmen
.
Sessions of the court which did not deal with military
secrets were open to newsmen. Since these sessions touched
on practically every phase of the submarine's construction,
repair and operation, as well as the crew's training and readi-
ness, they provided the American public with more information
about THRESHER than any other source
,
The court consisted of five officers . Their combined
experience covered almost every phase of naval operations which
would be germane to the investigation „ The men themselves
became the object of press attention, biographical information
about them was printed, and photographs were taken of their
arrivals and departures
.
The comprehensive press coverage of the court was not sur-
prising., Long after events, such as the memorial services, were
over, and the press had completely covered the "background"
stories, such as the comments of the next of kin and the his-
tory of submarine disasters, the court was in session, dealing
with subjects not previously discussed . More important was the
fact that the court was examining the one question about all
others which had preoccupied the attention of the press and
Composition of the court is indicated in Department of
Defense News Release (unnumbered) of April 11,1963, included
in Appendix k .
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the public from the first; what had happened to THRESHER?
The President of the Court, Vice Admiral Bernard L„
Austin s had anticipated the great press interest,, He had pre-
sided over other courts of inquiry, including that which in-
vestigated the cause of a fire which swept the aircraft carrier
USS CONSTELLATION during its construction in I960, and he had
even been the Navy's Public Relations Officer (roughly equiva-
lent to the current Chief of Information) when the submarine
SQUALUS had been lost off Boston, in 1939°
The Navy directive dealing with the conduct of courts
of inquiry, provides
The proceedings will be held in open session unless the
convening authority or the court, for security reasons or
other good cause, directs the entire proceedings or any
portion thereof be closed to the public
Holding the inquiry in closed session might have speeded
the proceedings (since it would allow witnesses to intersperse
classified testimony with unclassified) and it would have e-
liminated inhibitions which probably influenced some witnesses
On the other hand, closing the court would have seriously
abridged the public's right to know
A decision was made to hold as much of the investigation
as possible in open session, and the court decided to appoint
a public information officer who could devote his full attention
to affairs related to the inquiry o Such a procedure is unusual,
but the overwhelming press interest necessitated this move for
several reasons „ He would be able;
Manual of the Judge Advocate General (Department of












(1) To interpret the rules under which the court of
inquiry operates (and which are different from civilian courts),
(2) To devote his full-time efforts to working with the
press, thereby relieving members of the court from this time-
consuming task,
(3) To arrange for experts to discuss with the press
the various phases of submarine construction and operation
as pertained to THRESHER, since witnesses could not be inter-
viewed
,
(4) To help interpret Navy "lingo" to the press and
possibly prevent inaccurate reporting,
(5) To answer the many telephone inquiries that were
to come from news media not represented at Portsmouth,
(6) To keep the press advised of items of particular
interest in forthcoming activities of the court, and
(7) To protect, in general, the interests of the press.
The officer assigned was Commander James Ho Gormsen,
whose regular duties were as District Public Information Officer
for the Third Naval District, with headquarters in New York City<,
Much earlier in his career he had been Public Information Officer
for the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force
„
He joined the court in New London
,
just as the members
were boarding an airplane to fly to Portsmouth*, During the
flight, the president of the court told him that he would be
considered a full-fledged member of the court's staff, with
responsibility for providing assistance to the press and al-




concentrate on their work.
In certain respects, the court's public information
officer was fortunate . He was able to utilize the services
of the public information staff which had been established
under such trying circumstances during the first hours after
the announcement of the submarine's loss., He was also dealing
with events which, in most instances, the newsmen could ob-
serve at first-hand
„
On the other hand, there were certain restrictions
which would have to be placed on newsmen covering the court's
hearings == restrictions which, to say the least, would not
enhance the creation of cordial working relationships between
the public information officer and the members of the press.
Procedural rules prohibit sound and photographic equip-
ment in the courtroom, and witnesses are not allowed to discuss
their testimony outside the courtroom.
It was also apparent from the first that much of the
testimony would concern military secrets of the highest cate-
gory, and many sessions would be closed to newsmen.
Courts of inquiry are unlike civilian judicial bodies
and some procedures of the court were liable to appear highly
unusual to newsmen familiar only with civilian courts.
The public information officer was aware that newsmen
would be sensitive to any apparent lack of candor on his part,
i
The material in this section is based primarily on a
series of interviews with Commander Gormsen, conducted during
four days in April when the court was in regular session, and
on May 24 , when most of the testimony had been heard and the
court was preparing its final report. Some additional ideas
were provided by correspondence in May, 1964«
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or of any effort to limit their access to legitimate informa-
tion.,
He felt it was essential to gain the newsmen's confidence
immediately, since it was clear there would be times (when
classified information was being discussed by the court) when
such information as was releasable, (names of witnesses and
general topics discussed) would have to be released by him and
accepted by newsmen on faitho
When the members of the court stepped out of the auto-
mobiles which had brought them from the airport to the Ports-
mouth shipyard, they were immediately surrounded by newsmen.
The public information officer identified himself and held his
first press briefing on the spot assuring the reporters that he
would make every effort to assist them in covering the court's
proceedings o So spontaneous was the meeting, that at its con-
clusion, the newsmen showed the public information officer where
the press room was.
The apparent success of that first meeting is indicated
by the fact that several newsmen, who were in the group , told
the author they were pleased and relieved to find that the
Navy was going to cooperate fully in assisting them to cover
the court's activities.
The information officer's next act was to meet with
photographers and to arrange for them to obtain pictures of the
members of the court „ He later said that the time spent with
the photographers on the first day established a spirit of co-
operation which paid off in the days ahead.
The court went into session almost immediately. Among
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first witnesses to be heard were the crewmen from the rescue
vessel SKYLARK o The ship had been engaged in rescue operations
since the submarine was lost, and the crewmen's testimony gave
newsmen their initial opportunity to hear the accounts of eye-
witnesses to the events surrounding the submarine's last dive.
The crewmen had been transferred at sea from their ship and
appeared in the courtroom in their working uniforms, which
gave an air of urgency to the proceedings.,
If there had been any doubt that the court of inquiry
was to be a major source of information about the tragedy , it
was dispelled during these early sessions . At every meeting,
the courtroom was filled to capacity with newsmen (there was
room for about thirty-five persons) and one headline story
after another was written about the testimony.
No effort was made to suppress legitimate news even
though it might not be altogether favorable to the Navy.
Regularly the reporters heard information which, even if not
embarrassing to the Navy, certainly was not salutary . A former
commanding officer of the submarine told the court of previous
materiel problems, including some which had resulted in the
suspension of previous test dives . A brother of two THRESHER
crewmen told the court they were "apprehensive about the sub-
marine's conditior. ." Crewmen who had remained ashore when the
submarine made its last dive reported discrepancies in repair
work done by shipyard personnel
.
Several newsmen told the author they were surprised at
the amount of information which was revealed in open hearings
.
The rapid flow of information and the large number of
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newsmen covering the court made it inevitable that certain small
errors and misinterpretations of the testimony would result,,
At one session of the court , a SKYLARK crewman told the
court that the submarine had reported it was checking for leaks
while at four hundred feet. A wire service reporter left the
courtroom and filed a story on this facto By leaving the court-
room, the reporter had missed subsequent testimony which re-
vealed that this was merely a routine evolution and report . The
reporter ? s story, lacking this qualification seemed to his edi-
tors to be significant news and it was flashed across the coun-
try as a bulletin., Other reporters who had remained in the
courtroom and heard the full story did not emphasize the ref-
erence to leaks in their stories „ Some were queried by their
home offices as to why they had "missed" this important item.
Submariners' jargon also caused some confusion, even to
reporters who were familiar with more conventional Navy ter-
minology.
On one occasion, a witness referred to an aborted "fast
cruise" of THRESHER . The term wfast cruise" is used to describe
a mock cruise, conducted while the ship is tied "fast" to the
pier and all operational components of the submarine are tested.
Some newsmen
s
unaware of this distinction, reported that the
THRESHER had gotten underway for a fast trip but had been
forced to return to port.
To most Navymen, the initials "ASW" stand for anti-
submarine warfare; to submariners they denote "auxiliary
salt water. " Since this variant meaning was unknown to sev-
eral experienced military reporters they incorrectly inter-
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preted the testimony of witnesses
,
As soon as the newsmen became aware of the potential pit-
falls they were careful to check with the public information
officer on facts about which they were uncertain.,
i/^hen the court dealt with material particularly likely to
be unfamiliar to newsmen, background briefings were arranged.
The briefings were couched in general terms and specific
reference to THRESHER was avoided , iMewsmen, however, attempted
to channel these general discussions into a specific examination
of the THRESHER incident.
One shipyard officer who was to discuss the function of
a specific type of gauge was led into an examination of possible
causes of materiel failure in THRESHER,, Since the officer stated
he was convinced that the submarine was structurally sound, he
was led to conclude
s
at least according to press reports, that
the cause for the loss of the submarine was human error, A news-
paper reported that he said, "It appears to me that most likely
it was human error and the submarine exceeded her maxium depth
limits o It could have been flooding, but 1 doubt it,"
After the briefing, the commander of the shipyard issued
this statement I
It has been called to my attention that a press report
alleges that Captain Koseborough stated at a press con-
ference that human error was responsible for ThttESriER
exceeding her maximum permissible depth, the inference
being that human error was of an operational nature, and
that this was the most probable cause of loss. This is
not repeat not Captain Roseborough' s opinion nor is it
mine, I deeply regret the pain that this report must
have caused the next of kin of the gallant officers and
1T he Boston Herald
,
April 1/+., 1963, p. 50,

49
men of the THRESHER
o
1
This development, though it was not directly associated
with the court of inquiry, was included in stories about the
court., One newspaper reported it as a "sharp difference of
opinion," another as a misunderstanding in terms.
The only action of the court of inquiry which was the
subject of forthright criticism in the press was the designa-
tion of the commanding officer of the rescue vessel SKYLARK as
a "party to the inquiry."
An admiral who had commanded the early search for the
submarine told the court that for the first three days of the
operations he had been unaware of the last messages sent from
the submarine to the rescue vessel — messages which indicated
that THRESHER was experiencing minor difficulties and was
attempting to surface . The admiral explained that the mes-
sages had come to his attention only when he read the rescue
vessel's communication log, which had been transferred to his
ship for transportation to the court of inquiry..
He told the court, "It was inconceivable to me that
2
anyone would withhold such vital information"..
Navy directives concerning courts of inquiry say:
A person's conduct or performance of duty is "subject"
to inquiry when the person is involved in the incident
or event under investigation in such a way that dis-
ciplinary action may follow; or which may affect his
rights or privileges; or jeopardize his personal repu-
tation or professional standing,,
From a news release issued at Portsmouth, New Hamp-
shire Naval Shipyard, April 11, 1963
2
Rear Admiral Law son P, Ramage, quoted in the Boston
Herald
.
April 17, 1963, p. 4.
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Any member of the naval service «, . . . whose conduct or
performance of duty is-.subject to inquiry shall oe
designated as a party,.
The language of the directive is so unequivocal that the
court had no alternative but to designate the rescue vessel v s
commanding officer as a party to the inquiry,, even though
the admiral stated it was apparent that the incident had not
contributed to the loss of THRESHER
A person designated as a party is entitled to be present
at all hearings, to be represented by counsel and to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence „ Military legal
authorities characterize the procedure as a "privilege/1
but such a fine distinction could hardly be recognized by
civilian newsmen, accustomed to covering civilian courts,
which offer no parallelo
The public information officer had anticipated this
problem and was concerned that the action might be con-
strued as a reprimand to the rescue vessel ? s commanding of-
ficer o He therefore arranged for a Navy legal officer, not
associated with the court, to brief newsmen on the signifi-
cance of the action At a lengthy session with newsmen,
the legal officer explained the procedure in detail==and
the newsmen's stories ultimately conveyed the essence of
the briefing.
The stories, however, ultimately made their way into
the hands of editors and headline writers who had not had
the benefit of the background explanation., Thus the event
Manual of the Judge Advocate General (Department of
the Navy, Washington, D C ; Government Printing Office,
June 1961) p. $3.
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was given special prominence on the pages of the newspapers,
and the stories were introduced by headlines which could not
express the many qualifying aspects of the action*,
A sampling of headlines indicates this points
Skipper of Skylark on Carpet
Skipper of Escort Hit^
for Delay in Sub Data
Sub Escort's Captain
on Carpet for Delays
The public information officer's efforts to insure
that the story was reported in proper perspective were
thus mitigated
One Boston newspaper was not convinced, in any respect,
that the designation of the commanding officer was routine
or unavoidable o In an editorial , it said?
Lto Comdrc Stanley Hecker has been made a party to the
Thresher inquiry, in order,, the Navy says, to protect
his own interests
o
We hope this is so and that the Skylark commander is
not being made a scapegoat for the undersea disaster
which took 129 lives a week ago» Too much is in-
volved for the Navy and country to have this inquiry
sidetracked on petty and personal issues
„
It would appear that Hecker ? s real offense was that
he embarassed high naval brass by causing it to give
incorrect information to the press Several days after
Thresher went down the Navy was still saying there had
been no distress messages „ This was obviously un-
fortunate o And if the Skylark skipper had been more
experienced or more alert it might have been avoided
„
But in light of the whole Thresher tragedy, is it




April 17, 1963, p * 7«
3
The Boston Herald, April 17, 1963, p» 1.
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important? Should the naval court be concerning itself
with a possible public relations goof when there is so
much else at stake? We can't believe so.
The country is not interested in scapegoats „ It is
interested in facts that will help prevent another
Thresher tragedy The court should get on with its
business
„
No one, least of all, the public information officer
would deny that the extensive press coverage given to the
matter was unfortunate „ The very fact that the press brief-
ing was set up is evidence that the court was trying to
diminish the idea that the officer was being blamed for the
losso The procedure, unique to military law
s
was necessary
but the newsmen's lack of familiarity with the practice led
to an unintended interpretation of the situation c
Fortunately for the public information officer, not
all the problems which arose were so difficult to resolve
„
The prohibition on photography., for instance,, might




spoke to each witness at the conclusion of his
testimony;, explaining that the newsmen desired to obtain
photographs of him Each individual was allowed to make
his own decision, and those who agreed (most of the wit-
nesses did) were introduced to the photographers By-
agreement between the public information officer and the
photographers , all pictures were taken at the entrance to
the building in which the courtroom was located. As a
result, the witnesses were not pursued by press photog-
raphers and all confusion was eliminated
.
XThe Boston Herald, April 19 1963, p. 4#.
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One photographer told the author, that the arrange-
ment worked so well that he had "never had an easier assign-
ment .
"
The court met in open session during the first three
days of its hearings in Portsmouth, On the fourth day, the
Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force Commander, when asked if he
had a theory on the cause of the loss, explained that he
did
s
but that it involved classified information. The
court was closed to hear his testimony, and the newspapers




Fortunately this was a reaction to the first closed
session and emphasis of the "mysterious" quality of clas-
sified testimony did not persist. As the court turned to
the systematic examination of the various components of
the submarine, more and more testimony was classified
,
until almost all hearings were in private.
During this period, the public information officer
briefed the press on the names of the witnesses, and their
relationship to the inquiry.
Not all the testimony given in closed session turned
out to be classified. One officer, after testifying on a
classified matter for which he had been summoned, volun-
teered information about a piece of charred insulating
material from THRESHER which had been recovered by search
XThe Boston Globe , April 16, 1963, p. 1.
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ships. The officer explained that he was not convinced
that the charred appearance of the material was the result
of a fire in the submarine, as had been suggested by other
witnesses in previous, open sessions . He felt that the
blackened appearance of the material was the result of a
drilling process, used in the shipyard- He exhibited a
piece of insulating material which had been subjected to
such a process and it appeared almost identical with the
debris which had been recovered.
The court was reopened, and the officer repeated
the unclassified segment of his testimony before newsmen,
since it was apparent they would be interested in the new
theory.
The public information officer was dissatisfied with
this procedure. It was obviously impractical to reopen the
court and repeat every shred of unclassified testimony that
was mentioned in closed session. On the other hand, it
would be misleading if, as the information officer expressed
it, n o o we held a 'second performance' for the press
everytime we wanted to clear up a point. 1*
The next time such a situation occurred was when a-
nother shipyard officer, testifying in closed session,
explained to the court why a number of valves had been
observed in THRESHER backwards. He explained that when
piping was being installed in the submarine, valves were
included as spacers to insure that the piping was of the
Commander James H. Gormsen, in a personal interview
with the author, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, May 24, 1963 <>
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proper length- No effort was made to insure that these
valves were functioning properly at that time, since they
were used solelyas "dummies" and would ultimately be re-
moved, fitted with special packing rings and installed
permanently by special workmen,.
The question of the "backward valves" had been raised
by a THRESHER crewman in open court and had been widely re-
ported by the press „ Rather than reopen the court so that
newsmen could hear this unclassified testimony repeated, the
information officer suggested that the shipyard hold a press
conference to clear up the misunderstanding o This was done,
and many Boston newsmen travelled to Portsmouth to attend
the press conference, and subsequently wrote clarifying
stories
.
One of the witnesses to appear before the court was
Vice Admiral Hyman G Rickover, whom most Americans identify
as the "father of atomic submarine.," and certainly the fore-
most authority on nuclear propulsion „ Any comment he might
make about THRESHER would be important news, but the matters
he was to discuss were classified . The court was therefore
opened for Admiral Rickover T s introductory remarks , which
consisted
s
almost exclusively, of a reiteration of his
previous comments on the matter. Commenting on this pro-
cedure, the public information officer said;
The press realized that this was "stagea," but they
appreciated the opportunity to obtain the admiral's
statements . Admittedly it took the court's time, and
it wasn't absolutely necessary, since his testimony
consisted of information he had already released „ He
again stated his conviction that the loss was not
caused by reactor failure, and he expressed his deep
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sorrow at the loss of life a Nevertheless, his comments
,
given cS they were at the court of inquiry investigating
the loss of the submarine, were important and of concern
to the public .•*
As more and more of the court v s investigation was held
in closed session, press interest dwindled. During the last
month of the inquiry, Boston newspapers did not send reporters
to cover the session, but relied on reports distributed by t he
wire services and originated by newsmen in the Portsmouth area
Table 2 is a tabulation of the number of newsmen who were pre-
sent at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard during the first month
after the loss of THRESHER „ (The figures are drawn from a
TABLE 2 — Tabulation of the number of
newsmen present at Portsmouth Naval Ship-
yard, April-May, 1963
Date No. Date No. Date No. Date iMOo
April 1$ 42 Ap:nil 23 y May 1 3 May 9 6
16 26 24 37d 2 2 10
17 23 25 3 1 11
18 20 26 6 4 12
19 13 27 2 5 13
20 17 23 0, 6 14
21 29 15b 7 14 c 15
22 15 30 4 8
^Launching of USS JACK
bVADM Rickover testifies
cPress conference on "backward valves"
logbook which was not started until April 15. Estimates
as to the number of newsmen on the base during the first
days ranged from 75 to 100. It has also been suggested that




not re-register every day. )
By June 6, 1963, when the report of the investigation was
forwarded to the convening authority, and the court met for
the last time, the event went almost unnoticed in the Boston
press
.
Two weeks later, on June 20, 1963, the Navy announced
the findings of the court and a summary of their findings was
issued in a news releasee f^'he actual release is attached at
Appendix C„) 'J- he report was given only cursory attention in
the press and no newspaper reported on the total contents of
the release. A more detailed study of this phenomenon is in-
cluded in chapter II.
A year after the court had been in session, the court's
public information officer made the following observations on
some unique problems he faced i
It seemed that as the court dragged on, the press tried
to aim their stories toward the eventual conclusion of
finding the submarine „ That was not in anyway the func-
tion of the court unless finding the submarine would shed
light on the cause of the disaster. . . It was unlikely
that finding the submarine would h^j.p the court , since no
means exist to raise the submarine from that depth if it
could be found essentially in one piece. Most likely
,
what would be found would represent what happened to the
submarine as a result of the disaster rather than what
caused it.
I continually tried to explain that. . .the court would
not remain in session solelyto hear how the search was
progressing, binding THRESHER was not the court ? s re-
sponsibility, nor would it contribute to the court's
mission. But, inevitably, the two got mixed.
Also, it was of great satisfaction to me to discover
that the press, although given relatively free movement
through the unclassified areas of the yard, made no
effort to ferret out people whom they could interview
about THRESHER, or try to do any sleuthing on their own.

5S
I honestly believe that we gained their confidence suf-
ficiently at the outset so that they believed they would
be offered anything of interest and that going behind our
backs would be detrimental to therr rather Chan of value.
Public Relations invents in
Other Areas
During the night after THRESHER was lost, the feverish
activity at Portsmouth a nd Washington, D.C. was duplicated a
t
New London, Connecticut, the home of the submarine service,
at Newport, Rhode Island, where newsmen waited to to to the
scene of the search, and at the First Naval District Head-
quarters in Boston. In striking contrast, the public infor-
mation office at Atlantic Fleet headquarters in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, though busy throughout the night passing and receiving
information, was able to operate in an orderly manner, since news-
men seeking first-hand information were not present. Statements
originated by the command were released through Washington,
and the local newspapers were kept informed of the develop-
ments by telephone.
Activities in New London were marked by the same inten-
sive demand for information as in Portsmouth, and the Naval
Base was "swamped with newsmen."
The situation was somewhat different at Newport, Rhode
Island. Although about thirty newsmen checked in at the
Cruiser-Destroyer Force public information office, they were
primarily interested in getting to the scene of the rescue.
The force commander, a rear admiral, met with the newsmen,




assured them of his fullest cooperation, but explained that
the plans for future operations were incomplete and that his
staff would be unable to provide information on the incident
other than that which was being released in Washington and
Portsmouth.
Newsmen who were at Newport invariably commented on
the "spirit of cooperation" shown by the admiral and added
that his presence in the newsroom made it clear that everything
possible was being done to assist them.
Since it was apparent that no substantial developments
in the THRESHER story were going to develop in Newport, the
newsmen checked into motels and hotels, having been assured
by the public information officer that they would be called
if the situation changed.
The following morning, the decision to cancel the s hip
coverage was announced, and some newsmen left the city, with
the previously reported consequences.
One newsmen who stayed, however, said
I am not too sympathetic with anyone who would walk out
on the chance to cover the biggest submarine disaster in his-
tory. 1 think the Navy should have maintained its plans
to send the ship out. When a story that big occurs, the
people want to know everything that is happening, and the
Navy should have expected this. But, when the ship did
go out, the reporters with initiative were there, ready
to go along.
About thirty newsmen were still in Newport when the ship
departed, and all were offered the opportunity to go along.
Only fifteen accepted. The Cruiser-Destroyer Force public
llnterview with Richard Lamere , Boston Traveler re-
porter, Boston, Mass., May 2B, 1963 •
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information officer accompanied the ship and assisted the
reporters in obtaining information and filing their copy by
radio and ship-to-shore telephone.
With the return of the destroyer, the primary public
relations activities in Newport in conjunction w ith the THRESHER
incident concluded.
Boston was also a key locality in the THRESHER story,
both because the Naval District headquarters were located
there, and because the bathyscaph TRIESTE operated out of
Boston during its search.
On the night that THRESHER was lost, the Naval District
public information office was open and accommodated about
forty newsmen who interviewed naval district personnel and
reported the information relayed to the office by telephone
from Washington, Like other public information offices on the
east coast, the Boston office was besieged by telephone
calls from newsmen throughout the United States seeking facts
on the loss of THRESHER and information on the Davy's plans
to transport newsmen to the scene of the loss. The volume
of calls was so great that t here were delays of up to two
hours in returning the calls. Boston newsmen who had to
"wait their turn" found this unaccustomed delay aggravating.
The assistant district public information officer, a
Wave lieutenant, was assisted throughout the night by the
remainder of the office staff and two inactive-duty Naval
Reserve officers who were public information specialists.
When they heard about the loss of THRESHER, they voluntarily
reported to the office, realizing that their assistance
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would probably be welcome.
Respite the fact that there was little information being
released at the Boston office that was not also being released
in Washington or Portsmouth, the large contingent of newsmen
remained through the night- -some sleeping in chairs or on
the floor.
In the early morning hours a teletype hook-up between
the Boston and Portsmouth public information offices was com-
pleted, which enabled the district public information officer
and his assistant to communicate more freely,, Subsequently
the machine was used to pass news releases from Portsmouth to
Boston for quick transmittal to the Boston newspapers.
While the Boston office was essentially an ,fauxiliaryw
to the Portsmouth office during the first few days, it became
a primary information center when the bathyscaph TRIESTE
arrived in Boston on April 26, after being shipped from Cali-
fornia, through the Panama Canal, in the well of a dock landing
ship o
The bathyscaph was moored at the South Boston annex
of the Boston Naval Shipyard and a press headquarters was
established in an unused building nearby., This office was
subsequently used for press conferences associated with test
dives of the bathyscaph, and when the search commander had
occasion to talk to newsmen^
Another naval reserve officer, a lieutenant from Boston,
spent close to a month on active duty during various periods
in the following two months when press interest in the search
operations was at its peak,
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While these activities were directly associated with the
loss of THRESHER, the First Naval District public information
officer is not inclined to consider them a part of the disaster
public relations problems. Two weeks after THRESHER was lost,
the press coverage of the events, though still thorough, lacked
the intensity and highly emotional quality that marked the
"disaster" phase of the incident.,

CHaPM*. II
NB.WSPaPj^R CUV^kAGii, OF THE
LOSS OF THtU&lMt
Manifest Content
The mysterious loss of a major combatant vessel of the
United States wavy and the death of one hundred twenty-nine per-
sons was an event which stimulated the concern and interest of
most American citizens * Only a relative handful could observe any
of the events at first hand, and these events were only the most
public—memorial services or the departure of search ships «, It
remained for the mass media of communication, principally the news-
papers and television stations, to provide information on the
search operation, the sessions of the court of inquiry, the com-
ments of naval officials and civilian scientists
„
Any individual's opinion as to what happened, ana whether
the Navy had performed and was performing satisfactorily depended
primarily on what he read in the newspapers ana saw on his tele-
vision seto
Accordingly, a study was made of the coverage provided by
eight major daily newspapers, four in Bcston, The Boston Globe ,
The Boston Herald , the Boston Record-American and Sunday Adver -
tiser , and the Boston Traveler, and four from out-of-Boston
,
Chicago Tribune , Los Angeles Times , The iMew Y'ork Times and the




lished in Boston. Its coverage of news events is atypical of
other American newspapers, and the paper is therefore excluded
from this study.)
As a means of comparing the coverage of each newspaper,
stories devoted to the THRESHER case were divided into separate
categories, and the number of column-inches devoted to each
category on each day was tabulated . The raw results are indi-
cated in Tables 3 through 10.
The Categories
Categories were determined by examining the newspaper
stories and establishing a new category whenever subject matter
was discovered which did not readily fit into already existing
descriptions o Stories in twenty of the categories were found
to occur more or less regularly in the newspapers. A miscel-
laneous category was used to tabulate all other stories . Foot-
notes on the tables indicate the content of the miscellaneous
stories
.
The following is a brief description of the contents of
typical stories in each of the categories'
1. Loss announcement . Stories based on information re-
leased by Admiral Anderson at his press conferences and by
Navy spokeman elsewhere during the first hours after the loss.
2. Background of USS THRESHER . Stories describing
THRESHER, based on previously released material.
3. Background of submarine service, losses . Stories
describing the submarine service, written from previously
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both in the United States and foreign Navies.
4» Radiation hazard . Comments by American scientists
and United States Navy officials concerning the possibility of
hazards to public safety resulting from escape of radioactive
material from THRESHER T S reactors.
5. Search operations . Specific activities of Navy units
searching for THRESHER, including surface search for debris and
underwater search using scientific devices
.
6. Search background . Descriptive stories of the ocean
depths, and interpretive stories designed to explain the sci-
entific principles being used to conduct the underwater search.
Much of the material in this category was devoted^t/O explanations
of the bathyscaph TRIESTE.
7. Biographical data on crewmen . Stories which dealt
with Naval and civilian personnel lost in THRESHER. These
stories ranged from simple identification, to accounts of in-
dividuals' reactions to serving in THRESHER as related by
second parties.
8. Next of kin reaction . All stories dealing with the
reactions of relatives of THRESHER crewmen.
9. Court of inquiry . All stories associated with the
court of inquiry, including accounts of hearings, reports of
findings, and speculation as to what might have transpired in
closed sessions.
10, Memorial services . Any story dealing with memorial
services, including religious ceremonies at Portsmouth and




11. Congressional reaction . Stories recounting the re-
action of United States Congressmen, Primarily these stories
dealt with plans for official investigations of the cause for
the loss.
12. Reaction of Navymen . Stories written on the basis of
newsmen's interviews with other Navymen. Primarily of two sorts
(a) reminiscences of men who had served in THRESHER, and (b) the
comments of submariners concerning their feelings about return-
ing to duty.
13. Portsmouth reaction . Stories describing the mood of
modern Portsmouth (i.e. grief and concern) and the city's long
association with the sea and maritime disasters,
14. Messages of sympathy . Stories carrying the text of
messages of sympathy received by the government, primarily from
heads of foreign nations.
15. Official statements . Stories based on the comments
of government officials (other than Navy officials) such as the
President's message of condolence to next of kin.
16. Speculation on loss . Stories based on unofficial
explanations as to the cause of the submarine's loss. Pri-
marily of two sorts; (a) statements issued by submarine ex-
perts such as retired Naval officers and oceanographic experts
and (b) interpretive stories by newsmen.
17. Editorial comment . Newspaper comment carried in
editorial columns; primarily expressions of sympathy but also
including comment on the need for a thorough investigation.
1$. Newsmen's activities . Newspapers' accounts of how
their reporters covered the story.
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19. International reaction ., Stories based on the reaction
of foreign nations other than messages of sympathy from heads of
governments . Primarily of two sorts: (a) Russian comment on
possible hazards to public health from radiation hazards, and
indications of the inherent weakness of the American submarine
service and (b) Japanese reaction to the possible hazard re-
lated to the visit of American nuclear submarines to Japanese
ports
.
20. Letters to the Editor . Headers' comments on sub-
marine loss carried in "Letters to the Editor" columns of news-
papers .
21. Miscellaneous . All other stories. Each miscellaneous
item is briefly identified in the footnotes to the tables.
Additional tabulations were made of the amount of front-
page space devoted to the THRESHER case. Results are indicated
in the final column of Tables 3 through 10.
Units of Measurement
The unit of measure is the column inch, i.e. the space
occuoied by one normal column width times the length in inches.
The column width in all newspapers examined is approximately
the same.
The measurement includes headlines, pictures and type.
Study Procedure
Although there are twenty-one separate categories, there
were many occasions in which a given story, or part of a story,
might almost as easily fall into one category as another. For
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example, a story on a memorial service would contain descriptions
of the reaction of next of kin. In such instances the space was
included in the category which seemed most appropriate,, Often
the decisions were extremely subjective, and ideally, the ma-
terial should have been codified by several observers to deter-
mine if significant variations occurred . Since this was not
possible, the author re-examined several newspapers, obtaining
almost identical results.
Photographs often caused the greatest difficulty in
classification. A case in point was the photograph of a buoy
which marked the last known position of THRESHER. It was used
once to illustrate a story dealing with the search operations,
and on another occasion, it was used in conjunction with eulogy
of the men lost in the tragedy. When such instances occurred,
photographs were included in the category of the story which
they illustrated.
Results of the Study
Analysis of all data indicates that certain patterns of
coverage were characteristic of all the newspapers studied.
In five of the eight newspapers examined, the greatest
amount of space devoted to the THRESHER incident in a single
day, occurred on the second day. The three exceptions were
the Boston Traveler (the only afternoon paper in the study)
and the Chicago Tribune , both of which registered the greatest
amount of coverage on the first day, and The New York Times
,
which hit its peak on the third day. (It should be noted that
the "first" day the Chicago Tribune carried any THRESHER news
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was on April 12, The edition of the Tribune examined was one
mailed to out-of-town subscribers, and was printed very early.
The Tribune , therefore, carried news one day after other news-
papers a )
The most intensive coverage occurred during the first four
days - in each case more than half and in some cases close to
three quarters of the total coverage recorded in the full four-
teen day period occurred in the first four days.
Examination of Tables 3 through 10 shows that only in-
formation on the court of inquiry and reports of the search
operations appeared consistently after the initial four-day
period , Consequently, these two categories were the largest.
Each newspaper devoted more space to the court of inquiry than
to any other single subject. A total of 2,528 column/inches
was devoted to this subject » The next largest category was
that dealing with search operations - 1,617 column/inches-
Ranking third in total volume were stories about memorial
services - 1,06.1 column/inches.
The three categories together accounted for 5,206 column/
inches, nearly half of the total space (11,444 column/inches)
devoted to all stories related to the THRESHER incident in all
the newspapers examined.
This is hardly surprising, for these are subjects about
which it was easiest to write. The newsmen could observe the
event and report what he observed, or obtain his material from
news releases* To obtain material for stories in most of the
remaining categories, the newsmen had to conduct his own
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research, seek out sources and collect information,,
Comparison of Coverage
By Boston and wOut~of-Town 1* Newspapers
As might be expected, the Boston newspapers devoted more
space to the coverage of THRESHER events than did the "out-of-
town" papers which were examined » For the Boston press, the
loss of THRESHER was a local story The disaster occurred
nearby, the court of inquiry, the site of most memorial services
and the base of operations for the search were all located in
the circulation of the Boston newspapers. In addition, Boston
has long been a seaport, and its citizens are especially in-
terested in stories of the sea „ Bostonians also remembered the
loss of previous United States Navy submarines better than most
other Americans, for most of these tragedies had also occurred
in nearby waters
„
Therefore, it is not surprising that Boston newspapers
devoted from two to four times as much space as some of the
out-of-town newspapers,, (See Table 11 for a comparison,)
TABLE 11. -- Comparison of total amount of
space (in column/inches) devoted to THRESHER
incident by Boston and nOut-of -Town 1* newspapers
during the two weeks after the loss
Boston Out-of-Town
Newspaper Column/Inches Newspaper Column/Inches
The Boston Glebe 2,231 Chicago Tribune 802
The Boston Herald 2,552 Los Angeles T imes 1,291
Boston Traveler 1,533 The New )fork Times 1,003
Re cord -American and Washington fost 568
Sunday Advertiser 1,464
Total 7,7 -30 ,__. 3,664
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While the out-of-town newspapers devoted less total space to
the loss of the submarine, they gave proportional prominence to
the same stories that were emphasized in the Boston press. Stories
about the court of inquiry occupied the greatest amount of space,
followed by accounts of the search and memorial services
Boston and out-of-town newspapers devoted approximately
equal space to stories in several categories - notably to Ad-
miral Anderson's press conferences, stories about radiation
hazard and background stories on search techniques . All of the
newspapers, both Boston and out-of-town, wrote editorials ex-
pressing sympathy for the loss of the submarine and noting that
such tragedies were the price of progress, except the Chicago
Tribune, which made no editorial comment on the loss.
The out-of-town newspapers placed more emphasis on in-
ternational reaction than did the Boston papers „ As might be
expected, the out-of-town papers did not carry stories about
the reaction of Portsmouth citizens as the Boston papers did.
Summary of Manifest Content
During First Two Weeks
When the story of the loss of THRESHER broke, it monop-
olized the front pages of newspapers across the country* During
the first four days, newspapers devoted space to describing the
widest possible variety of aspects of the incident' reports of
the search, court hearings and memorial services, background
information on the submarine and its crew, the emotional re-
action of relatives and prominent citizens of the world and the
scientific reaction of civilian scientists and Navy officials,,
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On the fifth day (Monday, April 15) there was a marked drop
in THRESHER coverage, followed by a gradual decline in space de-
voted to the story c Background stories disappeared from the news-
paper's columns as the reporters* job became one of surveillance
of the events that were occurring,,
Subsequent Newspaper Coverage
Newspaper coverage subsequent to the period reported in
Tables 3 through 10 followed the declining trend already estab-
lished o Total coverage fell off, stories were devoted almost
exclusively to reports of the court of inquiry and the search
operations and were generally carried on the inside pages under
unobtrusive headlines.
By mid-May, typical coverage consisted of a story, four
or five paragraphs long, summarizing search operations and in-
dicating that the court of inquiry was still hearing witnesses
in closed sessionc For several days at a time a newspaper might
make no mention of THRESHErt Occasionally the submarine might
be mentioned in passing in another story - such as the account
of the launching of another nuclear submarine „ There were also
scattered reports of efforts by several organizations to raise
money for a scholarship fund for the children of THRESHER crew-
men.
On May 30, 1963, the Navy announced that THRESHER had
been located, and the story was back on page one with large
headlines. The announcement was based on an at-sea evaluation
of underwater photographs . A day after the announcement, ex-
pert photo interpreters in Washington, D C determined that the
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pictures were not of the submarine, and the Navy issued a re-
traction. This anticlimax further cooled public interest in re-
ports of the search. Following the retraction, practically all
mention of the submarine ceased until June 20 when a series of
photographs showing a high intensity of debris on the ocean
bottom were obtained and the Navy announced that the bathyscaph
TRIESTE would be taken to sea to dive in the area where the pic-
tures had been made.
A revival of interest in THRESHER followed (although it
was not intense enough to result in widespread coverage of re-
ports of the findings of the court of inquiry, which were an-
nounced during this period.) Radio, television and newspaper
representatives went to sea with the search forces and observed
the TRIESTE'S diving operations. Newspapers devoted extensive
space to accounts of the dives during which various underwater
phenomenon were observed, including a large crater, which it was
felt might have been created by the submarine's impact with the
bottom of the ocean. Initial stories were written in a scien-
tific vein - the complicated operations of the bathyscaph were
explained. Before the series of dives were completed, Russian
fishing ships took the operation under surveillance and on
several occasions hampered the mission by approaching too
closely. The Russian harassment became the topic of primary
interest to the newsmen.
After five inconclusive dives (during one dive it was
considered possible that the bathyscaph crew obtained fleeting
contact with the submarine) the attempt was ended so that the
bathyscaph could return to port for overhaul and the replacement
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of ballast which had been depleted during the operation..
Although the search was continued by surface ships, even
the brief summaries that had been appearing in the newspapers
now disappeared.
In August, the THRIESTE again went to sea for another
series of dives, but no newsmen requested to accompany the search
force, and no reports of the dives were carried in the newspapers
After almost a year, the search for THRESHER has not been con-
cluded. A major search operation, utilizing an improved version
of TRIESTE is scheduled to begin in the summer of 1964.
Latent Content
While the quantitative study of the manifest content of
the newspapers is revealing, it does not tell the whole story,,
A brief story, vividly written and prominently displayed may
attract more attention and influence more readers than a con-
siderably longer story, buried in the middle of the newspaper.
A headline which does not accurately represent the con-
tents of the story it introduces will mislead anyone who does
not read the story, and will probably provide clues which will
influence even the thorough reader's perception of the event.
Or one newspaper editor may choose to give far greater
prominence to a story than his colleague on another paper.
The diminished attention to the THRESHER incident, which
occurred with the passing of time, meant that every aspect of
The extent to which a reader's perception of a news story
is influenced by the headline is reported by Percy H, Tannenbaum,
"The Effect of Headlines on the Interpretation of hews Stories",
Journalism Quarterly
,




the story was not brought to the attention of the public with
equal thoroughness and force.
While the examples which follow are not an exhaustive study
of these matters as they relate to the THRESHER case, the iso-
lated instances are considered to be significant and interesting.
The Importance of Headlines
Time and again in the study of the various newspapers'
coverage of the THRESHER story, the author was struck by the
disparity in headlines used to describe essentially identical
stories.
On April 13, 1963 , two THRESHER crewmen who had not
sailed on the final cruise, testified before the court of in-
quiry concerning extensive mechanical problems which they had
observed while the submarine was undergoing repairs in the ship-
yard. (Their testimony included the previously mentioned ob-
servation that many valves had been installed backwards.) Both
told the court they felt that the problems had been solved be-
fore the submarine left on its cruise, and that they were sat-
isfied with the quality of workmanship.
A Boston newspaper carried the story on page one, under
the banner headline
SUB UNFIT FOR DIVE?
despite the fact that the story included (in an inside para-
graph) this statement: "He said to his knowledge all this was
corrected prior to the ship's first fact cruise in March."
In a later edition of the same paper, on the same day, a
-'-Boston Traveler , April 18,1963, "5 Star Stocks" edition, p.l.
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seven line bulletin concerning the incorrect report that
THRESHER had been found was inserted over this story and
a new head was displayed:
THRESHER HULL FOUND?1
There was no sub-head concerning the testimony in court, and
the basic story was unchanged
.
Another Boston newspaper's headline for the report of
testimony at the court was:
Trouble Plagued Sub,
2 Thresher Men Say^
The more conservative The Christian Science Monitor
carried an abbreviated account of the testimony on page 17,




In Los Angeles, the story was reported on page two,








In Chicago, the testimony put the THRESHER story
1Boston Traveler , April lg, 1963 , "5 Star Final" edition
p. 1.
2
The Boston Globe, April 19, 1963, p* 1.
^ The Christian Science Monitor , April 19, 1963., P° 17°
^Los Angeles Times , April 19, 1963, p. 2 C

£5
back on page one, after it had been relegated to the inside
pages the day before, with the banner headline:





An example of the unusual, if not downright capricious,
use of headlines was observed on April 19, 1963~-the day of
the running of the Boston Marathon.
In an early edition, a Boston newspaper carried this
banner headline on page one:
SECRET SUB WITNESSES 2
In a later edition, the same story, ihich earlier had rated
that urgent headline, was relegated to a corner of page one,




The banner headline which had displaced the THRESHER court
story was:
BELGIAN IS WINDER4
and concerned the marathon.
On occasion, the headline misrepresented the content
of the story it introduced, as when one Boston paper carried
^-Chicago Tribune
,
April 19, 1963, p. 1«
2Boston Traveler
,









this headline as a banner on its front page:
Congress Opens
A-=Sub Inquiry
The story, which began on page two, opened with
A full-scale Congressional investigation of the tragic
loss of the Thresher was urged Sunday by Senator Lever-
itt Saltonstall . . .
.
2
and later quoted the Senator as saying
I don't believe, however, that our investigation will be-
gin until the Navy has completed its inquiry «3
Emphasis of "Dramatic" Stories
Newsmen have long known that their readers are interested
in stories of conflict and emotion, and one can hardly be sur-
prised if reporters seek out such stories and recount them
with far greater detail than they do the less dramatic inci-
dents.
The loss of THRESHER gave rise to many dramatic stories,
and they were given special prominence.
There is no example of this more striking than the prom-
inence given to stories relating to some crewmen's expression
of fears about the seaworthiness of the submarine , while the
expression of trust in the submarine by others went almost un-
noticed.
A careful examination of all stories printed on this
Boston Record American
.
April 15, 1963, p° 1°




subject indicates that five crewmen had told relatives of var-
ious feeling, from concern to fear, about the submarined fit-
ness .
An Associated Press story of April 11, datelined Groton,
Conecticut was the first of these , It said
The wife of a crewman blamed the navy for sending the
Thresher thru deep-dive maneuvers shortly after leaving
drydock at Portsmouth, JM.H.
'Most of the fellows were a little leery," she said,
asking that her name be witheld. "They thought the boat
needed more time."l
The Los Angeles Times reported the comments of another
crewman's relatives
s
"My father's whole life was submarines," said Mrs. Andrea
Keele, 20, of 1515s 204th £>t., Torrance.
"He served on several. But he said the Thresher was dif-
ferent. He called it a coffin. He tried to transfer off
it several times."
Mrs. Keele's father, George J. Kiesecker, 36, an electron-
ics technician, was one of 129 lost on the vessel.
Kiesecker had expressed similar doubts about the seaworthi-
ness of the Thresher to his sister-in-law , kiss Jacquel-
ine Clover. . . .2
The long Beach (California) Press Telegram reported the
fears of another crewman, after a telephone interview with his
wife in Groton, Conecticut. The paper reported
ul ou might as well get yourself another man," engineman
Bill M. Klier told his wife, Msry, before boarding the
ill-fated nuclear submarine Thresher.
3
"I don't think this tub is going to make it."
The paper's display of this story was e xceptional . It was
'•In the Chicago Tribune
.
April 12, 1963, p. 4.
2Los Angeles Times , ^pril 12, 1963, p. 1.
-'Long Beach (Cal.) Press Telegram , April 12, 1963, p. 1.
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carried under a four-bank, eight=column banner headline
,
which took up one-third of the front page =
WAS SUB UNSAFE?
v Get Another Man... I Don't
Think This Tub Will Make It'
Santa Ana Crewman Told Wife
(The display was so noteworthy that another Long Beach
newspaper, a privately-owned paper devoted to coverage of
Navy activities, commented on it in its editorial columns.
It called the coverage a "...frightening example of yellow
journalism," and continued"
The men of the Thresher died with dignity and in silence,
deep in the ocean's bowels. Wherever they are now, it is
our prayer that they see not the words of sensationalism
in the few newspapers who "played" the story with irre-
sponsibility .1)
A Connecticut man, with two brothers aboard THRESHER
(the only case of brothers serving in the ship) traveled to
Portsmouth and asked to be heard by the court of inquiry,
where he said: "They were both extremely apprehensive about
2
the condition of Thresher."
On April 12, The Boston Herald reported:
Mrs. Laurence Whitten, of Northwood, N.H., wife of an
electronics engineer on the Thresher, admitted she had
no faith in the sub "because they have dragged it into
dry dock so many times."
She had a premonition of horror.
"I told him not to go, " she said. "But he told me it
was his job. "3
iLong Beach Dispatch
,
April 19, 1963, p. 4.
2The Boston Globe , April 14, 1963, p. 1.
3 The Boston Herald , April 12, 1963, p. 11.
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At the same time, another point of view was being expressed.
The Los Angeles Times quoted a relative as saying:
"Ronald tried many things during his 13 years in the Navy,
but being aboard the Thresher was his greatest thrill . . „ n
MHe spent his last leave with us just before reporting to
the sub. He was happier than I had ever seen him . . ."-*-
The Boston Globe reported the comments of a crewman's
mother, who lived in Wellesly, Massachusetts:
"It's funny," she said, "but I had never been afraid for him.
He loved the submarine service and used to call the Thresher
'my $1+3 million home'."
The Boston Re cord-American reported that one of the
THRESHER'S crew who had remained ashore
. . . said the morale of the Thresher crew was higher than
average
.
He said the men who served aboard in the sea and shock trials
felt it was America's finest submarine and "the feeling was
infectious to new men".
A former member of THRESHER'S crew, who was then serving
in Chicago, told the Chicago Tribune ;
"When I went to sea on the Thresher, 1 had the safest feel-
ing of any ship I have served on. I felt safer submerged
than on the surface. The Thresher belonged to the sea. She
looked out of place on the surface."^"
Apparently no effort was made to give special prominence
to any of these favorable comments. All were buried in stories
primarily devoted to some other subject.
A startling example of how a story could be given a highly
dramatic "twist" by the careful selection of certain material




April 12, 1963, p. 21.
3 Boston Record-American
,
April 19, 1963, p. 20.
Chicago Tribune , April 13, 1963, p. 2.
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and the avoidance of others can be observed in a story carried
by The Boston Globe
,
under the headline "Relatives Report Fears
of Crew".
The story began
Did the enlisted men who went down with the Thresher know
something about their ill fated ship that the officers didn't
know?
An admiral has quoted the skipper of Thresher as "completely
satisfied with his ship in all respects'1 ,,
But next of kin of some of the men who went to their death
in Thresher's crushed hull painted a totally different pic-
ture .
Veterans of long service in submarines, whose courage and
knowledge of submarines was beyond question, feared this ship.
Some of the crew called the Thresher a coffin and tried with-
out success to get transfers to the other ships
.
One said the Thresher spent most of its short lifespan in
repair yards.
Adm George W Q Anderson, chief of Naval operations, said he
heard rumors about the Thresher but his doubts were dispelled
by another admiral, Rear Adm Charles J Palmer, commanding
officer of the Portsmouth Navy Yard
Adm Palmer told Adm Anderson that Thresher's skipper was
completely satisfied with his ship,,
But the sister and daughter of a veteran submarine man,
electronics technican George J. Kiesecker, 3$, of Los Angeles,
one of the 129 lost in the Thresher, recalled today that
Kiesecker called Thresher "a coffin" and tried to secure a
transfer from it,
Kiesecker 's wife told her sister that when her husband bade
her goodbye Sunday, he told her "Honey, I have a feeling this
will be our last trip, that you will be a wealthy widow before
the week is out ."
Kiesecker's sister-in-law said the veteran of 20 years'
submarine service "was afraid for the first time in his life
after he was transferred to Thresher".
He had earlier served on the first Nautilus and the Sea
Dragon o In World War II, he applied for submarine service
and was on the submarine that penetrated Tokyo Harbor.
"He went aboard when they commissioned Thresher," she said.
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"George told us it was in drydock most of the time, that it
wasn't a good ship from the beginning, that there was always
trouble .
"
The Thresher had been undergoing overhaul, repairs, and in-
stallation of new equipment for eight months in Portsmouth
Navy Yard just prior to its fateful sailing Sunday*
Another iMavy wife confessed that she had pleaded with her
husband not to make this voyage, but he insisted he had to.
He, too, was an electronics technician* His widow said he
had "no faith" in the submarine which has been "dragged into
dry dock so many times".
But Adm Anderson said, after going to Portsmouth, n
. . .
there was no hint of any concern on the part of the officers,,
crew or civilians about the seaworthiness of this fine ship."-1
The remainder of the story contains a recapitulation of
statements made by Navy officials concerning previous damage to
the submarine, and their explanation of why the submarine had
been in the yard so often, along with some speculation about the
possible causes for the submarine's loss.
The author of the story was probably convinced that his
account was accurate* And yet, he made several slight errors
(some of which affected the sense of the story), drew certain
generalizations from isolated incidents, left out facts which
were probably available to him and in general, heightened the
dramatic quality of his story.
An item by item examination of these discrepancies is
revealing.
Item.
Some of the crew called Thresher a coffin and tried with-
out success to get transfers to other ships.
Comment: The only stories in which it was said that a
crewman called the submarine a coffin, were those referring to
1The Boston Globe





One said the Thresher spent most of its short lifespan in
repair yards.
Comment: This too, was attributed only to Kiesecker, al-
though the "some . . . one . . . " combination tends to imply that
the statements were made by different crewmen.
Item:
Adm George W, Anderson, chief of Naval operations, said he
heard rumors about Thresher, but his doubts were dispelled
by another admiral, Rear Adm Charles J. Palmer . . .
Comment: The actual statement issued by Admiral Anderson
was
:
Inevitably in the wake of such a major tragedy as that in-
volving THRESHER, rumors arise as to the physical ability of
the ship, aircraft, or other vehicle concerned, to carry out
a particular case. To dispel them in my own mind, I have
personally checked with the commanding officer of Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard . . .
Item:
The Thresher had been undergoing overhaul . . . just prior
to its fateful sailing Sunday.
Comments The ship sailed from Portsmouth on Tuesday,
April 9.
Item:
Another Navy wife confessed that she had pleaded with her
husband not to make this voyage, but he insisted he had to.
He, too, was an electronics technician.
Comment: Although the reporter does not identify the source
of this comment, it is clear that it was Mrs. Laurence Whitten
(quoted above). Since Whitten was a civilian employee of the
-'Department of Defense News Release No. 516-63, of
April 12, 1963s contained in Appendix A.
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shipyard, and not an electronics technician, which is the name of
a isiavy rate, it is incorrect to call Mrs , vvhitten "Another Navy
wife".
Item:
His widow said be had "no faith" in the submarine which has
been "dragged into dry dock so many times".
Comment: The original story says:
Mrs. Laurence Whitten . . . admitted she had no faith in the
sub . o . (underlining added)
Item:
But Adm Anderson said, after going to Portsmouth <, » .
Comment: Admiral Anderson did not visit the shipyard at
any time after the disaster.
The story made no mention of other crewmen's expressions
of confidence in the submarine.
It seems significant that the newspaper in which this story
appeared had previously carried stories expressing the favorable
com. ents of crewmen. In a column adjacent to the story cited
above j it printed a l\iavy statement explaining that THRESHER had
been sent to the shipyard more often than other submarines be-
cause it was the first ship in its class and therefore subject
to special tests , On the same page, it carried another story
which related a heroic act previously performed by a crewman
lost when the submarine went down.
There can be no question but that the newspaper's charac-
teristic reaction was one of sympathy and concern, and its
reporting objective.
Indeed these facts only emphasize the point that the ...est
responsible newsmen writing under the pressure of deadline can
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fall into a pattern of unfortunate oversimplification. It is an
especially unfortunate situation since it offers no simple solution
Newspaper Coverage
And the Time Factor
The rapid decline of space devoted to coverage of the
THRESHER incident has been noted earlier. While in many in-
stances the explanation for this was that there was no news to
report, it can also be observed that as time elapsed, events which
earlier would have warranted great attention were underemphasized.
Consequently, significant but late development in the case were
less likely to be known to the public.
On June 20, 1963, ten weeks after the submarine had been
lost, the results of the court of inquiry were announced in Wash-
inton, D„C. and the news release dealing with the findings was
transmitted to newsmen elsewhere, including Boston. The news
release (attached as Appendix C), if printed in its entirety
would have filled 31 column/inches of space. No newspaper in
the Boston area devoted more than seven inches of space to the
findings of the court despite the fact many had previously used
more space than that to say that the activity of the court of
inquiry was all-important.
To illustrate the effect of passing time on the amount of
coverage devoted to the incident, Table 12 indicates the amount
of space given to the court of inquiry by the four Boston papers
and The New York Times during the first two weeks, on the single





TABLE 12. — Comparison of amount of
space (in column/inches) devoted to
court of inquiry at various times
Total space Maximum space Space
Newspaper during first in any devoted to
two weeks single day findings
The Boston Globe 439 99 4 ~
The Boston Herald 590 197 5
Boston Traveler 310 55 7
Re cord-American 350 105 5
The New York Times 206 77 IS
Only The New York Times and the Boston Re cord -American car-
ried the news in a story devoted exclusively to the findings. The
other newspapers included additional information on the search
findings (although the figures in Table 12 refer only to space de-
voted to the findings). The readers of one newspaper were not
even informed in the headline that the findings of the court were
included in the story. That newspaper's page-one headline said
Trieste Heads for Thresher's Grave
and the first mention of the court's findings occurred in the
third paragraph of the story.
Newspaper Content and Navy
Public Information Officers
A quick glance at the volume of news releases issued by the
Navy in Washington during the two weeks after THRESHER was lost
(Appendix «.) readily indicates that only a minute fraction of the
1The Boston Herald , June 21, 1963, p. 1.
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total newspaper coverage was originated by the Navy.
The Navy played an important part in facilitating other
coverage - by transporting newsmen to the scene of search opera-
tions, by conducting background briefings, by answering press in-
quiries, by holding press conferences, and in other similar ways.
The great bulk of the newspaper coverage was derived from
sources other than the Navy. Newsmen on their own initiative
sought out the next of kin, civilian scientists, and others whose
commentary was interesting. Drawing on their own experience, the
newsmen related accounts of previous trips in nuclear submarines.
Turning to their files, newsmen resurrected the details of previous
submarine disasters. Based on their unique perception of the e-
vent and its consequences on world affairs, some analysts wrote
stories about the implications of the disaster.
In other words, Navy information officials throughout the
United States, working at peak efficiency, could not have begun
to supply all the information which newspaper editors felt was
necessary to tell the whole story of the loss of the submarine.
The collection, preparation and dissemination of news by
the modern communications media is a dynamic process, involving
many individuals - editors, reporters, rewrite men, headline
writers, and certain circumstances the public relations official.
In a fast-breaking story of major magnitude, as the THRESHER
story was, the final product, a news story appearing in a news-
paper, became a mosaic of elements derived from various sources.
A typical THRESHER story might begin in a courtroom at Portsmouth
,
New Hampshire, pass via telephone to a rewrite man in a newsroom,
be subject to modification by a news editor, and be assigned a
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unique slant by a headline writer, and given more or less im-
portance by its placement in the newspapers page.
A "background briefing" provided by a public information
official for the newsmen on the scene thus has in effect only
one of the inputs into the final product - only one element of
the process of reporting.
Even when the public information officer was on the scene,
his influence on the story as read by the public is minor.
Newspapers and the Issues
As noted earlier, it has been suggested that an important
event which involves the self-interest of the public, or which
arouses conflict, anxiety or frustration, will lead to the de-
velopment of issues, which will influence the formation of
public opinion.
As might be expected, many issues arose from the loss of
THRESHER; some were explicitly stated by the press, others were
only implied Some were mentioned only once or twice and then
disappeared; others attracted greater attention; none became a
matter for really extensive discussion in the press a Attention
to the issues accounted for a minute proportion of the total
manifest content
.
An analysis of press coverage indicates that the following
issues were reported.
1. Hazard to the public safety from radioactive contam -
ination , host adults in the United States are probably aware
that radioactivity constitutes a potential hazard to healtho
Perhaps the most immediate potential threat to the self interest

9B
of the American public , in connection with the loss of THRESHER,
was the danger that radioactive material from the submarine's re-
actor might represent a hazard if released «, The wavy maintained
there was "absolutely no chance of nuclear explosion in the sub-
marine, nor is there any danger of radioactive contamination".
The Russian government gave wide dissemination to reports
by its own experts that "the disaster will poison the Atlantic
with radioactivity and endanger waters as far away as Newfound-
land and New York and Boston".
2o Public confidence in the Navy The very fact that
THRESHER was lost indicated that something had gone wrong. This
cast some doubt on the future effectiveness of deep-diving sub-
marines u Strangely, press comment did not dwell at length on
this apparently important issue. The editorial comment of The
Washington Star was typical, "If there is a fatal flaw in the
THRESHER design or the construction specifications, the impli-
2
cations are obvious." However obvious the implications were,
the Star did not spell them out. Did it mean that because the
THRESHER class submarine is designed primarily to fight other
submarines that the Russians, with their large submarine fleet,
would now have an advantage? Did it mean that other submarines
built to the same specification as THRESHER would now have to
operate at reduced depth, with decreased effectiveness? If these
w ere implications, they were only implied, and were never treated
in a forthright manner in the newspaper columns.
-Reported in The Boston Globe , April 14, 1963, p. 50.
2
The Washington Star
, April 16 , 1963, p. 10.
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The most direct statement about the possible implications
that THRESHER r s loss would have on the future operations of nuclear
submarines appeared in the Boston Traveler. The paper stated
editorially:
The nation's ability to survive in an unpredictable world
rests on the reliability of the Polaris missile system, That
missile system in turn rests on the reliability of nuclear
submarines operating at great depths , Up to last Wednesday
s
the Thresher was rated as the best and most dependable deep-
dive nuclear submarine in the U.S. Fleet,
Until we find out what went wrong with her and build safe-
guards to prevent it from happening to other nuclear sub-
marines, our Polaris security theory stands as a question
mark„
It is ironic that the most forthright comment on the pos~
sible operational consequences of the loss of THRESHER, did not
concern the THRESHER class submarines, but referred to a sig-
nificantly different type of submarine, which does not, in fact,
need to operate at great depths to obtain tactical advantages
„
The Christian Science Monitor , which specializes in "inter-
pretive reporting", never investigated the operational impli-
cations of the loss of THRESHER.
Its initial report on the loss of the submarine, began:
Disappearance of the nuclear submarine Thresher off the Massa-
chusetts coast has turned the attention of naval officials--
and of the general public—to how underwater tragedies can
be avoided,
It also raises the question of what went wrong with the
various safety devices of the giant attack submarine, one
of the most modern and best equipped in the iNiavy's arsenal,"
most newspapers felt, like the Monitor , that the prime is-
sue was whether the submarine was safe_, and whether the Navy had
Boston Traveler
,
April 15, 1963, p. 19.
2
The Christian Science Monitor , April 11, 1963 > p° 1°
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taken every possible step to insure the safety of men who sei
in submarines o In this respect, the following issues were do
nant
:
a o jtfas the Navy heedless of the fears of its men ?
The soecial prominence given to stories about crewmen who had ex-
pressed a lack of confidence in their ship has already been noted,
Russian propagandists also attempted to add to the con-
troversy , A United Press International report from Jkoscow said:
Soviet naval authorities said today the loss of the ILS sub-
marine Thresher with 129 aboard may have been due to haste in
getting the vessel into action and to technical shortcomings
„
They added that the accident might testify to the fact that
the level of preparedness and technical equipment did not cor-
respond to the bragging assertion of the American press.
A soviet naval captain, V a Pustov, said "„ „.. . American
authorities knew there was something wrong,""
The New York Times quoted another Russian naval expert, reporting:
The admiral attributed the loss of the 129 men aboard the
Thresher to what he described as the Pentagon's "pursuit of
sensational publicity and dubious priority.," He charged tha^
the Thresher had been compelled to undertake "risky experi-
ment s .
"
b „ Was the iMavy conducting adequate research in s
marine rescue techniques ? The earliest announcements of the less
of THRESHER were accompanied by statements that rescue was im-
possible at the depths at which the submarine was operating. For
most people this was a revelation „ The astronauts are in a sir:.
lar situation for if any crucial equipment should fail, they are
beyond rescue „ The astronauts, however, are clearly recognized
as being explorers, and the calculated risk has been assessed and
2
UP I report in The Boston Globe , April 13, 1963, p^ 3^
2The New York Times
, April 14, 1963, p. 10.
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deemed acceptable, Un the other hand, the wavy is asking thou-
sands of submariners to routinely operate in a hostile environ-
ment where there is no possibility of rescue if an accident
should occur.
The issue did not escape the press. One science editor-
wrote:
Even if the Thresher had gone down in only 800 feet of water
and her hull had remained intact, rescue of those trapped in-
side would have been all but impossible.
The maximum depth that men can be rescued from a submarine
today is 400 feet and even this is straining,
. . , New England, home of three major submarine bases and
with a submarine tradition, will want to know what the navy
could do if faced with yet another submarine disaster.
And again, what research has been carried on to devise new
methods of rescue?
Mow that much of the country's naval strength and depth is
in its underseas craft, both Congress and the people-, may de-
mand a better "safety belt" for submarine personnel,
c . Was the iNiavy doing all it could to determine Lhe
cause of the loss ? As soon as the submarine was reported over-
due, search operations began, and are in progress even as this
is being written (June, 1964) . When it was determined that the
submarine was lost, a court of inquiry was convened to investi-
gate the disaster. As has been noted, these two facets of the
THRESHER incident accounted for more newspaper space than any
other items.
Initial newspaper coverage made it apparent to the public
that an intensive search had been mounted,
A Boston paper said:
It became apparent toward the close of the third day of the





search for Thresher in an area 290 miles east of Boston that
a massive effort would be made to recover at least a part of
the prototype attack submarine from water that runs to a depth
of 5 ,400 feet.
That search will use nuclear submarines, under-water tele-
vision cameras, a diving device in which men have explored
ocean waters to a depth of seven miles and whatever knowledge
is gleaned by a court of inquiry which set up operations yes-
terday at Pcrtsmouth Naval Shipyard
.
The public was made aware of the magnitude of the search
effort, but was also led to expect quick results by optimistic
reports of civilian oceanographers . On April 14, a Boston news-
paper reported that the director of Wood Hole Oceanographic In-
stitution predicted the submarine would be found in seventy two
hours , although the Navy search commander was quoted as saying
the search was "a great big problem which could take days and
days of fine tooth combing. w Expectations that THRESHER would
soon be found, led one Boston paper to report, incorrectly, that
3
the search had been successful.
When the early rumors failed to be fulfilled, the stories
of imminent discovery ended. On kay 31, on the basis of under-
water photographs, the Navy announced that the submarine had been
located, but the pictures were subsequently proven not to be of
THRESHER,
'While it is difficult to assess the effect the various
"THRESHER found" stories and their subsequent retractions had on
public opinion, it can be noted that the press never criticized
the Navy's effort in searching for the submarine.
1The Boston Herald




April 14, 1963, p. 26.
^ The Boston Globe (evening edition), April IS, 1963 s P u lu
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The court of inquiry, however, was criticized, and defended
in the newspapers.
The most outspoken criticism of the court was the previously
mentioned editorial advising the court not to look for scapegoats,
but to "get on with its business."
On another occasion, a New Hampshire Senator told the Senate
he objected to "exaggerations and emotional distortions" sur-
rounding the court. He was reported to have said, "I deplore
the misleading sensationalism of some reports of isolated details
of testimony before the court of inquiry." His criticism was
directed more at the testimony of witnesses than at the pro-
cedures of the court.
Only the day before this statement was made, another Sen-
ator, John C. Pastore, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic
Committee was quoted as saying:
We believe the Navy's board of inquiry is staffed with com-
petent people who have the best interests of the Navy and its
personnel at heart. We believe they, will make every effort
to get to the cause of the tragedy.
Perhaps the public's best clues to the thoroughness of the
court's procedures came from the reporters' descriptions of the
hearings. Descriptions, such as the following, made it seem un-
likely that the court was attempting to "whitewash" any possible
Navy discrepancies:
Vice Adm Bernard L. Austin, leaning hard on Rule £a shipyard
officer] , asked sardonically if he could "give a good reason"
why so many valves were improperly installed, "despite your
^Senator Tom Mclntyre, quoted in The Boston Globe ,
April 24, 1963, p. 24.
2





fine quality control organization?"
d . was the Navy being candid in revealing information
on THitttSHtttt? Those newspapers which chose to comment on the
question of the Navy's candor, were generally favorable . A
correspondent, covering the search operations wrote:
The Navy was not out to manage the news, but out to be sure
all the news available on the Thresher managed to get to
the public.
it may not ever get to the answer as to just whgt happened
and why, but it will not be for lack of trying.
Editorial comment, was also favorable: "Navy spokesmen,
however, deserve credit for their candidness so far, in at-
tempting to explain to the public the intricacies of nuclear
submarine technology."^
While no newspaper openly accused the Navy of purposely
withholding unclassified information, the sensitive reader
might be led to believe that the Navy was not candid in some
instances
.
A California newspaper, for instance, carried the headline
ADMIRAL HIDES SECRETS
OF ATOMIC SUB DISASTER
over a wire service story wnich conveyea a totally different
meaning. The story said:
The admiral in charge of rescue operations the first three
days after the nuclear submarine Thresher sank in the At-
lantic testified today he had formed an opinion as the
cause of the sinking, but he added "it is nothing I care to
The Boston Globe , April 21, 1963, p. 1.
2





April 12, 1963, p. 6.
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state in open session."
A more complicated example was a series of stories printed
by The Boston Globe , which began with a report by the newspaper
that THRESHER had been found.
A late edition of the paper carried the banner headline,
Thresher Found Intact, Flooded.
The story read:
WOODS HOLE—The Thresher has been located. It is intact and
flooded. It may be salvageable.
The nuclear powered submarine that was lost with 129 men
aboard in a test dive on April 10 was located on the ocean
floor 220 miles east of Boston in more than 8000 feet of
water.
This was learned today when the Atlantic II, research ship
of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution here, returned in
fog and drizzle to pick up more electronic sounding equip-
ment .
The hope of salvaging the submarine is understandably slender
Whether or not the Thresher can ever be brought to the sur-
face again depends almost entirely upon the capabilities and
resourcefulness of the bathyscaph Trieste scheduled to arrive
here from the West Coast within a fortnight.
At no place in the story was the source of information
cited. The newspaper made no attempt to confirm the story with
i\iavy officials until the paper was on the streets, Navy public
information officials were advised by Woods Hole authorities that
the story was incorrect, and so informed the newspaper.
Subsequently, the author was advised by newspaper sources
that the story was based on information from a civilian at Woods
Hole Oceanographic Instituion, whom they preferred not to iden-
Long Beach, California Press- Telegram , April 16, 1963
>
p . A-l .
2
The Boston Globe , evening edition, April 18, 1963, p <> 1«
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tify, except to explain that he was "reliable. 11 Newspaper per-
sonnel admitted the story was exaggerated, but said this was the
result of misunderstandings between a reporter and a re-write man
and the over-enthusiam of a headline writer.
It was explained that the newspaper had failed to check
the story with the Navy prior to publication because of the pres-
sure of deadline.
On the day after the initial story appeared, the paper re-
ported :
Hopes that the submarine Thresher may be located in her under-
water burial place brightened Thursday . . .
A Boston Globe story that the stricken sub had been located
was denied Thursday night by the Navy and the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution.
This particular statement did not tend to discredit the
Navy, but on April 24, the paper reported: "Despite previous
denials, the Navy acknowledged Tuesday that six ocean-bottom
'protuberances, considered real good prospects,' had been found o"^
The story referred to the fact that a Navy spokesman in
a briefing for newsmen in Washington, had indicated that the
search had isolated a series of "bottom anomalies." The spokes-
man explained at length that these could be rock outcroppings or
old ship wrecks. At no time did he suggest any confirmation of
the newspaper's report.
On May 31, after the Navy made its incorrect announcement
that THRESHER had been located, the newspaper again implied that
previous Navy denials were false. Under the headline
XThe Boston Globe
. April 19, 1963, p. 1.
2The Boston Globe





The announcement Thursday that the submarine Thresher had
been found confirmed a Boston Globe story of six weeks ago
which reported location of the wreckage.
Navy officials at the time denied this report, as did of-
ficers of the search ship which reportedly had made contact
with the ill-fated vessel by sonar soundings.
a source aboard the Atlantis told the Globe that Thresher's
hull was recorded for a second or two in a sweep of the re-
search ship's sounding equipment
.
While the newspaper was not pressing the point of the kavy
denials, it did continue to imply that the newspaper was correct
and the Navy wrong.
Significantly, the newspaper did not offer an explanation
of how it concluded, in its initial story, that the submarine
was intact, flooded and salvageable when the information was
based on a sound recording of a "second or two."
3. Long-range defense programs . In addition to the im-
mediate implications raised about the future of the THRESHER
class submarine in our defense program, the loss of THRESHER
raised other issues which might have the gravest effects on the
defense program in the future. Although they were given rela-
tively little treatment in the press, they include the fol-
lowing:
a
. Access to foreign ports for nuclear powered
vessels
.
The primary strategic purpose of any navy is to pro-
The Boston Globe
.
May 31, 1963, p. 1.
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vide mobile force which can operate in advance areas. In this re-
spect, the opportunity to use friendly foreign ports, though not
essential is advantageous. The loss of THRESHER immediately re-
vived long-standing and politically motivated demands in Japan,
that nuclear submarines not be allowed in that country's ports.
Immediately after the disaster, a Los Angeles Times correspondent
wrote from Tokyo:
Disappearance of the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Thresher
off Boston will lead to increased protests in Japan against
American plans to berth atomic submarines here.
Socialist opponents of the United States request that nu-
clear submarines be permitted to call at Japanese ports
have already taken up the issue.
They say the Thresher incident proves that nuclear vessels
are not as safe as American experts have assured the Japa-
nese government.
A wire service story from Tokyo, on April 17, reported
the Japanese foreign minister had said his country was "not in
a position to reject port calls b> (U.S.) nuclear-powered sub-
marines. w In a press conference, he said
But the Japanese government has asked the United States
government to provide information on the causes of the
loss of Thresher and answers to questions on the safety
of atomic subs.
b . Type of Polaris launchers for proposed NATO
deterrent force . At the time of the loss of THHKSHKR, dis-
cussions were being held by iMATO members concerning the possible
methods of deploying Polaris missiles, which were proposed as
the main NATO nuclear deterrent. The question, essentially, was
^Ted Sell, Los Angeles Times , April 12, 1963, p. 2.
2Associated Press story in the Los Angeles Times
,
April 17, 1963, p. 6.
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whether the missiles should be deployed in surface ships or sub-
marines. Either type ship would be manned by mixed crews from
several nations. Hanson Baldwin, one of the nation's leading
military analysts, wrote that the loss of THRESHER would seri-
ously affect the decisions as to the type of ship selected. He
said
,
... if Thresher, manned by a carefully selected and trained
crew from one nation could come to grief, what might happen
to an even more complex submarine of a Polaris type, manned
by a crew drawn from several nations?
4. Privately run verses Navy shipyards . The question of
the relative merits of private and navy shipyards is constantly
being debated. The issue was particularly important at the time
of the loss of THRESHER, since Congress was considering the 1964
defense budget, which contained a provision that a prescribed
amount of iMavy work would be done in private shipyards. The Ma-
rine Editor of the New York Herald Tribune reported on April 12,
The Navy's Bureau of Ships is conducting a quiet campaign
in Congress for elimination of a requirement in the pending
Defense Appropriations Bill that at least 35 per cent of all
Navy modernization and overhaul work be assigned to pri-
vately operated shipyards instead of Navy yards.
Private shipbuilders contend their yards are operated more
efficiently than naval shipyards making it possible for them
to execute modernization and repair work more quickly and
inexpensively than in naval yards.
2
The fact that THRESHER had been built and overhauled in
a navy shipyard (Portsmouth, New Hampshire) led to some lively
comment by proponents of private and navy yards.
Connecticut Representative William L. St.Onge, represents
1The New York Times
, April 13, 1963, p. 6.
p . 22
.
2Walter Hamshar, New York Herald Tribune , April 12, 1963,
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the area in which the electric Boat Division of General Dynamics
is locatedo Electric Boat is the largest civilian shipyard en-
gaged in the construction of nuclear submarines. Mr. St.Onge,
according to an Associated Press report,
. . . said the engineers at General Dynamics' Electric Boat
Division felt the original design for the Thresher failed
to meet minimum safety requirements.
Mr. St.Onge said Electric Boat engineers saw the original
specification for the Thresher and, felt the submarine would
be a "waterlogged floating stump."
He also reported that Electric Boat had refused to bid on con-
struction of Thresher class submarines, but this story was
quickly disproved when the Navy pointed out that the company
was at that time working on five submarines of that class.
One of the submarines that Electric Boat was building,
FLASHER, was struck by a fire on May 8, which killed three work-
men. Congressman St.Onge said he would "... request an im-
mediate investigation of the cause and particularly whether any
2
sabotage was involved."
On the same day, i\iew Hampshire Congressman , Louis C. Wyman,
was defending the Portsmouth shipyard. He too hinted at sa-
botage, apparently a favorite defense, for the integrity of a
yard, which is under fire, a newpaper account said:
"Let us quit blaming Portsmouth for the loss," wyman urged
in the House.
Gong. Wyman told Congress that "rumors, speculation, in-
dividual sour grapes and outright slander by headline
seekers are contributing to give the Portsmouth Naval bhip-









yard, its officers and its workers an undeserved and unwar-
ranted black eye."
"It is entirely possible that the loss had nothing whatsoever
to do with the Portsmouth yard or with any structural failure
within the submarine itself," wyman said.
"It is entirely possible that the loss was deliberately
brought about. we do not know/' he said.
The issues--a summary
These were the issues by implication only. They were
seldom succinctly stated; they were never the object of exten-
sive and purposeful discussion; and they accounted for only a
minute part of LHe total coverage given to the event, borne were
mentioned in only one newspaper (as the case of the implications
for Solaris submarines for NATO, which was the work of a single
analyst and was never commented on by other writers).
Almost a year after THkESH&k was lost, on March 4, 1964,
an hour-long television documentary, "The Legacy of the Thresher,"
was broadcast by the Uolumbia Broadcasting System television net-
work, after extensive interviews witn persons associated with
the search for THRESHEk, CBS concluded that the "legacy" of the
submarine was the dramatization of the need for additional know-
ledge of the ocean depths.
The other issues, drawn from the newspapers in April, 1963,
were not mentioned in the television program. Indeed they have
been neglected by the mass media almost from the day they were
raised
.







(1) The "issues" never existed, as such, in the public mine.
(2) That the issues existed, but were resolved.
(3) That the issues are dormant.
The most likely resolution of the problems of the issues
is a combination of the three possibilities.
•borne of the potential issues were simply not important
to the American public. By and large, the man on the street is
not significantly concerned about whether iMavy ships are built
in private or public shipyards (unless he is employed by one or
the other), or whether Japanese ports are available to Navy ships.
Certain other issues were unquestionably resolved. The
most dramatic of these was the possibility of a threat to per-
sonal safety--t,n<= Udnger to health from radiation. This issue
was resolved when the public accepted as credible, the state-
ments of authorities who said that no danger existed. Perhaps
a similar process resolved other issues, Navy officials said
they had done everything possible to prevent the accident, those
Navy sources were accepted as credible, therefore the public
was satisfied by the explanation.
In the months since the loss of THRESHER, the Navy has an-
nounced that it has made certain changes to submarines of the
same class, and was incorporating additional safety measures into
new construction submarines. The formation of a special board to
study the problems of deep submergence also indicated the Navy's
concern and that it was taking appropriate steps.
The resolution of the issues associated with the THRESHER
See Department of Defense news release #5^2-63, April 25,
1963, included in Appendix A.
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incident was almost invariably based on the evaluation of highly
technical information—in many instances classified, and in most
instances complicated beyond the ability of most citizens to un-
derstand. The resolution of the issues became a product of the
public's confidence in its officials.
Any influence the loss of THRESHER has had on public
opinion seems, after one year, peripheral at most. The dramatic
example of THRESHER will surely continue to stimulate interest in
oceanography. It might be a factor if a proposal were made to
man nuclear submarines with crews of mixed nationality.
The THRESHER incident will be recalled whenever men talk
of disaster at sea. The example of THRESHEtt may influence some
decisions in the future, but it would still seem that the spe-
cific incident of the loss of THRESHEit never generated any cru-
cial issues for the American public.

CHAPTER III
i\EWSMEN ' S COMKEN TS
Oh THE THRESHER INCIDENT
Since the public's perception of the THRESHER incident was
based primarily on account in the mass media, the men who pre-
pared those accounts played a crucial role in the total public
relations picture.
The author, therefore, interviewed representatives of all
media, including newsmen from Boston, Portsmouth and Washington,
D.C.
Each newsman was asked to comment on his assessment of the
performance of Navy public relations officials and to discuss
any matters which helped or hindered him in his attempt to cover
the story
.
Responses varied widely. Some newsmen were lavish in
their praise of the i\iavy T s performance during the disaster
.
Other's were critical. Often newsmen differed in their as-
sessment of the same event. In other cases, there was almost
universal agreement.
A summary of their comments on each important phase of
the THRESHER disaster follows.
Washington, D.C.
Newsmen interviewed in Washington, agreed that the iMavy's




terized the Navy's handling of the matter as "about the best job
1 2
i r ve seen done here." Another called it "almost perfect." A
3third said, "The people the Navy had down here were faultless."
All were impressed with the Navy's candor, the speed with
which it disseminated information, and its efforts to keep them
provided with information, even about events which were not oc-
curring in Washington.
One newsman felt that much of the success could be cred-
ited to Admiral George W. Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations
He said:
I don't recall seeing anything handled better than the
THRESHER case. The Chief of Naval Operations obviously de-
cided it was a Navy problem and the Navy should tell every-
thing it knew as fast as it could.
The Navy had its best PIO on the story—Admiral Anderson.
He has an unusual appreciation of the need for informing
people
.
He assembled a little group of professional men and kept
them here all night. Any question you asked you could get
a factual answer.^
Portsmouth, New Hampshire—Early Phase
Although most of the newsmen who covered the initial re-
lease of information in Portsmouth praised the Navy, they did
so with qualification.
Their criticism was not directed at the performance of
public information officials at Portsmouth, but at the fact that
--Interview with Charles Corddry, United Press International
Pentagon correspondent, Washington, D.C., April 26, 1963.
2
Interview with Elton Fay, Associated Press Pentagon
correspondent, Washington, D.C., April 26, 1963.
^Interview with Fred A. Hoffman, Associated Press Penta-
gon correspondent, Washington, D.C., April 26, 1963.
^Charles Corddry, interview with the author.
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the Navy had chosen to make Washington, rather than Portsmouth,
the focal point for the release of information.
They pointed out that the loss of THRESHER was a New Eng-
land story and that most aspects of the incident would be covered
by New England newsmen. They complained that local officials
often could not release information without "clearing it with
Washington." They were particularly critical of the delay in the
release of crewmen's names and of the lack of positive .infor-
mation on plans for transportation to the scene of the search
operations
.
The newsmen praised the performance of the Public Infor-
mation Officer, and felt he did everything possible to assist
them despite obvious obstacles.
Significantly, there was very little criticism of the
events which occurred after the first day. The newsmen at-
tributed this to the fact that the public information organi-
zation has "settled down." It is interesting to note, however,
that it was at this time that Portsmouth did become the focal
point of news coverage, and this fact may have unconsciously
influenced their evaluation.
Radio and television representatives (who could not cover
the story to the degree that newspaper reporters couldj offered
practically no criticism of the Portsmouth operation.
Portsmouth—Court of inquiry
Newsmen who covered the activities of the court of inquiry
were generally outspoken in their praise.
They were pleased with the cooperation of the members of
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the court (particularly the President, Vice admiral Austin ) and
the assistance of the public information officer.
One newsman felt that too many of the sessions were closed;
most of the others were convinced they were allowed to hear ail
significant unclassified testimony. A few expressed surprise
that some of the information they were allowed to hear was not
given in closed sessions.
One reported said:
We were aware that the court discussed things in closed
session that were not classified. On one occasion, the
court heard the testimony of several young seamen from SKY-
LARK. It was apparent that the public's presence would have
inhibited their responses— so we understood that, situation
.
We were given access to all the legitimate news.
Search Operations
The reporters who were aboard the i\iavy destroyer which
participated in the early search for THRESHER agreed that this
was an important phase of the coverage of the whole incident
.
They were surprised that the Navy had even considered cancelling
the trip and were generally irritated at the i\iavy T s delay in
announcing its plans in this respect.
A reporter who was aboard the ship said:
It proved to be a very productive trip. We had an oppor-
tunity to talk to the scientists, who gave us their approach
to the search problem; we were able to observe the tech-
niques of the search. Most of all, we were able to capture
the color and the drama which was a vital part of the story.
We went through a gale and knew the problems tnat the navy
faced. We observed the emotions of the men on the ship, we
were impressed with the effort the Navy was making and our
stories reflected this.
Interview with Robert Norling, City Editor, The Ports -
mouth Herald , Portsmouth, iM.H., May 24, 1963.
2
Interview with Ed. McGrath, The Boston Globe , Boston,
Mass. , May 21, 1963.
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The Unique View from the Newsroom
Although most of the interviews were conducted with re-
porters who had covered the events at first hand, some were with
newspaper personnel who remained in the newsroom. Among these
were the city editors of three tsoston newspapers.
The author had expected to find that their views woulo re-
flect the experiences and opinions of the reporters on their
staffs. This was not altogether true. In one case, several re-
porters had related various irritating delays and problems which
they had faced.
Their city editor told the author, "I have no comments on
specific problems. As a matter of fact, no one who was on the
story complained to me about any problems."
Equally strange is the fact that the city editors of the
three papers differed somewhat in their assessment of public re-
lations matters associated with the disaster.
One city editor summarized his comments, by saying, "The
Navy did the best job it possibly could have under difficult
2
circumstances. I have no criticism of anything that was done."
Another city editor said, "I can't think of anything that
was too bad. We have to understand that when a story as big as
THRESHER occurs, mistakes will be made on both sides. 1 have no
3
complaints . . .
1
Interview with Joe Dineen, Night City editor, The Boston
Globe
,
Boston, Mass., May 23, 1963.
2
Interview with John Mannion, City editor, The Boston
Herald , Boston, Mass., August 15, 1963.
3
^Interview with Joseph Dineen, Night City Editor, The
Boston Globe
,
Boston, Mass., May 23, 1963.
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Yet another city editor said:
I think that sometimes Navy officials weren't quite as well
informed about the case as we wert . . .
Some people on this case broke their backs to get information
to us. If they were stumped on a question they would try to
find the answers.
Sometimes our reporters discovered resistance.
In general, the, Navy tends to overprctect its personnel and
their families.
While the editors' opinions of the performance of Navy of-
ficials varied, they all agreed that, good or bad, the perfor-
mance of public information officers would in no way influence
the newspaper's coverage of the event.
The editor who had been somewhat dissatisfied with the
Navy's performance, said "we don't allow opinion to creep into
the news. Our editorial opinion might be caustic but we re-
main objective in the news columns."
The editors' opinions of their ability to remain rea-
sonably objective despite any personal dissatisfaction, is borne
out by the evaluation of the three newspapers' coverage of the
THRESHER case. The author is unable to observe any long-term
trend of coverage slanted so as to be favorable or unfavorable
to the Navy.
While there was no trend of biased reporting, there were
many instances of subjective reporting, editing, and headline
writing (notable examples have already been indicated^. That
Interview with John Brookes, City editor, boston Record -
American





this problem is inherent in the business of reporting the news,
is indicated by the many studies that have been written docu-
menting lapses of truth, fairness and objectivity in reporting
1
the news.
Despite this fact, the almost universal answer that re-
porters gave when the author asked, "ban you remain objectives",
was an unqualified HYes. M almost invariably reporters reiterated
the maxim that editorial comment should be reserved for the edi-
torial page.
Interviews with editorial writers, however, revealed that
reporters rarely communicate information to them, which the re-
porter felt "should be reserved for the editorial page."1
Pentagon correspondent , bit on Fay, was one of a very few
newsmen who admitted the possibility of personal emotions be-
coming involved in a news story. he said,
Of course there are times when 1 get angry--if i feel that
1 have been lied to, 1 get angry. in a way, 1 get paid lor
getting angry, but that doesn't affect the way 1 write a
story. Or at least, it shouldn't.
Another Washington newsman, Fred Hoffman, admitted the
possibility of subjective writing, and suggested a novel pre-
caution, the careful selection of adjectives and a complete
3
avoidance of "extravagant phrases."
Such insight into the existence of the problem was rarely
expressed
.
A notable study is Wilbur Schramm's Responsibility in Mass
Communications
,
(New York: Harper and Brothers , 1957) , chap . 8,
"Truth and Fairness," pp. 217-265.
2
Fay, interview with the author.
3
Hoffman, interview with the author.
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Newsmen T s recommendations
Each newsman interviewed was told that the purpose of this
study was to determine what procedure should be followed in the
future to facilitate coverage of fast-breaking news stories.
Each was asked his recommendations for future incidents.
The replies were invariable couched in the most general
terms.
The most consistently stated recommendation was that the
armed services should have more public information officers, and
that the public information officers should be experienced in
newspaper work.
This, newsmen said, would insure that the public infor-
mation officer had an appreciation for the newspapers' require-
ments—both as to the type of information desired, and special
requirements, such as meeting deadlines.
The Boston newsmen generally felt that the focal point
for release of information should be as close as possible to the
site of the event..
Editors stressed the importance of the wavy's immediately
advising its local authorities of the plan of action in other
areas. This, the editors said, would enable them to assigr
their reporters to the points of principal interest.
Several reporters, notably those who had accompanied the
destroyer which participated in the search, said that public
information plans should invariably proviae for newsmen to have
direct access to the scene of action.
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Newsmen* s Assessment of the THRESHER
Incident as a "Big Story"
All newsmen who were asked, correctly predicted that the
THRESHER story would be among the "ten biggest stories" of 1963*
All said they were aware of the magnitude of the story as soon
as they learned what had happened.
'When asked why the story was of such interest, most news-
men, almost automatically, enumerated several reasons. The
most mentioned were: (1) the great loss of life and property,
(2) the fact that THRESHER was the first nuclear ship to be
lost, and (3) the possible consequence to the defense program.
After quickly naming these reasons, and in response to
further questioning, several newsmen added that the mysterious
nature of the loss and the suspense of the search added to the
story. Another reason consistently given was that sea tragedies
always attract special interest.
A surprising explanation, all the more interesting because
it was advanced independently by several newsmen, was that peo-
ple are all somewhat claustrophobic and were therefore compul-
sively drawn to the story. Several reporters saia that reports
of the incident must have elicited "images" of trapped men
struggling as water poured into the submarine. This theory is
supported by the fact that a national magazine illustrated its
account of the loss of THREbhaili with an artist's representation
1
of just such a scene.
Life
,
Vol. 54, No. 16 (April 19, 1963), pp. 40-41.

CHaPTER IV
THE PATTERN OF DISASTER COVERAGE
Several newsmen told the author that public information of-
ficials could facilitate coverage of any future disasters by "an-
ticipating the requirements of the press ." The suggestion im-
plies a more or less standard set of requirements coiunon to all
disaster situations.
Examination of newspaper coverage of previous disasters
reveals that there are not only elements common to all major
disasters, but that the newspaper coverage is indeed so stand-
ardized that it can be predicted with reasonable accuracy.
For purposes of comparison with the THRESHER case, two
previous naval disasters were studied. One was the explosion
aboard the aircraft carrier USS LEYTE in 1953, which caused the
deaths of thirty-seven men; the other was the explosion aboard
the aircraft carrier USS BEM\ill\iGTGiM
,
in 1954? in which one
hundred and four officers and men perished.
From the many cases that could have been studied, these
were chosen since the comments of public information officers
involved have been recorded. Also, in common with the THRESHER






On October 17, 1953, an explosion of unknown origin
rocked the aircraft carrier Ui>b LEYTE, which was undergoing
repairs in drydock at the boston Naval Shipyard. Thirty-four
navymen and civilian shipyard workers were killed in the blast
and three other subsequently succumbed to injuries,
The explosion started fires which sent pillars of dense
smoke into the sky and served as a beacon to direct newsmen to
the scene of the disaster. Reporters and photographers gained
entry to the yard by following fire engines, almost bumper to
bumper, arriving at the scene ahead of any Navy public infor-
mation officers. (The public information officer from the ship
had been killed in the explosion.)
The reporters and photographers gained access to the ship,
but were ordered off by the commanding officer, who was direct-
ing fire- fighting operations. Armed marine guards escorted the
men from the ship. The guards did not have to use force, but
did have to "let them know we were right behind them and meant
business." as soon as some newsmen were escorted down one
brow (or gang plank) they boarded the ship from another. One
reporter was taken from the ship "at least three times." The
order was therefore given to remove the reporters from the ship-
yard. This was being done as the First Naval District Public
Information Officer arrived at the scene. After consultation
with the ship's commanding officer, he obtained permission for
The account is derived from a study made by Lt . E. L.




the newsmen to remain near the scene, on condition that they did
not board the ship, (One reporter, an honorary fireman, re-
mained aboard the ship for three hours, dressed in firemen's
protective clothing.)
While the public information officer had averted one
highly undesirable situation, another was developing at tne
shipyard gate. Only the reporters who had arrived at the time
the fire engines were passing through the gate had gained ac-
cess to the shipyard. Other newsmen (along with all civilians
and naval personnel who did not have a direct connection with
the fire-fighting operation) had been barred from entering.
In addition, photographers who had attempted to leave the
shipyard during that period, had been detained and their cam-
eras and film impounded.
The public information officer, engaged in providing in-
formation for the reporters already on the scene, was unaware
of these developments, and the yard was not opened to all news-
men who wanted to cover the event until almost three hours af-
ter the initial explosion.
The fires were extinguished four hours after the ex-
plosion, and two hours later, the commanding officer of the
ship met with newmen for a press conference.
Despite the basically bad press relations which had
evolved during the early hours of the disaster, the public
information officer was able to re-establish satisfactory
working relationships with the press by insuring their ac-
cess to subsequent events.
The court of inquiry was appointed the day after the
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explosion and the members arrived in tsoston the following day.
The next morning, hearings began . wewsmen where allowed to sit
in on all unclassified sessions, and to photograph witnesses
after they had testified
.
During early sessions it became apparent that the prob-
able cause of the explosion was a failure in the hydraulic sys-
tem of the ship's catapult mechanism, which was being tested
at the time of the explosion,.
After the first four days of hearing, the court was re-
cessed so that tests on parts which were suspected of causing
the explosion could be conducted. ihis was accomplished a
week later and the court met for two more days before concluding
its investigation.
On the day that the court had first met, memorial ser-
vices were held aboard LEYTE. Newsmen were invited to attend,





On May 26, 1954, an explosion occurred aboard the air-
craft carrier US:> BENNINGTON , operating at sea off Boston.
One hundred and three officers and men were killed and damage
to the ship amounted to two million dollars. Casualties were
evacuated to the Quonset Point Naval Air Station, Rhode Island,
and the ship subsequently came into port there.
Since the explosion had occurred at sea, the press was
Account derived from "a Case otudy of Public Relations
Aspects of USS BENNINGTON Disaster" { Unpublished report pre-
pared by U.S. Navy, November, 1954).
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unaware of the disaster. At about 10 a cm., roughly three and
one-half hours after the explosion, the Commandant of the First
Naval District made the initial release of the news in response
to an Associated Press inquiry.
The First iMaval District Public Information Officer (the
same man who had handled the LuiYTE disaster) went to Quonset
Point and established liaison with officials there. Arrange-
ments for assisting the press were completed prior to their ar-
rival. When the ship come into port, newsmen were allowed to
board her to photograph the disaster area and to interview crew-
men and other officials. The activity went on throughout the
night. Later, newsmen were assisted in their coverage of court
hearings, memorial services and related developments.
There was no duplication of the undesirable public re-
lations circumstances which had surrounded the early phases of
the LEYTE disaster.
Press Coverage of the Disasters
To determine press coverage of the disaster, microfilm
editions of the Boston Daily Globe , The Boston Herald and
The New York Times were examined-
Despite essential differences in the circumstances and
events associated with the LEYTK, BENNINGTON and THRESHER in-
cidents, the pattern of newspaper coverage was strikingly
similar. Certain important elements appeared in each news-
paper in each circumstance. The New York Times , in each





instance, avoided detailed accounts of the more emotional
events, such as the reactions of the next of kin. The Times
also devoted less space to the incidents than did the Boston
papers, but it touched on most of the same subjects.
The same categories into which the TH&ESHJSR, stories were
divided, could be used to describe the LEYTE and Buiivl i\l ii\i GTOim
coverage, except that there were no stories on nuclear radi-
ation, search operations or international reaction, and there
were extensive accounts of the progress of injured men.
On the basis of the examination of press coverage and the
reports of public information officer, the following "typical"
pattern of response to a major shipboard disaster can be in-
ferred:
First Day
(1) Newsmen learn of trie occurrence of a disaster and
all available reporters and photographers from local news-
papers are assigned to cover the various aspects of the event,
vtfire services and major out-of-town newspapers send in cor-
respondents. Certain reporters, experienced in one phase or
another of disaster coverage are assigned to their "specialty"--
some will concentrate on obtaining factual information and eye-
witness accounts, others will interview the next of kin, others
will report the mood at the scene of the disaster and in sec-
ondary places, such as the hospital to which the injured are
taken.
(2) Newsmen arrive at the scene, seeking direct access
to the event. They are primarily interested in three things:
the opportunity to observe the scene at first hand, obtaining
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the names and addresses of the dead and injured and inter-
viewing officials concerning the cause of the disaster.
(3) Reporters not actually at the scene of the disaster
begin research on previous similar disasters, as indications
of the magnitude of the disaster are received, they draw com-
parisons of previous and present disasters— is this the big-
gest? wnen was the last time a similar disaster occurred? A
newsman who covered a similar disaster writes his recollections
of the previous occurrence.
(4) Artist prepare maps, showing where the disaster oc-
curred and cutaway drawings showing the internal arrangement of
the ship.
(5) On the basis of the first reports, the newspaper goes
to press. The story is described under a banner headline, in-
dicating the number of dead, the place at which the disaster
occurred and the manifest cause of the disaster.
First day coverage of one Boston paper for each of the
disasters indicates the pattern.
The LEYTE disaster:
NAVY BLAST KILLS 33
Carrier Leyte Rocked at South Boston Dock; 40 Hurt.
The BENNINGTON disaster:
100 Killed in Carrier Fire
125 Hurt on USS BENNINGTON Off N.E. Coast.
2
The loss of THRESHER:
Boston Daily Globe
.
October 17, 1953, p. 1.
2
Boston Evening Globe
, May 26, 1954, p. 1.

130
Atomic Submarine Lost in Atlantic
Hope All But Gone . or 129 Men
USS Thresher Crushed 8400 Feet bown
^Navy Fears, in Worst Underwater Loso
(6) A previous photograph of the ship involved in the
disaster is printed, along with the picture of the commanding
officer.
(7) In adjacent columns, reporters tell of the reports of
eye-witnesses, the reaction of the next of kin who await word
on the fate of their loved ones and the plans for iMavy officials
to visit the scene. This initial coverage is essentially sym-
pathetic; the sense of personal loss pervades the stories.
Second Day
(1) The press remains at the scene of the disaster,
awaiting any comments by Navy officials. Next of kin are in-
terviewed in their homes. Messages of sympathy are received
by the Navy and are reported by the press. More eye witness
accounts are obtained, but the emphasis is on what the cause
might have been rather than a description of the scene itself.
(2) The composition of the court of inquiry is announced
and the president is interviewed. He is asked for his opinion
as to the cause and the probable areas to be investigated by
the court. He is obliged to explain that he has no precon-
ceived opinions as to the cause, and the court will follow
all avenues of investigation which might lead them to an an-
swer. The press reports that the Navy is "baffled as to the
The Boston Globe
.
April 11, 1963, p. 1.
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cause" and has no leads. The question of the possibility of
sabotage is raised, and the i^avy announces that it has not
ruled this possibility out, but that it seems unlikely.
(3) The newspaper prints a list of all the oead and in-
jured, and carries a full page of pictures of casualties.
(4) Ironic stories are related--men who aio not go on the
fateful cruise are interviewed; the relatives of men who aied
report that the victim had premonitions of disaster.
(5) Congressmen announce tiiat they will seek lull in-
vestigations of the disaster.
(0) becond day coverage is still displayed prominently
on page one, although the headlines are smaller, bev-ral dif-
ferent developments in the event are reporteo in a single
story, whereas they would have been dealt with separately on
the previous day.
Thirc bay
(1) Attention shifts to the court of inquiry, with
secondary emphasis on the other aspects (such as the progress
of injured men in the case of the two explosions, or the prog-
ress of the search in trie case of ThTti&>H£tt. ) The first wit-
nesses before the court aescribe the events that occurred,
kuch of the testimony duplicates information that lias already
appeared in the newspapers, but the accounts of the testimony
are covered thoroughly by the reporters.
(2) The newspaper prints editorials expressing the sym-
pathy ol' the nation to the relatives of the men who have died.
It is noted that their sacrifice is the price of defense readi-




(1) The court hears its first opinions as to tne possible
cause of the disaster, ana these opinions are reported in de-
tail. Other developments in the incident are included in the
story reporting the activities of the court.
(2) kemorial services are held. Newsmen devote as much
attention to the reactions of relatives of the victims who
attend the memorial services as they qo to the principals
conducting the ceremonies.
bubsequent Days
(1) Court testimony tends to become repetitious as new
witnesses confirm the accounts of previous witnesses. The
first closed session is especially significant, but as more
and more testimony is he]d in closed session, press interest
dwindles
.
(2) newspaper coverage is considerably curtailed--
other stories of major importance will push the disaster
story off the front pages. Lacking other significant news
(i.e. if it is a "slow news day" ) editors may give the dis-
aster story special prominence, although stories that would
have rated large headlines curing the first days, are now often
reduced to a few summary paragraphs, carried on inside pages.
(3) The final session of the court goes almost unnoticed
in the newspapers, since the findings are not announced, but
are forwarded to higher authority for review, when a summary
of the findings is announced, two weeks to a month later, it
attracts only cursory attention.

133
A Variation on the "Disaster btory" Theme
Especially interesting from a public relations standpoint,
is the fact that other stories, basically similar to the major
naval disasters described, are often treated almost cursorily.
Airplane accidents resulting in the loss of a great many
lives, though not common, still occur often enough so that they
are reported matter-of-factly. A unique "twist" in the occur-
rence may give it special prominence: if a record number of
persons die, or if there is a suspenseful rescue effort to ex-
tricate survivors, or if all the passengers are from one geo-
graphical area. By and large, though, the newspapers are not
deeply interested in "normal" airplane disasters.
Nor was the American press particularly interested in an
event which occurred in 1956, and duplicated most of the cir-
cumstances of the THhlibHiift disaster--with the important ex-
ception that there was no loss of life.
On may 29, 1956, the conventionally powered submarine,
Ui>b STICKELBaCK sank in waters off Hawaii several hours after
a collision with another Navy ship. By any standards, the
story was an exciting one. The submarine had been engaged in
maneuvers with surface ships, when suddenly it lost power
and started sinking. it had dropped one hundred feet, before
emergency procedures brought it to the surface--directly in
front of a surface ship which rammed the submarine. For sev-
eral hours, rescue operations were attempted, and Navy divers
were at work within the sinking submarine until only a few
minutes before it went down.
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Two days after the event had occurred, it was reported in
The New York Times—on page five in a twenty-one column/inch
story. The Boston Daily Globe devoted only five column/inches




In Collision; All bafe.
Both the Times and the Globe accounts were limited to
factual information—the dramatic circumstances of the salvage
teams at work in the submarine moments before it sank, were
not included.
Comments on the Previous Disasters
Public relations aspects of both the LfiYTB and B£i\li\ili\iGTOi\i
disaster were analyzed by Navy public information officers.
Both cases led the observer to conclude that candor and co-
operation with the press aided in the objective telling of the
story. The following excerpts from the studies are considered
especially significant.
Following the LliYTK explosion, Lieutenant (now Commander )
Edmund L. Castillo, United States Navy, who was a student at
Boston University School of Public Keiations and Communications,
interviewed fourteen newsmen who had covered the disaster.
Despite the early confusion following the explosion, when many
newsmen were given no cooperation from the wavy, 69°/o of the
iThe New York Times , May 31, 195S, p. 5-
2





newsmen interviewed, rated the Navy's public relations per-
formance as good. All those interviewed agreed that the wavy
had released all the information it legitimately could, and
when asked if they were impressed by "especially good practices"
in the l\lavy T s dealings with them, B3% said they were.
The newsmen's satisfaction with the public relations ac-
tivities of i\iavy officials was further inaicated by the fol-
lowing editorial in the Boston Traveler :
Countless times in the past, our military services have
been rapped on the knuckles for unnecessary secrecy, cen-
sorship and misguided hush-hush tactics. When flagrantly
out of place, such things lead only to public resentment,
irritation and generally poor public relations.
It's only fair, therefore, to commend a service when it
rejects sucn measures and offers the public its confidence
and co-operation.
That has been the case in the handling of the LEYTE dis-
aster. Except for isolated instances, where information
of unquestioned security was involved, the LEYTE story
has been out in the open since the moment of the tragic
explosion and fire.
The Navy's handling of this case has set a good pattern
for future relations between the services and the public.
Step by step, as the story has been placed before the
Board of inquiry, it has been placed with clarity in the
hands of the public.
Secrecy and foolish censorship in this case by now would
have bred damaging rumors. A whisper here and whisper
there would have launched false reports that could never
be corrected.
Frankness and open discussion have combined to answer the
questions in the mind of the public.
-r 2It proves that honest co-operation pays off.
A Navy Department case stuay of the BENNINGTON disaster,
1 Castillo, "The USS LEYTE Disaster."
2_
Boston Traveler , October 22, 1953, quoted by Castillo,
"The USS LEYTE Disaster," p. $0.
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assessed the importance of candor, and the desirable results
of such practices as follows:
Contrary to belief popularly held, a major disaster does
not necessarily result in bad public relations. From the
BENNINGTON disastei emerged numerous stories of individual
heroism and self-sacriixut wnicn ejicited a sympathetic
public response throughout the country. Editorially and
otherwise, the press praised the wavy's fast action in
saving lives and keeping damage to personnel arid equip-
ment at a minimum. Many papers pointed out that such
peacetime disasters are unfortunate but necessary con-
sequences of maintaining the nation's military security.
It cannot be stressed too emphatically that a "headline
press" is not necessarily a "bad press." If anything, it
is felt that the public reaction to the Navy as reflected
by the press during the BENNINGTON disaster was one of
admiration and pride. This is the response which the
Public Information Officer must strive to achieve. He
will never achieve it if he indulges in futile attempts
to suppress bad news, a disaster situation like any
other news event requires public relations handling
peculiar to its geographical location, the personnel
and material involved, and the temper of the media on
the scene. There are no hard and fast rules covering
all situations. Every situation is unique, and must be
handled by competent personnel as the situation becomes
known.
If, however, in handling peacetime disasters, the i\iavy
Public Information Officer is able to interpret a dis-
aster situation to the press in such manner that it
elicits from the public a sympathetic, patriotic reaction
similar to that which occurs in .time of actual war, then
he has achieved the one desirable public information ob-,
jective which he can hope to attain from a tragic event.






The fact that the attention of the American public is
drawn, almost compulsively, to stories of disaster is a phenom-
enon of importance to students of communications and partic-
ularly to public relations officials .
Especially interesting is the paradoxical, but neverthe-
less apparent, fact that some disasters attract more attention
than others.
While it was immediately apparent to newsmen, and public
relations officials that the loss of THKEbHEK was a "special
case," there was no universal agreement as to the reasons for
this.
The reason most consistently advanced by newsmen was
the great loss of life. It is readily noted, however , that
other disasters (especially airplane crashes) often approach
and sometimes exceed the death toll of THrtEohEit without at-
tracting a fraction of the attention.
Newsmen's explanation of this was twofold; (1J airplane
disasters occur regularly, and therefore are too common to
excite great interest; and (2) so many other elements were
present in the THRESHER case--the loss of a major ship, the




oefense planning--anG that these additional factors determine
the attention
.
One would expect, if this assessment were accurate, that
the newspaper content wouia reflect this situation, ana that the
elements which were considered most important would receive the
most attention. This could not be observed *
An alternate explanation for the appeal of disaster sto-
ries, can be inferred from the writings of stuaents of communi-
cations. They have noted that events involving personal con-
sideration are most likely to appeal to the general public
.
Bernard Berelson has written:
Communications are probably more effective in influencing
opinion on "personalities" than on "issues/ Americans
are an individualistic people. They like to have heroes;
and the communications media do their best to supply he- -.
roes of various kinds to various groups in the population.
Anotner authority, Wilbur Schramm has written:
a familiar name in a headline, a picture of one's own
street, a story about the university football team in
which one feels an almost personal pride, a story about
a polio epidemic which may affect one's chilaren, a
story about a subject which nas previously rewarded us
and been remembered— cues like these will certainly at-
tract attention.
a communicator is in the positon of trying to arrange his
index cues so that they will appeal to the personality
needs of his audience, borne of these will be individual
ana personal; others will be widespread ana general. For
example, stories about Lindbergh in 1927 would have a
personal-acquaintance appeal to a few hundred or thousand
people, but vast numbers could enjoy the conflict situation
of a man against an ocean, arid could identify with the
Bernard Berelson, "Communications and Public Opinion,"
in The Process and Effects of mass Communications
,
(Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1961J, p. 3 50.
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American boy who had that adventure and won the victory.
In the same vein, a bos con newsman, writing about one rea-
son for the tremendous attention given to another of the "top
ten" stories of 1963, two coal miners trapped in a mine in
August 1963, said:
In a day and age when we send astronauts orbiting thousands
of miles around the world, through outer space, what is it
about two men trapped only 331 feet underground that so
stirs the imagination?
Suspense, of course, is a factor common to both feats.
Aside from the suspense factor, another thing that makes
the Sheppton story of universal interest is the admiration
we all have for two qualities-
—
qualities that can appear
anywhere in the social spectrum among the rich or poor,
the ignorant or the educated, the old or the young. These
qualities are skill and fortitude.
It can be observed that editorials written about the men
of THRESHiSR struck this same note.
Typical comment was this:
The tragedy was a grim reminder that man, in his invasion
of the dark waters, still ventures beneath the waves at
his peril; that each dive is an act of courage, ana that
for every advance into the unexplored depths of the sea,
a heavy toll may be requirea.
The comments of those newsmen who said that the THRi&iHKR
case attracted such attention because "most of the people are
a little claustrophobic" and original reports of the loss
^Wilbur Schramm, "The Anatomy of Attention," in The
Process and Effects of mass Communications
,
(Urbana: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 1961}, pp. 31-32.
Victor 0. Jones, The boston Globe , August 28, 1963, p. 13
3
iMew xork Herala Tribune , April 12, 1963, p. 14«
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immediately conjured images of man trapped ana struggling
against the sea, thus becomes more significant.
It would seem that the personal element, perhaps even some
sort of public identification with the crewmen was the quality
about the story which gave it such urgency and attracted such
attention.
It was certainly apparent that the newspaper dwelt at
greater length on the personal aspects of the THJttESRSH story
than they did on any of the potential issues.
This theory does not explain why certain other disasters
do not attract equal attention. h.n airplane crash is certainly
an event which the average person can more easily comprehend in
terms of personal experience, but it is probably this very
fact that results in such stories being minimized. The threat
of death or injury in an automobile or an airplane is all too
real to the average person. The natural tendency of persons
to avoid communications which threaten them has been observed.
It can also be argued that those disaster situations
wnich are most widely reported are those which the average per-
son is not likely to encounter.
Perhaps newsmen can afford to dismiss the point with the
simple explanation that "people are not interested in common-
place disasters," but the public's motivations for reading the
story should concern the public relations official.
This perhaps over-ingenious explanation would tend to
The point is discussed fully by Hovland , Janis and Kelly
in Communication and Persuasion (new Haven: Yale University
Press, 1953 J i Chapter 3-
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explain why the only issues which became Gominant in the press,
were those which concerned the procedures to safeguard personnel
The Momentum of the Disaster i>tory
Regardless of the reasons for the immediate and intense
attention which disasters attract, the fact remains that such
attention does develop. The disaster occurs suddenly and the
response of the representatives of the communications media is
instantaneous
.
This quite obviously creates certain practical problems
for the public relations official--such as provicing physical
accomodations for newsmen, anci instituting procedures for
collecting and disseminating information.
An equally important consequence of the instantaneous
nature of disasters is the fact that vast attention is suddenly
focused on a subject about which there are probably few pre-
existing attitudes. This was certainly the case in the loss
of THRESHER, The validity of the concept of nuclear submarines
had never been challenged. One achievement after another had
established the nuclear submarine as a reliable and valuable
part of the American defense structure. Suddenly the relia-
bility of the nuclear submarine was questioned, the pre-existing
stereotype of a flawless mechanical masterpiece was shaken.
What might be called an "opinion vacuum" existed.
The communications media made an intensive effort to
fill the vacuum. They sought information from every conceivable
source, most obviously the navy, but also from other sources.
Front page prominence was given to the opinions of a young
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woman whose expertise was based on the fact that she was the
sister-in-law of a THRisibHEH crewman, and had talked to the crew-
man's wife via long distance telephone.
This tremendous rush to obtain information from any and
all sources resulted in the story reaching a premature climax,
within two or three days practically every conceivable source
had been interviewed, the story began to wane, with the result
that important information which developed later was ante-
climactical and received less attention than was apparently due
it.
The powerful dramatic quality of the original incident
gave the story an initial impetus so great that subsequent
developments could not sustain the pace.
Less significant developments which occurred when the
momentum was greatest received far more attention than more
significant developments which occurred when the momentum had
been lost.
iMothing illustrates this point better than the great
prominence given to early stories which reported that valves
had been installed in Thri^Hniit backwards, and the minor im-
portance placed on the subsequent explanation of this apparent
discrepancy, or the lack of prominence given to the conclusions
of the court of inquiry.
This tremendous initial surge of news also restricts the
public relations official's ability to influence the manner in
which the story is tola. Information is sought from so many
sources that the public relations official is associated with
only a limited amount of the material which is printed.

143
In the THRESHER -case, the i\avy T s decision to make the
initial announcements in Washington, provided the opportunity
for presenting the facts in an essentially favorable manner, in-
formation from many sources was assembled in one central place
so that a single spokesman could present a unified explanation
of what had happened and what was being done. It would seen.
that this procedure would best serve the interests of the Ameri-
can public
3
but it has been rioted that the procedure was subject
to criticism by the Boston press, who considered it an abridge-
ment of their right to tell the story in the manner they felt
would best serve the public interest.
This circumstance presents a dilemma, unavoidable in a
fast-breaking story: it is impossible to satisfy the require-
ments of every group.
There can be no question but that certain procedures fol-
lowed by the iMavy on the night of April 10, were not completely
satisfactory. To have delayed in releasing the news until all
the public relations arrangements had been satisfactorily com-
pleted would have been a serious breach in the wavy's obliga-
tions to the people.
Military Secrets and Credibility
The need to protect military secrets complicates the
public relations problems associated with a military disaster.
The public's desire to know all the information about the
situation which has aroused their interest must inevitably be
frustrated
.
It has been observed that an urgent situation which cannot
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be fully explained foster ambiguity ana gives rise to rumor.
According to one study, the establishment of even mild
censorship during World War II
. . . created the most fertile of all possible soils for
the propagation of rumor. Vie now know that rumors con-
cerning a given subject-matter will circulate within a
group in proportion to the ambiguity of this suject mat-
ter. . .
The authors of the study note that as the rumors circulate,
certain details are obliterated, ana others are given additional
importance. (The previously cited examination of one newsman's
selection of information to be included in a story about the
"fears of THRESHER crewmen" bears a striking similarity to the
process of the selection and transmission of rumor, except
that it was done by an individual rather than a group.)
The public information officials goal is to reduce am-
biguity when some information must be withheld.
Two "techniques" are available to him:
(1) To immediately establish his credibility by in-
suring a free flow of unclassified information, ana
(2) To take immediate steps to respond to any rumors
which begin to develop.
It will be recalled that the public information officer
at Portsmouth was able to quell the rumor that next of kin had
been advised not to talk to newsmen by issuing a statement
denying that this was Navy policy, and guaranteeing that they
would take immediate steps to correct this false notion if it
Gordon Allport and Leo Postman, "The Basic Psychology
of Rumor," in Process and Effects of Mass Communication , ed.




were proven to exist.
In this particular instance, the newsmen could check the
authenticity of the statement by a test case (though none aidj
.
In other instances, newsmen and the public at large were
asked to accept iMavy statement's on faith alone.
It has been noted that there was sharp disagreement be-
tween l\iavy officials and certain Russian sources concerning the
possible dangers of radioactive contamination resulting from the
THRESHER disaster.
Without any hesitation the American public accepted the
assurances of American experts (particularly admiral Rickover},
obviously considering them more credible than the Russians.
This particular incident is a practical duplication of
the controlled experiments reported by Carl Hovland and
waiter Weiss. Those authors reported that "high credibility"
was the function of two things: expertise and trustworthiness.
The very existence of the nuclear powered submarine was
a testament to admiral Rickover 's expertise, and his long his-
tory of outspokenness would qualify him as trustworthy; he had
demonstrated time and again that he would not hesitate to ad-
vocate ideas unpopular with his superiors.
admiral Anderson's credibility was established with the
Pentagon correspondents, from long experience. His position
as the top naval officer qualified him as an expert, and the
fact that newsmen were willing to accept the iNiavy's explanations
concerning his failure to report THRESHER'S last messages, indi-
Carl I. Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of
Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," in Process
and Effects of Mass Communication
, ed . Wilbur Schramm (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1961 J , pp. 275-288.
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cates that he was considered trustworthy.
On the other hand, i\avy public information officials who
worked on the THR£i§HER case, often had to establish their cred-
ibility— since they were dealing with newsmen with whom they
were completely unfamiliar.
The only way they could do this was by demonstrating
time and again that they were willing to cooperate fully in the
coverage of legitimate news.
The events surrounding the court of inquiry provide an
especially useful example. The newsmen had no way of knowing
what was discussed in the closed sessions. They were, however,
aware that some information, which might be construed as un-
favorable to the Navy, has revealed in open session. There was
evidence that they were getting both sides of the story, which
tended to limit their suspicions that the evidence submitted in
closed session was not truly classified.
Implications for Public Relations
Planning
On the night of April 10, a naval officer who has just
finished talking to the wives of THRESHER crewmen to tell them
that their husbands were dead, stepped out of an office in the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. At the end of the hall, a group of
newsmen were clustered around an obviously distraught widow,
attempting to question her. The officer clenched his fist,
shook it at the newsmen and said, "I'll never buy another news-
paper so long as I live."
In many respects, his reaction characterizes the tre-
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mendously difficult circumstances which inevitable arise in the
wake of a disaster. In the emotionally charged atmosphere wnich
pervades an organization struck by a disaster, the presence of
newsmen, clamoring for information, seems like an affront to com-
mon decency. The fact that the public relations official is ad-
vocating a policy of complete cooperation with them seems less
understandable
.
But the mood passes. The officer probably did read the
newspaper and was surprised to discover that the reporters had
written about the event with understanding and sympathy, and the
editorial columns of the paper carried a stirring tribute to
the men of the submarine.
The same officer probably read with interest the details
of the next exciting story which his newspaper printed.
Right or wrong, it is the prerogative of the press in
America to print the news that the public wants to read. While
one can philosphize about the lack of taste which the press
sometimes shows, their right to access to facts is undeniable.
Ultimately it is the responsibility of the government to in-
form its citizens, fully and honestly about its operations.
"Bad" news, just like v, good" news belongs to the people,
and their right to it cannot be abridged except for legitimate
reasons of security, as awkward or as embarrassing as it may
be to release bad news, it is a denial of the basic democratic
process not to do so.
£ven if the moral and legal requirement to tell ail the
news did not exist, there is yet another reason for 1 releasing
discomfiting information: "bad" news cannot be suppressed.
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Inevitably it will leak out, ana then any previous lack of can-
dor will only serve to magnify the event. To the original bad
news is added a second story of attempted suppression.
Since trying to hold back news can only result in dis-
crediting the news source, truth must be the principal rule in
the release of news.
A second rule should be speed. By getting the story out
as quickly as possible, the opportunity for rumor is dispelled,
and the story is over and done with in a minimum of time.
One wavy public information officer who has seen his
share of disasters (and who prepared the study on the LEYTE
disaster mentioned previously) observed in a professional wavy
journal, that three objectives should guide the public relations
official in a disaster situation:
(1) To retain public confidence in the wavy.
(2) To preserve gooa press relations.
(3) To protect and promote the welfare of wavy per-
sonnel and their families.
These were the principles which guided public information
officers during the Trifl.iiia.Hiih. disaster, ana they can well guide
the public relations official of any organization.
Retaining Public uonfidence
when a disaster which might have been prevented occurs,
the public's opinion of the organization involved is subject to
reappraisal, When THfl.£&H&rt was lost, the public had a number of
1
LGDh. E. L. Castillo, "The Art of Getting Off the Front
Page," U.S. IMaval Institue Proceedings , karch 1959, pp. 3b-43.
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reasons to question the competence of tne havy in general, and
nuclear powered submarines in particular.
The public is aware that it is an unfortunate consequence
of the drive for military security that men and machines must
operate near the limits of endurance and safety, but if risk
must be accepted, it must also be minimized. L>id the navy take
every step to insure that the submarine was structurally sound,
and the crew fit? was the Navy making an honest effort to dis-
cover the reasons for the loss of THHiiibHER? was research under-
way to reduce the unavoidable risks?
If the answers to these questions were "yes" then the loss
of THRKShl^h , though still a terrible tragedy, might not undermine
the public's belief in trie basic integrity of the wavy.
If the fact that the navy had taken and was taking ail the
steps it could to promote safety and efficiency were known, that
it is even conceivable that the public ultimately would develop
increased respect and confidence in the wavy. The loss of the
men of TRtt^Hi^K can never be ameliorated, yet, it is just such
a dramatic incident which can lead the public to a fuller ap-
preciation of the men who serve their country.
Preserving Good Press relations
Good press relations can only be derived from a long his-
tory of candor and cooperation between an organization and the
members of the press. It would be an affront to the integrity
of responsible newsmen to assume that any history of good press
relations is going to influence the reporters' presentation ~>f
the facts. Good press relations can facilitate the flo.v of
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communications between public relations official and newsman.
They result, for instance, in the newsmen's acceptance of the
basic honesty of his source, if the press is accustomed to
being treated fairly ana with candor, it is not necessary for
the public information officer to cocuiuent his every statement
with evidence.
This reservoir of good will is invaluable, but it can be
washed away in one flood of improper or inconsiderate action.
Good press relations can be lost if there is lack of can-
dor or cooperation when a difficult situation has arisen, in
fact, the press admires nothing more than an honest answer to
a difficult question. In the long run, it may mean more than
a history of cooperation in what is basically a good news
situation.
The temptation to cover up a bad situation is admittedly
strong, and it is probably strongest in those who do not regu-
larly work with the press. Unfortunately, practically every
official knows of some "bad" news that has been successfully
withheld from the press. The danger is that one may win a
succession of such battles and then lose the war in one ca-
lamitous misfortune.
Protecting the welfare of Personnel
The obligation to inform the public and the advantages
to be gained from cooperation with newsmen aoes not imply
that the privacy of an organization's personnel or their fam-
ilies should be invaded.
After the protection of security information, protection

1XL
of individual privacy is probably the most legitimate reason ior
not "cooperating" with the press.
It is a reason which newsmen understand and honor, perhaps
reluctantly, without eventual damage to satisfactory press re-
lationships.
admittedly, it is easier to outline objectives than to
attain them. In a disaster situation, there is no simple
formula for success. One can observe from the THRiiiShJirt inci-
dent and the other disasters examined, that certain predictable
conditions inevitably arise when disaster strikes. Anticipation
of these conditions and the application of certain procedures
aimed at ameliorating them can make the public relations of-
ficial's efforts more effective.
Prior Planning
The key to successful action in a aisaster situation xs
the existence of a previously formulated plan.
Qutlip and Center in their textbook on public relations
have observed!
There is one type of event which cannot be furecast--a
catastrophe, but it can be planned for . tivery insti-
tution anu industry is subject to the fate of a dis&stei
and should plan accordingly. When it happens, time is a
key element in the handling of communication. There is
no time to plan cautiously anu carefully in a program oi
information. Plans made far in advance for calamity pro-
cedure must go into action .
if one coulo anticipate tne events which lead to "bad u
news, the events, in most cases, coulQ be avoided. It is an
1
£>cott K. Outlip and Allen h. Center, Effective Public





almost universal characteristic of "bad" news that it is unex-
pected. It is painfully apparent that disasters ana crises occur
again and again. While no two disasters are exactly the same,
the subsequent responses of the press shows remarkable pre-
dictability.
The time to make decisions on the broad questions of phi-
losophy and organization is when things are quiet and can be con-
sidered calmly and objectively . Yi/hen there is no pressure, the
public information officer can often win approval for basic pol-
icies, like full cooperation with the press and absolute canaor,
that he might be able to obtain only with difficulty when the
instinct for self-preservation is at its peak--in the moment of
crisis.
Having a plan means more than thinking about the possible
consequences of a bad situation and deciding on a logical course
of action. The plan must be written down and sanctioned by
authority.
When disaster strikes a complicated organization, in-
dividuals with varying responsibilities are thrown together.
All too often key figures are unfamiliar with public information
procedures. At such a time, nothing is more convincing than the
existence of a document approved by higher authority.
Anticipate Public Interest
and the Presence of the Press
Disasters intrigue and fascinate the public. Although the
general public cannot be present, they expect to be represented
by the media of public communication. It is a service that news-
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men render with relish. Invariably newsmen will want to visit
the scene. It is part of their job to be eye-witnesses to the
events. They will not be satisfied with second-hand descriptions
of the events, or the written statements of the officials.
Mewsmen do not want to quote public relations officials in
their stories, nor is the euphemistic term wan official spokes-
man" a satisfactory substitute. If the people are to give cre-
dence to the statements of officials, they want to know who the
officials are, to judge for themselves whether the source is ex-
pert and trustworthy.
During the early phases of a disaster, the organizaion is,
in effect, on trial. Anticipating questions and having answers
ready is a long, first step toward creating an atmosphere of co-
operation. By taking the initiative and releasing information
before it is requested, the public relations official gains an
even greater advantage.
He has, first of all, indicated his willingness to co-
operate. This leads to a situation which cannot be duplicated
if the newsman feels he has to pry out information item by item.
Taking the initiative in releasing information also enables
the public relations official to organize his facts, to create
a single story which guarantees that all members of the press
will receive equal treatment.
When THKhiSHHift was lost, the first newsmen arrived at
Portsmouth within minutes after the announcement, but others
arrived throughout the night. As each man arrived, he could
obtain copies of all information previously released. Con-
flicting statements were avoided and public relations personnel

;were spared the necessity of constantly briefing late-comers.
The original THRESHisiR announcement, prepared in Washington,
took three hours to write, although it consists of only four
paragraphs. The statement was phoned to key i\lavy commands on
the east coast, insuring that the same basic facts were available
to all newsmen.
Accept Certain Limitations
The public relations official firmly committed to a policy
of full cooperation with the press can easily fall into the trap
of trying to do too much. The powerful stimulus of a major dis-
aster creates an almost limitless demand for information, h pre-
occupation with certain details may result in the neglect of more
important general issues. It is better do do a few things well,
than many things haphazardly.
When THRESHER was lost, literally hundreds of small radio
stations called the Pentagon, seeking to record interviews with
i\lavy spokesmen. A public information official in Washington
noted that their compliance with these requests delayed their
final decision on plans to transport newsmen to the site of
search operations.
The public information officer for the court of inquiry
received similar requests. Since he was the only spokesman for
the court, he could not respond to a daily barrage of requests
for interviews. He therefore denied the requests, but invited
the radio stations to send their own representatives. Under the
circumstances, there were no grounds for an accusation that the




While the government public relations official has an in-
herent responsibility to provide the public with facts, he is
under no obligation to answer irresponsible criticism, nor is
it practical for him to attempt to correct every misrepresen-
tation of the facts.
A major crisis stimulates the imagination of almost every-
one, a tragedy, such as the loss of THRi!ii>Hi^t, cannot help but
elicit feelings of frustration, in the public as well as in the
military. An obvious source of relief is to find someone to
blame. Often the process results in ill-defined expressions
of disfavor, as in this letter, quoted in its entirety, which
was received by the Wavy Department:
April 12, 1963
Dear Sir:




Of greater concern to the public information officer are
those expressions of disfavor which find their way into the
public media of communication. Is it more to his advantage to
attempt to answer such criticism, or to ignore it?
The Russian government, always eager to malign the United
States issued several stories related to the loss of THRiiJSHiSR.
In an Izvestia story which was also broadcast throughout the
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world, the Russians charged among other things:
The sinking of the newly charged atomic reactor is sure to
contaminate the Atlantic waters, all the more so since the
tragedy took place in the northern current of the Gulf Stream.
The abyssal counter current probably will carry the con-
taminated, water in the opposite direction, toward Boston and
iMew York.
The story can be rebutted on a number of grounds, and atomic
energy experts in the havy prepared a lengthy statement, con-
sisting essentially of information that had already been re-
leased, but specifically referring to the Russian charges. In-
formation officials decided not to release the statement, since
it would have attracted more attention, needlessly extending a
pointless controversy.
Summary of bindings
On the basis of the study, the following conclusions can
be drawn:
(1) The disaster situation, if unusual in nature, and in-
volving the loss of life, will stimulate intensive public
interest.
(2) The suddenness with which disaster strikes, results in
attention being focused on a subject about which there has often
been little prior thought. The public need for orientation on
this new subject stimulates massive reaction by the media of
communicat ions
.
(3) Disaster coverage begins at a peak and quickly reaches
an ante-climax. Events of minor importance occurring during the
Quoted in The i^ew York Times
. April 14, 1963, P« 6.
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peak of activity will receive more attention than more important
events which occur later.
(4) Public interest is primarily focused on personal ele-
ments. Among the issues which aevelop , those which concern the
organization's procedures to protect its personnel will receive
principal attention.
(5) Because of the emphasis on the personal aspect of a
disaster, the response, even to dissimilar disasters, is stand-
ardized. The public relations official, by studying previous
disasters, can anticipate requirements for the future.
(6) The press expects Immediate ana complete cooperation
from the public relations official, and airect access to the
scene of action ana to authorities. The gathering of news is
highly competitive and newsmen will be most sensitive to any
apparent partiality to one segment of the press.
(7) The public relations official's ability to influence
the coverage of a disaster situation is limited (a) by the mag-
nitude of the event which results in his dealing with only a
small proportion of the total news, and (bj because the aspects
of the story which he does hanale are subject to subsequent
treatment by media officials with whom he has no personal con-
tact .
(3) The public relations official, by facilitating the
free flow of information, can create a spirit of cooperation
with members of the press that will prove aavantageous to his
organization. The public relations official must rely es-
sentially on instinct and experience, but two attributes will
aid him: speed and truth.
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(9) Disaster's uo not inevitably result in "bad" public re-
lations. The public is willing to accept the idea that certain
risks are inevitable. Its confidence in an organization is based
on belief that the risks were as minimized as possible. Disaster
can lead to greater appreciation of the men who accept risks to
promote the general welfare.
Implications for Further Study
The disaster situation can create intensive interest in a
matter not subject to pre-formed opinions. One could therefore
assume that opinions which are formed, would be the result of
recent stimuli, notably the mass media of communications. This
wuula be particularly true in an event like the loss of TmtuiSH&R,
to which the public did not have direct access, and therefore re-
lied exclusively on accounts in the mass media.
In the course of the study of the THftfi&HJ&ft disaster, it
was observed that key personnel on several boston newspapers
expressed significantly different opinions of the performance
of Wavy officials.
Karly studies of newspaper content had not made the author
aware of any substantial bias toward the wavy by one newspaper or
another. With benefit of the knowledge that opinions of key
editorial personnel varied, their newspapers were re-examined.
While no marked bias could be categorically proven, the author
was struck with the idea, perhaps no more than a hunch, that
readers who obtained most of their information about the loss
of THitxiiSHJBit from one paper or another, might vary in their
opinion of the navy's performance, and that there would be cor-
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relation between opinion and source of information.
Under normal conditions, it would be difficult to prove
that public opinion on a matter of consequence was dependent on
the unique view of the newspaper which an individual read. It
would be logical to assume that an individual would subscribe to
that newspaper which most consistently expressed opinions with
which he agreed. One could not reject the strong likelihood of
compatible, pre-existing bias. If, for instance, an opinion poll
indicated that there was correlation between opinion and source
of information, there would be a strong indication of direct
cause and effect.
For the student interested in the relationships between
mass media communications and public opinion, the study of issues
generated by a disaster would seem to provide distinct advantages.

APPKlNiDI^ A
A compendium of releases issued by the Department of
Defense on behalf of the l\iavy in Washington, D.C., following
the loss of THRKSHJSR. Additional information released in
Washington but not included in this compendium because of a
lack of copies included the transcripts of press briefings by







OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.
IMMEDIATE RELEASE APRIL 11, 1963 NO. 506-63
OXford 76l6l
SUMMARY OF ADMIRAL ANDERSON 1 S PRESS CONFERENCE
About 9:30 p.m. (est), April 10,1963
Just before dark, an oil slick vas reported in vicinity of last dive.
If the submarine sank in 8*400 feet of water, "rescue would be absolutely out of
the question."
Purpose of today's test was to dive to test deptho
No chance of a nuclear explosion; no likelihood of radioactive contamination.
If sub sank in that depth, no possibility of personnel being alive aboard.
We can only hope she is proceeding but merely out of communications.
Court of inquiry will be convened: Vice Admiral Bernard Austin, President of
Naval War College, will be president of the court, which will be made up of
other experienced submarine officers.
We have had no difficulty with any SSN which might have led to such an accident,
Admiral Anderson does not plan to go to the scene. Rear Admiral Ramage, an
experienced submariner with Medal of Honor, is on scene commander.
Commissioned in August 1961. In 1961 aiad 1962, she took part in tests and
operations with the fleet. In July 1962 went into yard at Portsmouth for
over&aul and installation of new equipment. She just completed this overhaul
and was undergoing the tests which are normal at the end of an overhaul period.
She made shallow dives yesterday and was scheduled today to make test dives.
There probably is a remote possibility of sabotage. This is a matter for the
court of inquiry to look into 9
Last submarine peacetime disaster was sinking of SQUALUS in ko fathoms* of water
off New Hampshire coast on May 23, 1939. 33 were rescued, 26 were lost. The
submarine was raised, renamed? and saw service in WWII.
This accident will not result in any change in our plans to build additional
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Washington 25, D. C.
NO. 509-63
OXford T6l6l
Statement "by Admiral George W» Anderson, Chief, Naval Operations at the Pentagon,
Wednesday, April 10, 1963, 8:00 p.nu, on USS THRESHER*
The next of kin of the crew of the nuclear submarine USS THRESHER (SSN-593)
are "being notified that the ship is overdue and presumed missing.
The THRESHER had been conducting routine tests some 220 miles east of Boston.
The submarine rescue vessell USS SKYLARK was accompanying the THRESHER. This
procedure is normal for submarine tests and trials following an overhaul.
SKYLARK reported that THRESHER has not communicated as scheduled since be-
ginning deep dive tests shortly after 9 A„M* (EST) this morning.
While there is a possibility that the- nuclear submarine has not reported
her position due to a communication failure, a search was immediately commenced
by the Navy in accordance with emergency proceedings for such situations.
Navy ships, aircraft and other submarines are searching the area where the
THRESHER was last reported. They are encountering cloudy weather with winds of
from 25 to 40 knots and seas of from 5 to 9 feet., Such conditions would make it
difficult for the on-scene search units to sight the overdue submarine even though
it were on the surface and unable to transmit a position report by radio communi-
cations .
The location of the THRESHER from her last report was given as hl.kk North ...
and 6U.57 W. The depth of water at this location is approximately 8*+00 feet
(ihOO fathoms). Merchant ships in this area have been requested to keep a sharp
lookout for the submarine in addition to the maximum effort being made by the
Navy.
Additional reports on the progress of the search will be made by the Navy.
Names and addresses of the membersof the crew will be released after all next of





SS(N)593 (THRESHER) FACT SHEET
1. SS(N)593 (THRESHER) is the lead ship of the Navy's newest class
nuclear attack submarines. She is similar to the other recent submarines
with the ALBACORE teardrop shape hull, the Westinghouse S5W reactor
plant and a single propeller driven by a geared turbine. However, she
represents a tremendous advance over all other submarines in the areas
of performance, depth quieting and sonar, THRESHER, in becoming our
Country's best ASW defense, will be a true submarine independent of the
surface with unmatched submerged maneuverability and speed. In order
to achieve the quietest position, the sonar (underwater listening devices)
has been moved to the bow of the submarine, and the torpedo tubes to
the midships area. Conventional and advanced weapons are fired therefrom
o
at a 10 angle to the hull.
2. An entire new sonar suit has been designed for THRESHER enabling
her to hear enemy ships and submarines at far greater ranges than has
ever been possible before. Her active sonar will allow her to "ping" on
other ships and submarines to great ranges. THRESHER has over 1, 000
transducers and hydrophones installed along the length of the ship. The
majority are concentrated in the quiet forward area making her our most
effective mobile underwater listening post. Raytheon Manufacturing
Company is the prime contractor for the majority of this sonar, but
special portions are furnished by Edo Corporation, Sperry Company,




3. Noise in a submarine has two effects. The first is radiation into
the ocean which allows the submarine to be detected by others. The second
is noise interference with submarines own listening devices. In order to
make this sonar equipment effective, tremendous quieting measures
have had to be made in THRESHER. Refinements and developments of
machinery have been made specially for THRESHER to reduce the noise
output of all equipments installed in this submarine. Great pains have been
taken to smooth the hull and optimize its shape to reduce the hydrodynamic
noise to a minimum. THRESHER will be by far the quite st nuclear sub-
marine afloat or submerged. Naval activities, notably Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, have led the development of quite machinery but private industry
has picked up the ball and made great strides in machinery equipment design
and construction to silence the "Silent Service. ,r A few of the many groups
involved in these efforts are General Electric, Westinghouse, Louis Allis,
Electro Dynamic Division of the General Dynamics Corporation, Ingersoll-
Rand, Allis Chalmers, Cutler-Hammer, Aurora Pump Division of the New
York Air Brake and DeLaval Steam Turbine Company.
4. Another significant advancement of THRESHER is the ability to cruise
the oceans at far greater depths than any other submarine. Problems in
welding and forming of heavy structural members in development of piping
systems and hull fittings for deep submergence have been encountered and
successfully solved. A vast program was setup to develop and test each
and every item required for this submarine to operate at these unprece-
dented depths. Again the Navy and private industry worked in cooperation
(MORE)
- 3 -
to develop and test thoroughly hundreds of items required. Never before
has such an extensive development program been necessary for a Naval
Ship and never before has such extensive tests been undertaken to give
complete assurance that the submarine would be absolutely safe.
5. Another area of development has been in the increasing of habita-
bility and operability of submarines. Great efforts have been expended
on increasing the habitability standards to make the crew's life as
pleasant as possible. Operating stations have been worked out in great
detail to assure simple and safe operation with a minimum of personnel
and operator fatigue. One particular area is in the weapons handling
and firing system. Weapons are loaded into the torpedo tubes and fired
in "push button". fashion in THRESHER with a mimura of personnel.
Special equipment for air revitalization will allow THRESHER to operate
completely independent of the atmosphere for long periods of time.
60 THRESHER is being launched bow first, and is the first submarine
to be so arranged. This has led to breaking of the traditional bottle of
champagne on her propeller shaft rather than on her bow. The reason
for the bow first launching is that the depth of water over the way ends at
Portsmouth is comparatively shallow. Since the forebody of the ship is
more full than the afterbody, launching bow first develops buoyancy
earlier in the launch travel than the usual stern launching. This earlier
buyoyancy is required to prevent the ship from tipping off the end of the



















Four 21" diameter torpedo
tubes amidships with semi









Deepest in the World
Over 20 Knots
There are presently 13 submarines in the SS(N)593 Class being built and
four more authorized. Other shipbuilders are New York Shipbuilding
Corporation, Camden, New Jersey; Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation,
Pascagoula, Mississippi and Mare Island Naval Shipyard, and Electric
Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, Groton, Connecticut.
Many THRESHER concepts are incorporated in our entire submarine ship-
building program.
THRESHER is the world's most advanced nuclear powered submarine and
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Amplifying Information released 6:20 AM EST, April 11, 1963 re USS THRESHER
During the night, five additional ships arrived on the scene to
assist SKYLARK and RECOVERY in search operations for the nuclear-
powered submarine THRESHER. These ships include the destroyers
V. L. LIND and YARNELL, the submarine SEAOWL, the nuclear-powered
submarine SEAUOLF, and the frigate NORFOLK.
Commanding the search operation at this time is Captain Frank
Andrews, Commander Submarine Development Group 2, embarked in USS NORFOLK.
Six other ships, including the destroyers BLANDY, S. B. ROBERTS,
WARRINGTON, and THE SULLIVANS, and the submarine rescue vessel
SUNBIRD and the oceanographic survey ship ATLANTIS II are expected
to arrive before noon today. In addition, the fleet oiler WACCAMAW
is enroute to provide fuel for ships participating in the search.
Rear Admiral Lawson P. Ramage, Deputy Commander of the Atlantic
Fleet Submarine Force, will assume command of the search force upon
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Washington 25, D. C.
OXford 76161
Estimated weather In the area
A storm warning is posted for the area with a gale warning issued.
Winds now are "between 15 to 25 knots with possible predicted winds of 20-35
knots with occasional gusts up to ho knots. The cloud cover is "between .6 and
.8 with a ceiling of 3500 feet. Scattered showers predicted with accompanying
lower ceiling.
The weather system affecting the area is fairly stationary and improve-
ment is predicted to he slow.
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The following statement was issued by Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover,
Chief of Naval Reactors Branch of the Atomic Energy Commission, and
Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships for Nuclear Propulsion:
M I am deeply affected by the loss of the THRESHER and her crew and
test personnel. I and members of the Naval Reactors Group knew many of
them personally. We mourn their loss. We can only hope that in giving
their lives for their country they have contributed in making it stronger.
Our sympathy goes out to their wives and children and to their parents.
"I can assure you there is no radio active hazzard as a result of
this unfortunate accident. Reactors of the type used in the THRESHER,
as well as in all our nuclear submarines and surface warships, can







OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.
sf^TES O*
April 11, 1963 OXford 76161
COURT OF INQUIRY:
Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, President, U. S, Naval War College, Newport, R,I»
Rear Admiral Lawrence R. Daspit, Commandant, Sixth Naval District, Charleston,
S
eC.
Capt# William C. Hushine, Superintendent of Shipbuilding, Croton, Conn,
Capt, James B» Osborne, Joint Strategic Planning Staff, Omaha, Neb*
Capt. Norman C. Nash, Commander Service Squadron 8, Atlantic Fleet
•
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IMMEDIATE. RELEASE April 11, 1963 NO. 513-63
OXford T6l6l
FOR THE PRESS:
Two Navy aircraft are departing Andrews Air Force Base, Md., at
1:00 P.M. (EST) today, April 11, to overfly the area in which the search
for the USS THRESHER is underway.
A news pool is aboard each plane consisting of the following media:
Plane 1:
United Press International -= Steve Gerstel
United Press International Photo — Jim Atherton
Magazines — Times Magazine — Joe Kane
Afternoon Newspapers — Christian Science Monitor — Neal Stanford
Plane 2:
Associated Press — Bern Price
Associated Press Photo — Boh Schutz
Morning Newspapers ~ Boston Herald
Local Pool — New London Day
Foreign News Services — Sydney Morning Herald Foreign News Service,
6th Floor,, New York Times Building, New York City - Maurice Adams
Editors desiring to obtain copy filed by pool members may do so by







OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.
IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 11, 1963 NO. 51^-63
QXford 76l6l
FOR THE PRESS:
The following message was transmitted at 11:04 A.M." (EST) yesterday
"by USS SKYLARK, the submarine rescue vessel which was accompanying USS THRESHER
during her test dive:
"UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THRESHER SINCE 9:17 A.M, (EST).
HAVE BEEN CALLING BY UQC VOICE AND CW QRB CW EVERY MINUTE EX-
PLOSIVE SIGNALS EVERY 10 MINS WITH NO SUCCESS. LAST TRANSMISSION
RECD WAS GARBLED. INDICATED THRESHER WAS APPROACHING TEST DEPTH.
MY PRESENT POSITION 41-43N 64-57W CONDUCTING EXPANDING SEARCH."
The message from THRESHER to SKYLARK was of a routine nature and indicated
no distress. It is not unusual for communications "between submarines and sur-







OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.
SPATES O*
IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 12, 1963
NO. 515-63
OXford 76161
Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth, after a flying trip to confer
with Submarine Force Officers in New London, and with Admiral Ramage
at the scene of the THRESHER search, returned to Washington tonight
and issued an official declaration that the THRESHER and all on board
are lost.
At the same time, Secretary Korth ordered that all naval instal-
lations display the national ensign at half mast from tomorrow morning
until sunset on Monday, April 15.
In making his official declaration of the loss, Secretary Korth
expressed a fervent hope that the rumors and speculation which have
already begun will cease, providing the bereaved families a more stable
climate in which to compose themselves and endure their grief,
"In this connection, " he said, "I have the unequivocal assurance
of all those in a position to know, including the Chief of the Bureau of
Ships, the Commander, SubmarinesAtlantic, and the Search and Rescue
Commander on the scene that, in waters of this depth, there is absolutely






IMMEDIATE RELEASE April 12, 1963
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.
NO. 516-63
OXford 76161
The following statement has been made by Admiral George W.
Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations:
Inevitably, in the wake of such a major tragedy as that involving
THRESHER, rumors arise as to the physical ability of the ship, aircraft,
or other vehicle concerned to carry out a particular mission. Such has
been true in this particular case. To dispel them in my own mind, I
have personally checked with the commanding officer of the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, Rear Admiral Charles J. Palmer, and have been assured
by him that the commanding officer of THRESHER, prior to going to sea,
was completely satisfied with his ship in all respects. I also learned
that the proposed diving routine which was to be followed on Tuesday
and Wednesday of this week by THRESHER, although in accordance with
routine Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet doctrine, had personal ly been
approved by the commanding officer himself. There was no hint of any
concern on the part of the officers, crew, or civilians about the sea-
worthiness of this fine ship.
It should be remembered that a Court of Inquiry has been
convened with Vice Admiral B. L,. Austin as President to ascertain to the
best of its ability the facts attendant to this most tragic happening, and to
delve thoroughly and meticulously into all aspects of operations, overhaul,
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Noon, April 12, 1%3
STATUS OF FORCES IN THRESHER SEARCH
ON STATION
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The following statement was issued by Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover
today:
"Measurements for radioactivity on samples of debris recovered
from the scene of the THRESHER incident have shown no radioactivity.
Samples of the ocean bottom have also been obtained by the oceanographic
ship ATLANTIS II, in the vicinity of the incident, and have likewise





Chronology of Events on April 10, 1963, Pertaining to THRESHER Sinking
Throughout the various naval activities on the East Coast and in Washington,
Wednesday was at first a fairly routine day. The first hint of trouble came at
about 11 a.m. (EST) when SKYLARK, the anti-submarine rescue ship working
with THRESHER during her tests, reported to Commander Development Group
Two at New London, Captain F. A. Andrews, that the ship was unable to
communicate with THRESHER. At this point, SKYLARKs message did not
cause a great deal of concern, because submarines many times before have
failed to communicate promptly in response to other communications, but still
have returned safely from operations. Further more, THRESHER was not due
to complete her tests until 3 p.m.
At about 1 p.m. , Commander Development Group Two relayed SKYLARK 1 s
report to Commander Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet, Vice Admiral Elton W.
Grenfell, at Norfolk. Admiral Grenfell and his staff then commenced initial
procedures to alert naval activities in the Norfolk area. Admiral Grenfell also
notified Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet,
that there was a possibility THRESHER might be in difficulty. At 2:15 aircraft
were diverted to the vicinity of the diving position, and other measures were
taken in the event further action should be necessary. These included diverting
ships to the scene and alerting other ships to get underway. Aircraft were at
the scene of action by 3 p. m.
In Washington, Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations was
attending a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Vice Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, was in a meeting in the CNO conference
room, located between Admiral Anderson's office and his own. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff meeting concluded at 3:35. While Admiral Anderson was en route from
the meeting, he received a call from Admiral Dennison on the ,rhot line" tele-
phone circuit in his office. When informed of Admiral Anderson's absence,
Admiral Dennison asked to speak to Admiral Ricketts, who took the call in
Admiral Anderson's office and was advised of the fact that communication
between SKYLARK and THRESHER had been lost, and that the submarine pos-
sibly could be in trouble. Admiral Ricketts immediately dispatched his senior
aide, ""aptain H. B. Sweitzer, to intercept Admiral Anderson and inform him
of Admiral Dennison 1 s message.
Captain Sweitzer encountered Admiral Anderson in the corridor adjacent
to the office of Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth. Upon receiving Admiral
Dennison' s message, at about 3:40, Admiral Anderson immediately informed
the Secretary. After a brief conversation, Secretary Korth called President
Kennedy's Naval Aide, Captain Tazewell T. Shepard, Jr.
,




the situation at this time, and then went personally to pass this word to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, who was Acting Secretary
of Defense in the absence of Secretary McNamara, who was in Europe. Admiral
Anderson then returned to his own office.
Throughout the balance of the afternoon, numerous conversations were
held between Admiral Anderson and Admiral Dennison, during which the
measures being taken by Admiral Dennison and his subordinate commanders
were discussed. As time passed and no word was received from THRESHER,
all became more and more concerned. Later in the afternoon, it was decided
that it was probable that she had encountered serious difficulties, was missing,
and possibly was lost.
A decision was made that the Navy would begin notifying next-of-kin at
7:30, and that a public announcement would be made at 8 p.m. Rear Admiral
Lawson P. Ramage, Deputy Commander Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet, was
placed in charge of search and rescue operations on the scene and Vice Admiral
Bernard L. Austin was informed that he was to be named the President of the
Court of Inquiry. A statement summing up the situation was prepared by the
Navy's Office of Information for Admiral Anderson's use at 8 p.m.
Admiral Anderson met with Elton Fay of the Associated Press and
Charles Corddry of the United Press, shortly after 8 p. m. and with a larger
group of newsmen, including radio and television reporters about an hour later.
Admiral Dennison, who is retiring May 1 as CINCLANT, CINCLANT
Fleet, and SACLANT, long had been scheduled to be honored at a dinner by
SACLANT officers at the Officers Club on the base, and did attend, although
he arrived 45 minutes late. He kept in touch with proceedings through the
means of a portable radio-telephone. Upon conclusion of the dinner, about
10 p.m.
,
he returned to his quarters with Admiral Grenfell, Rear Admiral
Joseph W. Leverton, Jr. , and members of his staff, and reviewed events up
until that time.
In Washington, Admiral Anderson conferred on several occasions with
Secretary Korth, Admiral Ricketts, Vice Admiral Charles D. Griffin, and his
own staff before meeting again with media representatives at about 9'- 30. He
returned to his office about 10 p. m. where he remained for an hour before
securing to his quarters.
END
THRESHER SUMMARY — SITUATION SUMMARY, NOON APRIL 16, 1963
The search continues today for the submarine THRESHER in an area
220 miles east of Cape Cod. Captain F.A. Andrews, USN, Commander Sub-
marine Development Group TWO, commands the search units from his flag-
ship, the destroyer USS WARRINGTON. Other ships involved are the re-
search vessel ATLANTIS II of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, the
submarine rescue ship USS SUNBIRD, the submarine USS REDFIN, the
POLARIS submarine USS THOMAS JEFFERSON, and the research vessels USNS
GILLISS and USS ROCKVILLE. The destroyer USS THE SULLIVANS will sail
from Newport today for the search area. Captain CD. Brown, USN,
Commander Submarine Squadron EIGHT will sail from Newport later today
in the destroyer USS HISSEM to relieve Captain Andrews as on-scene
commander.
The services of USS REQUISITE as mother ship for a deep-towed
bottom echo sounder will not be required. The device will be install-
ed on the ATLANTIS II at Woods Hole instead. USS PREVAIL will arrive
at Norfolk tomorrow where she will have a deep-towed magnetometer
installed.
The Atomic Energy Commission reports that results of an air sur-
vey are negative for radioactivity in the search area. No further
debris or significant information has been obtained in the search
area.
The bathyscaph TRIESTE departed from San Diego yesterday aboard
the landing ship dock USS POINT DEFIANCE. She is expected off the
New England coast by April 27. The Court of Inquiry headed by Vice







OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Washington 25, D. C.
IMMEDIATE REIEASE April 25, 1963 NO. 582-63
OXford 76161
DEEP SUBMERGENCE SYSTEMS REVIEW GROUP
ESTABLISHED BY NAVY TO STUDY DEEP OCEAN OPERATIONS
(The following information was released in Washington, D.C., at
7:16 P.M. (EST), April 2U 9 1963, by the Department of Defense.)
The immediate establishment of a Deep Submergence Systems Review
Group in the Navy Department was announced today (April 24.) by Secretary
of the Navy Fred Korth.
Rear Admiral E, C. Stephan, USN, Commander of the U. S. Naval
Oceanographic Office and a veteran submariner, has been relieved of all
other responsibilities to serve as chairman of the Group, He will have
a full time staff and will be further assisted by representatives of the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 9 the Office of Naval Research
and the Navy's Bureaus of Medicine and Surgery, Ships, Weapons and Yards
and Docks.
This group, under Admiral Stephan, will review and formalize into
one program all of the Navy's continuing efforts to solve the many
problems presented by deep ocean operations. These efforts include
oceanographic research programs which have been in progress for many years
as well as plans for Deep Research Vehicles which are now ready for
application to operational use.
The immediate objective of the new Group will be to examine the Navy's
plans for the development and procurement of components and systems related
to the location, identification, rescue from and recovery of deep submerged
large bodies from the ocean floor and to recommend a program that will
enhance the effectiveness of such systems. In this connection the Group will
review and formulate recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy and the
Chief of Naval Operations concerned with:
(1) Programs currently underway in Navy bureaus and laboratories for
the location, identification, rescue of personnel and recovery of objects
such as submarines on the ocean floor.
(2) Research^ development and operational projects currently being
carried on in the National Oceanographic Program under the aegis of the
Interagency Committee on Oceanography,
(3) Any novel and alternative instruments and methods suggested by
government agencies, private industry, academic and research institutions or
other agencies which have a bearing on the subject.
MORE Cm3
The group will not directly concern itself with current efforts
involving the USS THRESHER unless requested to do so by the Naval authorities
in charge of the operation.
Admiral Stephan will receive overall policy guidance from the




i'^Iews release issued by the National Broadcasting Company,
April 12, 1963, concerning the evolution of the television report




HERE'S HOW NBC NEWS QUICKL* BUILT ITS TV SPECIAL
ON THE LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE THRESHER
On the night of Wednesday, April 10, the Wavy Department
announced in Washington that the atomic submarine Thresher "ap-
peared to be lost 1' in the Atlantic at a point some 200 miles
east of Boston.
NBC News quickly assigned a group of newsmen throughout the
northeast to cover the story. These were the preliminary moves
that resulted in an hour-long special program the following
night that, with films and live interviews, told the story of the
Thresher's disappearance.
a chronology of these events follows: (all times EST)
1 p.m. --The decision is made firm to televise "The Loss of
the Thresher" at 7*30 p.m. The sponsor, Gulf oil Corporation,
has decided to omit any commercial messages because of the nature
of the program. Producer Chet Hogan, researcher Mona McCormick
and frank kcGee, who will "anchor" the program, have already been
gathering material.
2 p.m.—Associate producer Jerry Jacobs and news editor
Gene Farinet screen films taken by an NBC News cameraman from a
plane flying over the ocean where the sub went down. The NBC
plane was the first on the scene Thursday morning.
2:30 p.m.—Production assistant Marian Eiskamp finishes
typing the "routine" of the show. This is an outline showing





2:35 p .m. --Jacobs and Farinet screen a portion of an ittBC
i\iews special broadcast that dealt with the atomic submarine
George Washington. A segment showing the diving sequence aboard
the George Washington is edited out for use on the night's pro-
gram. The film clip will last 27 seconds.
2:40 p.m.--Hagan calls his wife to tell her he will ba home
late. He tells her about the special program.
2:44 p.m.—Farinet spreads large maps of the northeast coast
on the floor of Hagan's office. They select a map for repro-
duction by visual technicians for use on the program. It will
be seen by viewers for about 20 seconds.
2:50 p.m.--A messenger brings Farinet, Jacobs and unit
manager Frank Badami hot dogs and containers of coffee. McGee
runs out of the office saying he is going to eat. It will be
10 p.m. before they eat again.
3:20 p ,m. --Everyone is typing except Badami, He is talk-
ing long distance with a mobile TV unit being set up at ban
Diego, Calif., where correspondent Jrtoy ^eal will interview an ox-
ficer of the bathyscaph Trieste.
3:40 p.m.--McGee is typing at his desk with long sheets of
copy paper spread out before him. Hagan enters his office and
the two discuss the outline of the show. The pieces begin to
fall into place.
4:30 p .m.--btopwatch in hand, KcGee reads to himself the
script he has written. He yells, "How long is the dive sequence?"





4:35 p.m.--Farinet has located some film of the Trieste.
a messenger has been dispatched to Jersey City to get the film.
He has not returned. Farinet checks and learns the film is en
route.
5:10 p.m. --The film of the Trieste arrives. Portions of
it are germane to the program. It is edited and prepared.
5:37 p.m.--Badami is on the phone talking with Washington
for a remote pickup on corresponaent kartin Agronsky who will
interview Captain James F. Calvert, former skipper of the nu-
clear sub Skate.
5:45 p.m.—The mobile TV unit arrives at i\»ew London, Conn.,
and establishes communications with Badami in i\iew York. Joseph
Michaels will broadcast live from the unit with late word on a
Mavy board of investigation that has been convened.
7:12 p.m. --In the control room, Hagan scans late wire
copy, searching for any late news breaks that will alter the
factual content of his program.
7:13 p.m.—Director Robert Priaulx has alerted directors
at the remote pickup sites.
7:20 p.m.—Badami passes out coffee and cup cakes.
7:24 p.m. --There is difficulty clearing up the vioeo line
to the i\ew London pickup. Within a minute, the line is clear.
7:30 p.m.—.an announcer says: "'Wide Country,' usually
seen at this time . . . M
The next morning, critics praised the show; one writing,
by far the most comprehensive coverage."• • •
QL£X) NBC-New York, 4/12/63
I
APPENDIX C
News release containing the findings of the Court of
Inquiry investigating the loss of Ubb THRiSSHER. Issued in
Washington, D.C. and Boston, Kass, The copy appended was re-
leased by the Public Information Office, First waval bistrict
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PU BL!C INFORMATION OFFICE 20 JUNE 1963
QUARTERS* FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT
496 SUMMER STREET
BOSTON, MASSo
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NATIONAL RELEASE BEING MADE BY OASD (PA) IN WASHINGTON AT
NOON JUNE 20, 1963
QUOTE " A FLOODING CASUALTY IN THE ENGINE ROOM IS BELIEVED TO BE THE "MOST
PROBABLE'' CAUSE OF THE SINKING OF THE NUCLEAR SUBMARINE USS THRESHER, LOST
APRIL 10* 1963* 820 MILES EAST OF CAPE COD . WITH 129 PERSONS AB0ARD o
THE NAVY BELIEVES IT MOST LIKELY THAT A PIPING SYSTEM FAILURE HAD
OCCURRED IN ONE OF THE THRESHERS SAL" TATER SYSTEMS* PROBABLY IN THE ENGINE
ROOMo THE ENORMOUS PRESSURE JER SURROUNDING THE SUBMARINE SUBJECTED
HER INTERIOR TO A VIOLENT SPRaY OF WATER AND PROGRESSIVE FLOODING* IN ALL
PROBABILITY WATER AFFECTED ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS AND CAUSED LOSS OF POWER.
THRESHER SLOWED AND BEGAN TO SINK. WITHIN MOMENTS SHE HAD EXCEEDED HER
COLLAPSE DEPTH AND TOTALLY FLOODED* SHE CAME TO REST ON THE OCEAN FLOOR, 8*400
FEET BENEATH THE SURFACE,,
THIS OPINION OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY WAS MADE PUBLIC TODAY BY SECRETARY
OF TEE NAVY FRED K0RTH o
THE COURT* HEADED BY VICE ADMIRAL BERNARD L. AUSTIN, USN* HEARD TESTIMONY
FROM 120 WITNESSES * BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, DURING THE EIGHT WEEKS IT WAS
IN SESSION AT THE NAVAL SHIPYARD* PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE,, IT RECORDED 1700
PAGES OF TESTIMONY ANir GATHERED FOR THE RECORD SOME 255 CHARTS, DRAWINGS d
LETTERS* PHOTOGRAPHS* DIRECTIVES,DEBRIS AND OTHER EXHIBITS BEARING ON THE SINKING,
THE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT WAS DELIVERED LAST WEEK TO THE CON-
VENING AUTHORITY* AIMIKAL H. PAGE SMITH* USN* COMYANDER-IN-CniEF* U.S ATLANTIC
FLEET* WHO TRANSMITTED IT* WITH HIS COMMENTS* TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVYo
COPIES OF THE BULKY 12=VOLUME RECORD ARE NOW BEING STUDIED IN THE NAVY DEPART-
MENT BY ENGINEERS* DESIGNERS AND EXPERTS IN NUCLEAR SUBMARINE OPERATIONS.
THE COURT DECLARED THAT* IN ITS OPINION* "THE BASIC DE8I0M OF THE THRESHER
CUSS SUBMARINE IS GOOD* AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION HAS RESULTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A HIGH-PERFORMANCE SUBMARINE"
•
THE BULK OF THE COURTIS RECOMMENDATIONS STAGED THE NEED FOR CAREFUL REVIEW
OF THE DESIGN* CONSTRUCTION AND INSPECTION OF VITAL SUBMARINE SYSTEMS* SUCH AS
SEA WATER AND AIR SYSTEMS* AND A REVF^ OF OPERATING PROCEDURES TO IMPROVE
DAMAGE CONTROL CAPABILITY UNIT~ / CONDITIONS SUCH AS FLOODING*,
CERTAIN ACTIONS HAVE ALRL^tu BEEN TAKEN . FOR EXAMPLE* THE NAVY«S BUREAU OF
SHIPS IS APPLYING A NEWLY DEVELOPED INSPECTION TECHNIQUE TO ASSURE THE INTEGRITY
OF HIGH PRESSURE PIPING SYSTEMS ON ALL NAVAL SHIPS » BASED UPON ULTRASONIC PRIN-
CIPLES* THE NEW METHOD IS BEING EMPLOYED INITIALLY ON NUCLEAR SUBMARINES,,
PERSONNEL TRAINING AND ULTRASONIC INSPECTION EQUIPMENT FAMILIARIZATION ARE
NECESSARY AND SOME RESCHEDULING OF SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION DATES AND OVERHAUL
INTERVALS WILL BE REQUIRED.
MUCH OF THE TESTIMONY HEARD BY THE COURT WAS RECEIVED IN CLOSED SESSION AND
ITS OVERALL REPORT IS CLASSIFIED SECRET TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF THE CAPABILITIES
TBE NAVY 9 S NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FORCE* SECRETARY K0RT1 HAS AUTHORIZED THE RELEASE
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